The sobering reality is that nuclear danger has not gone away. Regional deterrence relationships are being tested by border tensions and military modernisation of adversaries.
Deterrence and punishment depend on psychologically impacting those we are trying to influence. The problem is that we cannot know with certainty how much damage needs to be caused.
The Chinese term for deterrence differs from the English term in International Relations literature. China combines deterrence and compellence strategies.
I was in Islamabad when Mark Tully broke the news of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto being hanged. I held it against him—he could have tipped me off. But he was a journalist before he was a friend.
Premier David Eby, the leader of the minerals- and gas-rich province of British Columbia, spoke with executives at Tata Steel and Reliance Industries on a trade mission to India.
President Murmu has also conferred Kirti Chakra on Major Arshdeep Singh of 1 Assam Rifles for eliminating armed cadres when patrol led by him came under fire along Indo-Myanmar Border last May.
No nation other than China can negotiate one-on-one with Trump on an equal footing. That’s why the middle powers who so far formed the core of multilateral bodies now feel orphaned.
I pray Alisha gives her analysis specifically with regard to the edgy state that exists between India and Pakistan.
These are two ever-hostile neighbouring/adjoining nations which share a long border. The available nuclear-attack reaction times were always short. I understand that the time needed for a hypersonic missile to fly between even the farthest regions of the two countries could be as short as 40 minutes.
The window of 15-20 minutes never afforded much time for perplexed confabulation. As per my limited knowledge, a bunch of geriatrics who comprise a committe will need to be woken up and persuaded to attend a meeting at the PM’s residence for a decision to be made regarding India’s nuclear (second strike) response, when it is needed.
Frankly, agonizing over the ever-shortening notice periods available for the rest of us to act before our vaporization occurs seems moot.
Nevertheless….
How has Pakistan’s reliance upon a nuclear stockpile which (primarily) comprises tactical nuclear warheads influenced the nuclear war threshold existing between the two countries? Did Pakistan miscalculate (from its brinksmanship perspective) and end up raising the nuclear threshold, thereby permitting India to indulge further in conventional military aggression than is otherwise possible?
What are the author’s observations from Operation Sindoor?
Timely article by Alisha. Refreshing.
I pray Alisha gives her analysis specifically with regard to the edgy state that exists between India and Pakistan.
These are two ever-hostile neighbouring/adjoining nations which share a long border. The available nuclear-attack reaction times were always short. I understand that the time needed for a hypersonic missile to fly between even the farthest regions of the two countries could be as short as 40 minutes.
The window of 15-20 minutes never afforded much time for perplexed confabulation. As per my limited knowledge, a bunch of geriatrics who comprise a committe will need to be woken up and persuaded to attend a meeting at the PM’s residence for a decision to be made regarding India’s nuclear (second strike) response, when it is needed.
Frankly, agonizing over the ever-shortening notice periods available for the rest of us to act before our vaporization occurs seems moot.
Nevertheless….
How has Pakistan’s reliance upon a nuclear stockpile which (primarily) comprises tactical nuclear warheads influenced the nuclear war threshold existing between the two countries? Did Pakistan miscalculate (from its brinksmanship perspective) and end up raising the nuclear threshold, thereby permitting India to indulge further in conventional military aggression than is otherwise possible?
What are the author’s observations from Operation Sindoor?
Look forward to the author’s insights. Thanks.