In May 1974, RSS chief Madhukar Dattatraya Deoras spoke at a lecture series in Pune about caste-based discrimination and social equality within the Hindu fold.
SEBI probe concluded that purported loans and fund transfers were paid back in full and did not amount to deceptive market practices or unreported related party transactions.
While the IAF remains committed to the Tejas programme and has placed orders for 180 Tejas Mk1A, the force is eagerly waiting for the Tejas Mk 2 version.
What Munir has achieved with Trump is a return to normal, ironing out the post-Abbottabad crease. The White House picture gives us insight into how Pakistan survives, occasionally thrives and thinks.
I am sorry to read such depressing assessments of the 1999 Kargil War from a general who himself been responsible for equipment, training, deployment and operations throughout his service life.
About initial detection and assessment, has he forgotten the deployment of 3 Infantry Division from Chushul to Dras and beyond? How can one Infantry Brigade with 4 battalions effectively cover approximately 300+km that too in high altitude areas?
Does the general forget the equipment, clothing, rations, communication, etc, in some areas worse than Siachen? Does he remember that lack of equipment and infrastructure, the forward posts were vacated during the onset of extreme winters every year?
I have witnessed death of several soldiers due to extreme cold and snow caused by delayed evacuation in 1995.
Were the senior officers like him sleeping and failed to realise the importance of holding forward posts irrespective of weather?
What happened to the sophisticated R&AW surveillance aircraft that was supposed to keep an eye of the vacated areas along the LOC?
I am surprised to read assessment of situation from a senior and decorated general and others, who failed to bring the situation in the notice of government over several decades.
I am satisfied now that the northern boundaries are sealed shut with troops deployed throughout the year. Why the same was not ensured earlier, the generals and MoD/government must clarify.
‘Armchair reminiscences’ after two decades and ‘a man on the spot’ is like some pilots giving their views on an air crash,…..” if I was in the cockpit I would have blah blah blah blah”.
You can’t give short shrift to somebody who has experience and expertise. He is a distinguished soldier with important insights. There are valuable lessons in every war, even ones you win.
Ravi has rightly pointed it out. Gen Panag was Army Commander of the Northern Command much after the 1999 War. He should have known the history and the reasons of Pakistani infiltration. Why didn’t he and others anticipate such eventualities well in time?
Army battalions in Kargil area were neither equipped nor reinforced to guard the 300+km high mountains. Were the generals sleeping all the time? The regular patrols were reduced by almost 50% due to budget-cuts and unfortunately, the Pak intrusions were exactly where the patrolling was carried out (that too during the summers).
The troops never had special high-altitude and extreme winter clothings as they have their n Siachen.
Weren’t the generals and government supposed to anticipate the likely intrusions?
Great article!!! Basically, worship the God of Preparedness so that we don’t have to call upon the God of Valor…
I am sorry to read such depressing assessments of the 1999 Kargil War from a general who himself been responsible for equipment, training, deployment and operations throughout his service life.
About initial detection and assessment, has he forgotten the deployment of 3 Infantry Division from Chushul to Dras and beyond? How can one Infantry Brigade with 4 battalions effectively cover approximately 300+km that too in high altitude areas?
Does the general forget the equipment, clothing, rations, communication, etc, in some areas worse than Siachen? Does he remember that lack of equipment and infrastructure, the forward posts were vacated during the onset of extreme winters every year?
I have witnessed death of several soldiers due to extreme cold and snow caused by delayed evacuation in 1995.
Were the senior officers like him sleeping and failed to realise the importance of holding forward posts irrespective of weather?
What happened to the sophisticated R&AW surveillance aircraft that was supposed to keep an eye of the vacated areas along the LOC?
I am surprised to read assessment of situation from a senior and decorated general and others, who failed to bring the situation in the notice of government over several decades.
I am satisfied now that the northern boundaries are sealed shut with troops deployed throughout the year. Why the same was not ensured earlier, the generals and MoD/government must clarify.
‘Armchair reminiscences’ after two decades and ‘a man on the spot’ is like some pilots giving their views on an air crash,…..” if I was in the cockpit I would have blah blah blah blah”.
You can’t give short shrift to somebody who has experience and expertise. He is a distinguished soldier with important insights. There are valuable lessons in every war, even ones you win.
Ravi has rightly pointed it out. Gen Panag was Army Commander of the Northern Command much after the 1999 War. He should have known the history and the reasons of Pakistani infiltration. Why didn’t he and others anticipate such eventualities well in time?
Army battalions in Kargil area were neither equipped nor reinforced to guard the 300+km high mountains. Were the generals sleeping all the time? The regular patrols were reduced by almost 50% due to budget-cuts and unfortunately, the Pak intrusions were exactly where the patrolling was carried out (that too during the summers).
The troops never had special high-altitude and extreme winter clothings as they have their n Siachen.
Weren’t the generals and government supposed to anticipate the likely intrusions?