Dhoni's gloves, in the cricket World Cup match against South Africa, had the Balidan, the regimental dagger insignia of the Indian Para Special Forces.
New order sets price cap for cars that can be bought by armed forces from subsidised canteens. Many see this as ‘ill-treatment’ while jokes target military brass.
Alongside buying into the grift that is dating apps, the girlies are also installing astrology apps like Astrotalk to investigate the same tired mystery—will he ever text back?
Aquaculture is the fastest growing food sector in Africa, offering significant returns on investment for all involved and achieving the continent’s goals for food security, dignified livelihoods and economic growth.
Bihar is blessed with a land more fertile for revolutions than any in India. Why has it fallen so far behind then? Constant obsession with politics is at the root of its destruction.
While everyone is sort of gungho on the announcement of the long promised CDS finally seeing the light of the day. However no one is questioning the role, scope and mandate of this CDS.
In the Western concept as with some regional powers that follow the CDS concept, the CDS or Chairman Joint Chiefs is an Operational Cdr who runs the operations, whereas the Service Chiefs are Staff appointments, with a mandate of “Man, Equip and Train” their respective Service. In our context, the Operational Cmd of the Services is still with the Service Chiefs, so what would the CDS do……..presumably, he will continue to do the same job as the CISC, albeit with a glorified designation.
Similarly, with the Theatre Commands; both the General and some wise people who have commented have assumed that just because China has implemented the TC concept, we should follow suit. Again, what are the broad framework for this and do we have the same numbers / capacity / Resources as China or USA to implement this. Secondly, the Chinese Theatre opposite us covers the entire geographical extent and hence qualifies as a Theatre. Whereas, in whatever writings that are avbl in the open media, the Indian Army wants to have two or three Theatres opposite the same. The very idea goes against the concept of effi6that a Theatre is supposed to generate. Lastly, a Theatre Cdr (as with the ComCom in USA) is expected to report directly to the Chief Executive through the Def Min. In our case, will the Theatre Cdr report to the RM bypassing the Chiefs, and if so who will provide the single point input to RM since the CDS has neither an Operational mandate or the Op Staff to evaluate.
If the chain of the Theatre Cdr is going to be through the Service Chiefs, then the whole purpose is defeated.
It’s good to dream big but for all big dreams, a lot if groundwork is needed. Something our pseudo Strategist lobby might like to do before penning far fetched ideas.
While everyone is sort of gunshot on the announcement of the long promised CDS finally seeing the light of the day. However no one is questioning the role, scope and mandate of this CDS.
In the Western concept as with some regional powers that follow the CDS concept, the CDS or Chairman Joint Chiefs is an Operational Cdr who runs the operations, whereas the Service Chiefs are Staff appointments, with a mandate of “Man, Equip and Train” their respective Service. In our context, the Operational Cmd of the Services is still with the Service Chiefs, so what would the CDS do……..presumably, he will continue to do the same job as the CISC, albeit with a glorified designation.
Similarly, with the Theatre Commands; both the General and some wise people who have commented have assumed that just because China has implemented the TC concept, we should follow suit. Again, what are the broad framework for this and do we have the same numbers / capacity / Resources as China or USA to implement this. Secondly, the Chinese Theatre opposite us covers the entire geographical extent and hence qualifies as a Theatre. Whereas, in whatever writings that are avbl in the open media, the Indian Army wants to have two or three Theatres opposite the same. The very idea goes against the concept of effi6that a Theatre is supposed to generate. Lastly, a Theatre Cdr (as with the ComCom in USA) is expected to report directly to the Chief Executive through the Def Min. In our case, will the Theatre Cdr report to the RM bypassing the Chiefs, and if so who will provide the single point input to RM since the CDS has neither an Operational mandate or the Op Staff to evaluate.
If the chain of the Theatre Cdr is going to be through the Service Chiefs, then the whole purpose is defeated.
It’s good to dream big but for all big dreams, a lot if groundwork is needed. Something our pseudo Strategist lobby might like to do before penning far fetched ideas.
