Military reforms in many countries are inspired by the US’s Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 (GNA). For some, the Act is a gold standard for military reforms.
The Nirouyeh Vijeh Pasdaran Velayat, or NOPO, was the only force Ali Khamenei trusted.It was founded in 1991 and is more feared than the Revolutionary Guards.
Rating democracies is a tricky business. I am only using the simple metric of who in the Indian subcontinent has had the most peaceful, stable, normal political transitions and continuity.
AFAIK, even in Operation Sindoor, IAF had to face damages to its assets initially, because of artificially imposed restrictions by political executive ( Limited mandate to strike and destroy terrorist infrastructure was found to be limiting as PAF responded by an all out strike). Only when the political mandate unshackled the Indian armed forces that the indian fortune changed. So yes battlefield fluidity demands equal flexibility from political establishment.
What is expected is jointness of force. Airforce is hampered by reduction in force levels from sanctioned levels which itself was designed for 1.5 war fronts, not the 2.5 fronts which we face. Further distributing the IAF assets among theatres will result in diluting Air force till it no longer remains a force.
Same is true for our minimal Sea force levels. In the Andaman and Nicobar Command where the case for theaterization will help the indian navy achieve blue water navy capability of simultaneously defending entire IOR and the trade passing through it.
As a civilian it is clear to me that navy assets deployed over the himalyas was the clearest demonstration of jointness which India needs.
Nato must scale up by investing 4% in defence capabilities and we are a developing country, we make do with 2.6%. This paucity of resource is the gorilla in the room that needs addressing beyond theaterization.
Pak and china are not threats but challenges we must rise to and acquire force levels commensurate with increasing economic stature.
We must be atmanirbhar this vijaydashmi or else the demons of pak china america external hand and color revolutions will keep scaring us.
AFAIK, even in Operation Sindoor, IAF had to face damages to its assets initially, because of artificially imposed restrictions by political executive ( Limited mandate to strike and destroy terrorist infrastructure was found to be limiting as PAF responded by an all out strike). Only when the political mandate unshackled the Indian armed forces that the indian fortune changed. So yes battlefield fluidity demands equal flexibility from political establishment.
What is expected is jointness of force. Airforce is hampered by reduction in force levels from sanctioned levels which itself was designed for 1.5 war fronts, not the 2.5 fronts which we face. Further distributing the IAF assets among theatres will result in diluting Air force till it no longer remains a force.
Same is true for our minimal Sea force levels. In the Andaman and Nicobar Command where the case for theaterization will help the indian navy achieve blue water navy capability of simultaneously defending entire IOR and the trade passing through it.
As a civilian it is clear to me that navy assets deployed over the himalyas was the clearest demonstration of jointness which India needs.
Nato must scale up by investing 4% in defence capabilities and we are a developing country, we make do with 2.6%. This paucity of resource is the gorilla in the room that needs addressing beyond theaterization.
Pak and china are not threats but challenges we must rise to and acquire force levels commensurate with increasing economic stature.
We must be atmanirbhar this vijaydashmi or else the demons of pak china america external hand and color revolutions will keep scaring us.