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There are no short-term solutions for increasing defence pensions. It is a political challenge that the National Security Council must holistically examine.
Bipin Rawat said those below officers’ rank in the military are sent home at the age of 37-38 and they are forced to look for a job, which may not be dignified for them.
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ABWs with lack of critical spares, lack of funds for modernization, not consulting EME from beginning of the weapon / platform Procurement process, and then not understanding these root causes by MGO upwards are the core issues. EME has always delivered in war and peace, and will continue to excel – trust them, support them, and you will not repent ever. GOCO hasn’t succeeded in other nations with better legal systems, conscription and Military industrial bases – not sure what gives you the confidence that it will be successful in India. Relook inwards and see what the GS has /has not done to help improve captive MRO capabilities. IAF and IN have a culture of ownership of these establishments, unfortunately IA seldom discusses and understands MRO.
Goco is not gonna work and will be costlier too. The private players don’t have experience in dealing with military equipment for repairs and overhaul. Work culture in the need of war like EME can never be adapted by private giants and we all know how responsible will they be for equipment failure?
To remove corruption in procurement of spare parts basically the quality and trained menpower where the specialized person in grouping policy can give better results.
Article written by a retd general who I am sure has not in his life visited a base workshop, the only problem which the base wksp face are majorly of spares, corportise the spares part everything else to incl infra, skills and leadership is on par.
Most of these articles are written for public consumption, by Rtd Infantry Generals, who are not Engineers, or don’t listen to Technical advises of senior EME officers.
With the advent of technologies, and future warfares will be computer based,digitised, it is high time, Engineers are inducted and trained to handle,maintain,repair,refurbish, recondition,cannibalisation techniques.
It is also not ot out of place to ask,,why the method now being suggested by the Rtd LtGeneral, was not implemented while he was in service?
Sir, as per ABW manpower consult they systematic suffering with the over burden of staff, line and axillary type employees.
It mean less Technician or more supporting force applied for the same.
We do not have to take the costlier option of GOCO to bring in efficiencies in Army Base workshops, and that too, after eroding inherent capabilities of Armed Forces, it can easily be done at a much lesser cost by infusing some funds for upgrading infrastructure and revamping/ outsourcing spares provisioning. This way , Indian Army retains its core strengths of engineering support too ..
GOCO is another avenue for large number of offrs to get re employment on retirement. Two offrs who are driving for implementation of GOCO will retire in next one year and have already booked a slot with industry for their job
Unfortunately in Indian Army the maintenance agency is not consulted on any decision. The decision are taken by offrs who have no idea about MRO. Once GOCO fails you can’t recreate Base wksp overnight. What about the skill levels of combatants. From where we will get it overnight. The IAF and IN have their own in house MRO facilities including refit. Why no GOCO for them? It is because in IAF and IN thr maint are headed by engineers and not by Gen cadre offrs.
Why not implement the same for the OFs first which have been lacking in timely provisioning of critical spares on a quarterly basis and thus forcing the workshops to either hunt for new suppliers which have MOQ issues else inflated spares supply in terms of time and cost.
Skillset is the prime weapon in the hands of these workshops which are in addn an excellent platform for the field army to help them in undertaking critical repair being an internal part of the repair eco system.
It’s first imp to fight the root cause of such delay in OHS rather than improvising a new system without knowing pros n cons n later adding a liability for the forces.
Ground realities are always different from bookish knowledge.
In the Indian conditions of high entropy, privatisation of system readiness is not advisable. As and when weapons get manufactured in the private sector, DLevel may be taken up by them. It is important to sort out the root cause of the problem which is plant readiness and supply of spares as overhaul kits. If these two core issues are taken up by the private sector in a collaborative spirit, the ABWs can get back to force regeneration as usual. GOCO has been a NO GO in most countries, its success in indigenous conditions of profiteering, corruption, trust deficit and military careerism is impossible. Once Army’s skills and competencies fade away, the reman cost by private sector will put the budget in a tailspin. Today the ABWs are an important lever of Engineering support even for front line troops besides providing an avenue for skill development of EME’s combatant workforce. Unreliable, malfunctioning weapons of any arm will only add to the vulnerabilities of the Infantryman. A pragmatic, graduated approach is called for.