You speak of the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the Chief of Defence Staff is equivalent in rank to the permanent under secretary of defence( the administrative head of the UK defence ministry and equivalent to the Indian Defence secretary). The three service chiefs rank below the permanent undersecretary of defence in an established mechanism which reflects civilian control of the military. Now the 3 service chiefs got upgraded to the status of cabinet secretary in India by charming Indira Gandhi. Will they accept a lower rank in order to have a CDS? 😀
Would respectfully request senior retired officers such as yourself to publish the whole picture and not just half of it!
The E India army was constantly at war and and this continues after 1857 when the Indian army was controlled by the crown we had the constant frontier wars. Over this time the civilian administration of the Indian army was streamlined and adjusted to the requirements of perpetual war. Over two centuries the army evolved into a magnificent institution fully complemented with the civil administration. This process did not happen overnight but was a slow evolutionary process, the army constantly reacting to its fighting environment, adjusting and improving.
The army of Robert Clive and Lord Cornwallis, reformed by now forgotten Commanders like Gen Hugh Rose, led Lord Kitchener and Auchinleck , with its proud regimental traditions ethos and structure was handed over lock stock and barrel to the bureaucracy of Sardar Patel.
Over seventy years of Azadi this Rolls Royce of a machine the Indian Army, has come to be driven by drivers of the bullock cart. Today the Hindutva screaming baying mob from Nagpur have infiltrated our officer corps and many in senior command.
Well it’s finally happened! The House that Jack built over three hundred years has finally come to ruination. Defeat in war will be the sharp shock.
A great impediment to the creation of a CDS and theater commands is inter-service rivalry, not just the timidity or disinterest of the political class or the machinations of the bureaucracy. A reason for this is the status-obsession of the higher echelons of the army, which is repugnant to the air force in particular. It could be said that after Pakistan and China, the biggest enemy of the Indian Army is the Indian bureaucracy, followed closely by the Indian Air Force! Neither do the top brass in any service – with the slight exception of the navy – show the intellectual capacity to innovate, evolve joint doctrines, build a vision around indigenous armament development and so on. On the other hand we see a great many turf wars – for instance over which service will fly the Apache attack helicopters and so on; rejection of indigenous hardware like the Arjun tank or Tejas aircraft; gripes about the delays in procurement, the lethargy of the DRDO and so on; but we see little ‘leadership’ in the true sense of carrying all disparate institutions together. Time and again we have been caught lacking the requisite military capability when we badly needed it, for example after 26/11 or during Kargil when we should have exploited Pakistan’s violation of the LOC to strike into PoK and recover some territory we call our own but have done nothing to recover. I wonder how much of this quest for the elusive CDS is about truly integrating defense preparedness, and how much is merely a desire to get an extra pip on the shoulder and move up the order of precedence. PM Modi has strengthened Mr. Doval’s position as the NSA because the latter shows the clear-eyed killer instinct and strategic thinking that the PM himself has, combined with deep experience of the shadow war that India has long fought with Pakistan and China; and partly because PM Modi’s style is to delegate key areas such as security, economics and party political management each to a closely trusted member of his core team. No CDS can replace that unless he has the trust of the PM and the competence to truly fill the role. The brass of the armed forces will have to earn the role if they covet it.
The threatened coup by then Chief of Army Staff , Gen V.K. Singh, over his birth certificate, is reason enough to avoid concentration of power in any one person. Also let us not forget the mutiny of Sikh soldiers after Operation Blue Star.
There is an integrated command for the Andaman Islands. One could have a similar system for the Northern, Western, Eastern and Southern Commands.
However, I agree with the General about the choice of a Defence Minister. When Parrikar was packed off to Goa we did not have a full time Defence Minister for about six months. Later I was shocked at the appointment of Nirmala Sitaraman as the Defence Minister. Fortunately Rajnath Singh is a better choice.
As for Doval, the master spy, he was earlier described as the most powerful man in India, after the PM. He is a matter of grave concern, with his penchant for “surgical strikes”.
