The sobering reality is that nuclear danger has not gone away. Regional deterrence relationships are being tested by border tensions and military modernisation of adversaries.
Deterrence and punishment depend on psychologically impacting those we are trying to influence. The problem is that we cannot know with certainty how much damage needs to be caused.
The Chinese term for deterrence differs from the English term in International Relations literature. China combines deterrence and compellence strategies.
The collusion between the new class of bureaucrats, politicians, businessmen and trade union bosses perpetuates itself partly because of the short-run benefits and partly because they see no way out of the system, wrote author MH Mody in 1980.
IAF is firming up plans to revamp airlift capabilities with medium transport aircraft that will be assembled in India & serve as its main workhorse. Embraer is leading contender as of now.
I pray Alisha gives her analysis specifically with regard to the edgy state that exists between India and Pakistan.
These are two ever-hostile neighbouring/adjoining nations which share a long border. The available nuclear-attack reaction times were always short. I understand that the time needed for a hypersonic missile to fly between even the farthest regions of the two countries could be as short as 40 minutes.
The window of 15-20 minutes never afforded much time for perplexed confabulation. As per my limited knowledge, a bunch of geriatrics who comprise a committe will need to be woken up and persuaded to attend a meeting at the PM’s residence for a decision to be made regarding India’s nuclear (second strike) response, when it is needed.
Frankly, agonizing over the ever-shortening notice periods available for the rest of us to act before our vaporization occurs seems moot.
Nevertheless….
How has Pakistan’s reliance upon a nuclear stockpile which (primarily) comprises tactical nuclear warheads influenced the nuclear war threshold existing between the two countries? Did Pakistan miscalculate (from its brinksmanship perspective) and end up raising the nuclear threshold, thereby permitting India to indulge further in conventional military aggression than is otherwise possible?
What are the author’s observations from Operation Sindoor?
Timely article by Alisha. Refreshing.
I pray Alisha gives her analysis specifically with regard to the edgy state that exists between India and Pakistan.
These are two ever-hostile neighbouring/adjoining nations which share a long border. The available nuclear-attack reaction times were always short. I understand that the time needed for a hypersonic missile to fly between even the farthest regions of the two countries could be as short as 40 minutes.
The window of 15-20 minutes never afforded much time for perplexed confabulation. As per my limited knowledge, a bunch of geriatrics who comprise a committe will need to be woken up and persuaded to attend a meeting at the PM’s residence for a decision to be made regarding India’s nuclear (second strike) response, when it is needed.
Frankly, agonizing over the ever-shortening notice periods available for the rest of us to act before our vaporization occurs seems moot.
Nevertheless….
How has Pakistan’s reliance upon a nuclear stockpile which (primarily) comprises tactical nuclear warheads influenced the nuclear war threshold existing between the two countries? Did Pakistan miscalculate (from its brinksmanship perspective) and end up raising the nuclear threshold, thereby permitting India to indulge further in conventional military aggression than is otherwise possible?
What are the author’s observations from Operation Sindoor?
Look forward to the author’s insights. Thanks.