L&T and TATA have successfullythe manufactured a number of weapon systems duly employing a number of retired service officers
ABWs have tremendous potential but are under utilised
They have stood the test of the times and have been a life line for field army
Army is unable to exploit their potential due to inherent spare problem and lack of support from top leadership for modernization
GOCO is worth implementation as a pilot project.
ABWs with lack of critical spares, lack of funds for modernization, not consulting EME from beginning of the weapon / platform Procurement process, and then not understanding these root causes by MGO upwards are the core issues. EME has always delivered in war and peace, and will continue to excel – trust them, support them, and you will not repent ever. GOCO hasn’t succeeded in other nations with better legal systems, conscription and Military industrial bases – not sure what gives you the confidence that it will be successful in India. Relook inwards and see what the GS has /has not done to help improve captive MRO capabilities. IAF and IN have a culture of ownership of these establishments, unfortunately IA seldom discusses and understands MRO.
Now technology is use and throw hence maintenance period is very less hence GOCO will work….
Goco is not gonna work and will be costlier too. The private players don’t have experience in dealing with military equipment for repairs and overhaul. Work culture in the need of war like EME can never be adapted by private giants and we all know how responsible will they be for equipment failure?
To remove corruption in procurement of spare parts basically the quality and trained menpower where the specialized person in grouping policy can give better results.
Article written by a retd general who I am sure has not in his life visited a base workshop, the only problem which the base wksp face are majorly of spares, corportise the spares part everything else to incl infra, skills and leadership is on par.
Army
Most of these articles are written for public consumption, by Rtd Infantry Generals, who are not Engineers, or don’t listen to Technical advises of senior EME officers.
With the advent of technologies, and future warfares will be computer based,digitised, it is high time, Engineers are inducted and trained to handle,maintain,repair,refurbish, recondition,cannibalisation techniques.
It is also not ot out of place to ask,,why the method now being suggested by the Rtd LtGeneral, was not implemented while he was in service?
Sir, as per ABW manpower consult they systematic suffering with the over burden of staff, line and axillary type employees.
It mean less Technician or more supporting force applied for the same.
We do not have to take the costlier option of GOCO to bring in efficiencies in Army Base workshops, and that too, after eroding inherent capabilities of Armed Forces, it can easily be done at a much lesser cost by infusing some funds for upgrading infrastructure and revamping/ outsourcing spares provisioning. This way , Indian Army retains its core strengths of engineering support too ..
GOCO is another avenue for large number of offrs to get re employment on retirement. Two offrs who are driving for implementation of GOCO will retire in next one year and have already booked a slot with industry for their job
Unfortunately in Indian Army the maintenance agency is not consulted on any decision. The decision are taken by offrs who have no idea about MRO. Once GOCO fails you can’t recreate Base wksp overnight. What about the skill levels of combatants. From where we will get it overnight. The IAF and IN have their own in house MRO facilities including refit. Why no GOCO for them? It is because in IAF and IN thr maint are headed by engineers and not by Gen cadre offrs.
Why not implement the same for the OFs first which have been lacking in timely provisioning of critical spares on a quarterly basis and thus forcing the workshops to either hunt for new suppliers which have MOQ issues else inflated spares supply in terms of time and cost.
Skillset is the prime weapon in the hands of these workshops which are in addn an excellent platform for the field army to help them in undertaking critical repair being an internal part of the repair eco system.
It’s first imp to fight the root cause of such delay in OHS rather than improvising a new system without knowing pros n cons n later adding a liability for the forces.
Ground realities are always different from bookish knowledge.
There is rampant corruption in this workshops, that’s the reason why this guy’s are resisting privatization..
In the Indian conditions of high entropy, privatisation of system readiness is not advisable. As and when weapons get manufactured in the private sector, DLevel may be taken up by them. It is important to sort out the root cause of the problem which is plant readiness and supply of spares as overhaul kits. If these two core issues are taken up by the private sector in a collaborative spirit, the ABWs can get back to force regeneration as usual. GOCO has been a NO GO in most countries, its success in indigenous conditions of profiteering, corruption, trust deficit and military careerism is impossible. Once Army’s skills and competencies fade away, the reman cost by private sector will put the budget in a tailspin. Today the ABWs are an important lever of Engineering support even for front line troops besides providing an avenue for skill development of EME’s combatant workforce. Unreliable, malfunctioning weapons of any arm will only add to the vulnerabilities of the Infantryman. A pragmatic, graduated approach is called for.