There has been a marked deterioration in the quality of the top brass, especially the army chiefs. General V K Singh’s sorry display over his date of birth is a good example; as is the public display of bad blood between him and General Suhag and the tales we heard about the machinations from the time of General Kapoor over succession in the army. Compare that to the likes of Gen Manekshaw who had the courage to read the rule book to defense minister Krishna Menon and the wit to resist PM Indira Gandhi’s pressure to launch the war in 1971 until the armed forces were fully prepared. The armed forces have a lot to do in terms of again developing true leadership and promoting meritocracy.
Mr Ajai Singh Commentator – the young RSS Prachark earned his first spurs early by helping organise the Mill workers in Ahmedabad and polarising the vote by instigating the 1969 Gujarat riot not to be confused with the later 2002 riot.
As organiser under Advani the Pracharak played a pivotal role in organising the Rath Yatra which toured the country followed by baying mobs spreading hatred which led to the demolition of the Babri mosque.
This is all part of the historical record.
I write this because you are mistaken the Prachark is neither a military genius or a strategist.
The Parcharak is no doubt gifted on methods to garner the vote, but has not much formal education, has a distorted view of history and is ignorant of what the Indian Army is about.
And You are wrong Sam Manekshaw never stood up to Krishna Menon, I doubt if he ever knew Menon. The person he stood up to was Jagivan Ram whom he first met in Fort William, Calcutta in 1969 when Sam was GOC Eastern Command. Menon and Nehru were in an entirely different league to Sam Manekshaw.
Sam Manekshaw although some people of the hindu faith are making him into a deity, was a self serving ambitious officer and a show off, his contemporaries were just as good as him, many of them had fought in the jungles of Burma and all of them got accelerated promotion when the British left India. Some of them like Sam being Anglicised held the pidgin English speaking Indian politician in contempt. Certainly Sam Manekshaw would have held the Pracharak in contempt along with your hero Doval.
Today batches of Generals join on retirement the BJP, some have been sworn in by a serving BJP defence minister, these are suspected RSS members, Generals like VK Singh and ilk whom you are critical of, are like yourself big fans of Modi and Doval.
I think winning in 2019 on the national security plank – amidst so much economic gloom – was a flash in the pan, the bolt of lightning that does not strike the same spot twice. Pakistan is small potatoes, and no sane person is predicting a war with China. So national security does not really keep the political class up at night. If CDS had been a wonderful, transformative idea, it would have got done soon after Kargil. Since then, more than this potentially five star post, what a India has missed is not having a series of stellar Raksha Mantris.
While everyone is sort of gungho on the announcement of the long promised CDS finally seeing the light of the day. However no one is questioning the role, scope and mandate of this CDS.
In the Western concept as with some regional powers that follow the CDS concept, the CDS or Chairman Joint Chiefs is an Operational Cdr who runs the operations, whereas the Service Chiefs are Staff appointments, with a mandate of “Man, Equip and Train” their respective Service. In our context, the Operational Cmd of the Services is still with the Service Chiefs, so what would the CDS do……..presumably, he will continue to do the same job as the CISC, albeit with a glorified designation.
Similarly, with the Theatre Commands; both the General and some wise people who have commented have assumed that just because China has implemented the TC concept, we should follow suit. Again, what are the broad framework for this and do we have the same numbers / capacity / Resources as China or USA to implement this. Secondly, the Chinese Theatre opposite us covers the entire geographical extent and hence qualifies as a Theatre. Whereas, in whatever writings that are avbl in the open media, the Indian Army wants to have two or three Theatres opposite the same. The very idea goes against the concept of effi6that a Theatre is supposed to generate. Lastly, a Theatre Cdr (as with the ComCom in USA) is expected to report directly to the Chief Executive through the Def Min. In our case, will the Theatre Cdr report to the RM bypassing the Chiefs, and if so who will provide the single point input to RM since the CDS has neither an Operational mandate or the Op Staff to evaluate.
If the chain of the Theatre Cdr is going to be through the Service Chiefs, then the whole purpose is defeated.
It’s good to dream big but for all big dreams, a lot if groundwork is needed. Something our pseudo Strategist lobby might like to do before penning far fetched ideas.
