Four broader factors will shape the trajectory of India-Israel relationship. Failure to anticipate these possible unintended consequences now may complicate its future direction.
If there is any country trusted by both sides in Gaza, it is India. While some Arab and Muslim countries are mistrusted by Israel, any Western influence is doubted by Palestinians.
Tel Aviv’s envoy to New Delhi Reuven Azar welcomes international backing for Trump’s peace plan, while asserting Israel has no interest in maintaining a physical presence in Gaza.
Scholar Khinvraj Jangid writes that Ajil Doval’s visit to Israel signals Modi govt's concerns about Israel's actions in Gaza and should be seen as a 'warning call'.
Tower Semiconductor Ltd is seeking government incentives for an 8 billion dollar investment in India to manufacture 65-nanometre and 40-nanometre chips.
Azar has earlier served as head of the Israel-US-China internal task force at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel.
Aluminum prices, already rising before the conflict, have gained further as traders and buyers focus on the potential for tighter markets and shrinking global inventories.
It’s easy to understand why the government can’t speak the hard truth. When this war ends, as all wars do, India’s interests will lie with both the winner and the loser.
One statistic matters a lot. India has Five hundred times as many guest workers in Muslim countries in West Asia as it does in Israel. Sent after 7th October. Israel cannot rival those countries as a source of oil and natural gas for India. Or as an export market for India, barely a couple of billion dollars. Viewed objectively, Israel is a very small part of Indian equities in the Middle East. 2. India is diversifying arms purchases away from Russia. France and Israel, USA are emerging as alternatives. Nothing so special about Israel that it needs to be placed on a pedestal. Sweet talk aside, buyers are spoils for choice in the arms bazaar. 3. No longer the land of Mahatma Gandhi, true. But post Gaza, a sense of discretion in engaging too visibly with Israel would be prudent. That would have a bearing on BRICS and SCO as well.
A more nuanced analysis than this publication typically offers. The regional risk mapping around Gulf rivalries and Iran’s uncertain future is genuinely useful. But a few fundamentals seem to have been overlooked.
Bharat was not dragged into the US-Pak-Afghan quagmire after 9/11. It was not dragged into Russia-Ukraine. It has consistently maintained a peace-seeking posture while major powers played their games around it. This institutional wisdom didn’t develop accidentally — it was earned over 75 years of sophisticated navigation. So the implicit assumption that Bharat might suddenly lose this compass while deepening ties with Israel deserves some scrutiny.
The author also sidesteps a question of reciprocity that matters enormously. During Kargil, Israel delivered — weapons, intelligence, no hesitation. The Gulf states the author worries about Bharat alienating? Considerably less helpful when it actually counted. Strategic partnerships are built on such moments, not just on shared commercial interests.
On Palestine, Bharat has given far more than it has received — decades of aid, diplomatic solidarity, and vocal support. Their reciprocity on Kashmir for Bharat has been either Zero or underwhelming at best. This asymmetry deserves acknowledgment when weighing how much India owes to that relationship versus its relationship with Israel.
The multi-alignment concern is also somewhat misplaced. Bharat was practicing multi-alignment long before it became fashionable — buying Soviet weapons while engaging Washington, cultivating Iran while building Gulf partnerships. Non-Alignment was always the label; multi-alignment was always the operational reality.
The author’s caution is not wrong. But a nation that has navigated 75 years of great power rivalries without being consumed by them has more than earned the benefit of the doubt
One statistic matters a lot. India has Five hundred times as many guest workers in Muslim countries in West Asia as it does in Israel. Sent after 7th October. Israel cannot rival those countries as a source of oil and natural gas for India. Or as an export market for India, barely a couple of billion dollars. Viewed objectively, Israel is a very small part of Indian equities in the Middle East. 2. India is diversifying arms purchases away from Russia. France and Israel, USA are emerging as alternatives. Nothing so special about Israel that it needs to be placed on a pedestal. Sweet talk aside, buyers are spoils for choice in the arms bazaar. 3. No longer the land of Mahatma Gandhi, true. But post Gaza, a sense of discretion in engaging too visibly with Israel would be prudent. That would have a bearing on BRICS and SCO as well.
A more nuanced analysis than this publication typically offers. The regional risk mapping around Gulf rivalries and Iran’s uncertain future is genuinely useful. But a few fundamentals seem to have been overlooked.
Bharat was not dragged into the US-Pak-Afghan quagmire after 9/11. It was not dragged into Russia-Ukraine. It has consistently maintained a peace-seeking posture while major powers played their games around it. This institutional wisdom didn’t develop accidentally — it was earned over 75 years of sophisticated navigation. So the implicit assumption that Bharat might suddenly lose this compass while deepening ties with Israel deserves some scrutiny.
The author also sidesteps a question of reciprocity that matters enormously. During Kargil, Israel delivered — weapons, intelligence, no hesitation. The Gulf states the author worries about Bharat alienating? Considerably less helpful when it actually counted. Strategic partnerships are built on such moments, not just on shared commercial interests.
On Palestine, Bharat has given far more than it has received — decades of aid, diplomatic solidarity, and vocal support. Their reciprocity on Kashmir for Bharat has been either Zero or underwhelming at best. This asymmetry deserves acknowledgment when weighing how much India owes to that relationship versus its relationship with Israel.
The multi-alignment concern is also somewhat misplaced. Bharat was practicing multi-alignment long before it became fashionable — buying Soviet weapons while engaging Washington, cultivating Iran while building Gulf partnerships. Non-Alignment was always the label; multi-alignment was always the operational reality.
The author’s caution is not wrong. But a nation that has navigated 75 years of great power rivalries without being consumed by them has more than earned the benefit of the doubt