The sobering reality is that nuclear danger has not gone away. Regional deterrence relationships are being tested by border tensions and military modernisation of adversaries.
Deterrence and punishment depend on psychologically impacting those we are trying to influence. The problem is that we cannot know with certainty how much damage needs to be caused.
On 30 October 1979, political scientist PG Mavalankar delivered an address at the 14th AD Shroff Memorial Lecture in Bombay, outlining the roles and responsibilities of intellectuals in society.
The concern is not that 2025’s rally was irrational, but that it may be difficult to repeat. Outlooks remain anchored to AI investment and growth without reigniting inflation.
If deal goes through, Greece will be 2nd foreign country to procure vehicle. Morocco was first; TATA Group has set up manufacturing unit there with minimum 30 percent indigenous content.
Many of you might think I got something so wrong in National Interest pieces written this year. I might disagree! But some deserve a Mea Culpa. I’d deal with the most recent this week.
I pray Alisha gives her analysis specifically with regard to the edgy state that exists between India and Pakistan.
These are two ever-hostile neighbouring/adjoining nations which share a long border. The available nuclear-attack reaction times were always short. I understand that the time needed for a hypersonic missile to fly between even the farthest regions of the two countries could be as short as 40 minutes.
The window of 15-20 minutes never afforded much time for perplexed confabulation. As per my limited knowledge, a bunch of geriatrics who comprise a committe will need to be woken up and persuaded to attend a meeting at the PM’s residence for a decision to be made regarding India’s nuclear (second strike) response, when it is needed.
Frankly, agonizing over the ever-shortening notice periods available for the rest of us to act before our vaporization occurs seems moot.
Nevertheless….
How has Pakistan’s reliance upon a nuclear stockpile which (primarily) comprises tactical nuclear warheads influenced the nuclear war threshold existing between the two countries? Did Pakistan miscalculate (from its brinksmanship perspective) and end up raising the nuclear threshold, thereby permitting India to indulge further in conventional military aggression than is otherwise possible?
What are the author’s observations from Operation Sindoor?
Timely article by Alisha. Refreshing.
I pray Alisha gives her analysis specifically with regard to the edgy state that exists between India and Pakistan.
These are two ever-hostile neighbouring/adjoining nations which share a long border. The available nuclear-attack reaction times were always short. I understand that the time needed for a hypersonic missile to fly between even the farthest regions of the two countries could be as short as 40 minutes.
The window of 15-20 minutes never afforded much time for perplexed confabulation. As per my limited knowledge, a bunch of geriatrics who comprise a committe will need to be woken up and persuaded to attend a meeting at the PM’s residence for a decision to be made regarding India’s nuclear (second strike) response, when it is needed.
Frankly, agonizing over the ever-shortening notice periods available for the rest of us to act before our vaporization occurs seems moot.
Nevertheless….
How has Pakistan’s reliance upon a nuclear stockpile which (primarily) comprises tactical nuclear warheads influenced the nuclear war threshold existing between the two countries? Did Pakistan miscalculate (from its brinksmanship perspective) and end up raising the nuclear threshold, thereby permitting India to indulge further in conventional military aggression than is otherwise possible?
What are the author’s observations from Operation Sindoor?
Look forward to the author’s insights. Thanks.