While everyone is sort of gunshot on the announcement of the long promised CDS finally seeing the light of the day. However no one is questioning the role, scope and mandate of this CDS.
In the Western concept as with some regional powers that follow the CDS concept, the CDS or Chairman Joint Chiefs is an Operational Cdr who runs the operations, whereas the Service Chiefs are Staff appointments, with a mandate of “Man, Equip and Train” their respective Service. In our context, the Operational Cmd of the Services is still with the Service Chiefs, so what would the CDS do……..presumably, he will continue to do the same job as the CISC, albeit with a glorified designation.
Similarly, with the Theatre Commands; both the General and some wise people who have commented have assumed that just because China has implemented the TC concept, we should follow suit. Again, what are the broad framework for this and do we have the same numbers / capacity / Resources as China or USA to implement this. Secondly, the Chinese Theatre opposite us covers the entire geographical extent and hence qualifies as a Theatre. Whereas, in whatever writings that are avbl in the open media, the Indian Army wants to have two or three Theatres opposite the same. The very idea goes against the concept of effi6that a Theatre is supposed to generate. Lastly, a Theatre Cdr (as with the ComCom in USA) is expected to report directly to the Chief Executive through the Def Min. In our case, will the Theatre Cdr report to the RM bypassing the Chiefs, and if so who will provide the single point input to RM since the CDS has neither an Operational mandate or the Op Staff to evaluate.
If the chain of the Theatre Cdr is going to be through the Service Chiefs, then the whole purpose is defeated.
It’s good to dream big but for all big dreams, a lot if groundwork is needed. Something our pseudo Strategist lobby might like to do before penning far fetched ideas.
You speak of the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the Chief of Defence Staff is equivalent in rank to the permanent under secretary of defence( the administrative head of the UK defence ministry and equivalent to the Indian Defence secretary). The three service chiefs rank below the permanent undersecretary of defence in an established mechanism which reflects civilian control of the military. Now the 3 service chiefs got upgraded to the status of cabinet secretary in India by charming Indira Gandhi. Will they accept a lower rank in order to have a CDS? 😀
Would respectfully request senior retired officers such as yourself to publish the whole picture and not just half of it!
The E India army was constantly at war and and this continues after 1857 when the Indian army was controlled by the crown we had the constant frontier wars. Over this time the civilian administration of the Indian army was streamlined and adjusted to the requirements of perpetual war. Over two centuries the army evolved into a magnificent institution fully complemented with the civil administration. This process did not happen overnight but was a slow evolutionary process, the army constantly reacting to its fighting environment, adjusting and improving.
The army of Robert Clive and Lord Cornwallis, reformed by now forgotten Commanders like Gen Hugh Rose, led Lord Kitchener and Auchinleck , with its proud regimental traditions ethos and structure was handed over lock stock and barrel to the bureaucracy of Sardar Patel.
Over seventy years of Azadi this Rolls Royce of a machine the Indian Army, has come to be driven by drivers of the bullock cart. Today the Hindutva screaming baying mob from Nagpur have infiltrated our officer corps and many in senior command.
Well it’s finally happened! The House that Jack built over three hundred years has finally come to ruination. Defeat in war will be the sharp shock.
A great impediment to the creation of a CDS and theater commands is inter-service rivalry, not just the timidity or disinterest of the political class or the machinations of the bureaucracy. A reason for this is the status-obsession of the higher echelons of the army, which is repugnant to the air force in particular. It could be said that after Pakistan and China, the biggest enemy of the Indian Army is the Indian bureaucracy, followed closely by the Indian Air Force! Neither do the top brass in any service – with the slight exception of the navy – show the intellectual capacity to innovate, evolve joint doctrines, build a vision around indigenous armament development and so on. On the other hand we see a great many turf wars – for instance over which service will fly the Apache attack helicopters and so on; rejection of indigenous hardware like the Arjun tank or Tejas aircraft; gripes about the delays in procurement, the lethargy of the DRDO and so on; but we see little ‘leadership’ in the true sense of carrying all disparate institutions together. Time and again we have been caught lacking the requisite military capability when we badly needed it, for example after 26/11 or during Kargil when we should have exploited Pakistan’s violation of the LOC to strike into PoK and recover some territory we call our own but have done nothing to recover. I wonder how much of this quest for the elusive CDS is about truly integrating defense preparedness, and how much is merely a desire to get an extra pip on the shoulder and move up the order of precedence. PM Modi has strengthened Mr. Doval’s position as the NSA because the latter shows the clear-eyed killer instinct and strategic thinking that the PM himself has, combined with deep experience of the shadow war that India has long fought with Pakistan and China; and partly because PM Modi’s style is to delegate key areas such as security, economics and party political management each to a closely trusted member of his core team. No CDS can replace that unless he has the trust of the PM and the competence to truly fill the role. The brass of the armed forces will have to earn the role if they covet it.
The threatened coup by then Chief of Army Staff , Gen V.K. Singh, over his birth certificate, is reason enough to avoid concentration of power in any one person. Also let us not forget the mutiny of Sikh soldiers after Operation Blue Star.
There is an integrated command for the Andaman Islands. One could have a similar system for the Northern, Western, Eastern and Southern Commands.
However, I agree with the General about the choice of a Defence Minister. When Parrikar was packed off to Goa we did not have a full time Defence Minister for about six months. Later I was shocked at the appointment of Nirmala Sitaraman as the Defence Minister. Fortunately Rajnath Singh is a better choice.
As for Doval, the master spy, he was earlier described as the most powerful man in India, after the PM. He is a matter of grave concern, with his penchant for “surgical strikes”.
There has been a marked deterioration in the quality of the top brass, especially the army chiefs. General V K Singh’s sorry display over his date of birth is a good example; as is the public display of bad blood between him and General Suhag and the tales we heard about the machinations from the time of General Kapoor over succession in the army. Compare that to the likes of Gen Manekshaw who had the courage to read the rule book to defense minister Krishna Menon and the wit to resist PM Indira Gandhi’s pressure to launch the war in 1971 until the armed forces were fully prepared. The armed forces have a lot to do in terms of again developing true leadership and promoting meritocracy.
Mr Ajai Singh Commentator – the young RSS Prachark earned his first spurs early by helping organise the Mill workers in Ahmedabad and polarising the vote by instigating the 1969 Gujarat riot not to be confused with the later 2002 riot.
As organiser under Advani the Pracharak played a pivotal role in organising the Rath Yatra which toured the country followed by baying mobs spreading hatred which led to the demolition of the Babri mosque.
This is all part of the historical record.
I write this because you are mistaken the Prachark is neither a military genius or a strategist.
The Parcharak is no doubt gifted on methods to garner the vote, but has not much formal education, has a distorted view of history and is ignorant of what the Indian Army is about.
And You are wrong Sam Manekshaw never stood up to Krishna Menon, I doubt if he ever knew Menon. The person he stood up to was Jagivan Ram whom he first met in Fort William, Calcutta in 1969 when Sam was GOC Eastern Command. Menon and Nehru were in an entirely different league to Sam Manekshaw.
Sam Manekshaw although some people of the hindu faith are making him into a deity, was a self serving ambitious officer and a show off, his contemporaries were just as good as him, many of them had fought in the jungles of Burma and all of them got accelerated promotion when the British left India. Some of them like Sam being Anglicised held the pidgin English speaking Indian politician in contempt. Certainly Sam Manekshaw would have held the Pracharak in contempt along with your hero Doval.
Today batches of Generals join on retirement the BJP, some have been sworn in by a serving BJP defence minister, these are suspected RSS members, Generals like VK Singh and ilk whom you are critical of, are like yourself big fans of Modi and Doval.
I think winning in 2019 on the national security plank – amidst so much economic gloom – was a flash in the pan, the bolt of lightning that does not strike the same spot twice. Pakistan is small potatoes, and no sane person is predicting a war with China. So national security does not really keep the political class up at night. If CDS had been a wonderful, transformative idea, it would have got done soon after Kargil. Since then, more than this potentially five star post, what a India has missed is not having a series of stellar Raksha Mantris.