The IAF is not fundamentally opposed to theatre command or an empowered CDS. There needs to be better understanding between the three services.
Having broadly...
Flexibility, concentration of effort & centralised control are essential for best utilisation of the IAF. These could be compromised under theatre commands.
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Indian Air Force is training its commandos for special operations ; Indian Army will soon have more aeroplanes than Air Force ; I think next Indian Navy will be buying tanks & AFVs. So much integration has already taken place.
Each service has its core competence & domain for achieving the same aim i.e. winning a war for the country. This turf war will fritter away the already thin resources available to all the three services. First let’s talk about equipping each service will equipment & manpower required for a two front war in it’s traditional role. Then think about encroaching into others’ domain. Let’s learn something from history & others’ (and our own) mistakes.
The issues the AVM had indicated are more logistical issues than doctrinal. All the more to have reason to have a theater command approach and scare resources to be centralized. Similar approach to strategic assets . Just like My Patil pointed out .. Bombing missions are likely to be a thing of the past and replace by SRM and ICBMs. which are more effective than bombing missions.. Teh good suggestion the transport aircraft should be transfer ed to ARMY as they would be the major users Log range bombing missions is a thing of the past. ..one thing agree with the AVM .the Airforce should develop it doctrine around a very offensive force focusing on surgical strikes and special slice and dice approachs
As most of the transport fleet is catering for army requirements during war as well as peace time (baring logistical move of critical items for air force during war; the bombing role is obsolete). It should detached completely from IAF along with manpower to go under control of army. Making the air force free to concentrate on offensive air power reducing unnecessary inter service demand and allocation.
Given that flexibility is a tenant of airpower, utilizing this tenant effectively will require massive transportation of material is case aircrafts are redeployed inter or intra theater. The AF requires this transportation capability as much as the Army where redeployment encompasses more numbers, but given the vagrances of land warfare are required less frequently.
Indian Military Doctrine: An Analysis
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indian-military-doctrine-an-analysis/
Indian Air Force is training its commandos for special operations ; Indian Army will soon have more aeroplanes than Air Force ; I think next Indian Navy will be buying tanks & AFVs. So much integration has already taken place.
Each service has its core competence & domain for achieving the same aim i.e. winning a war for the country. This turf war will fritter away the already thin resources available to all the three services. First let’s talk about equipping each service will equipment & manpower required for a two front war in it’s traditional role. Then think about encroaching into others’ domain. Let’s learn something from history & others’ (and our own) mistakes.
The issues the AVM had indicated are more logistical issues than doctrinal. All the more to have reason to have a theater command approach and scare resources to be centralized. Similar approach to strategic assets . Just like My Patil pointed out .. Bombing missions are likely to be a thing of the past and replace by SRM and ICBMs. which are more effective than bombing missions.. Teh good suggestion the transport aircraft should be transfer ed to ARMY as they would be the major users Log range bombing missions is a thing of the past. ..one thing agree with the AVM .the Airforce should develop it doctrine around a very offensive force focusing on surgical strikes and special slice and dice approachs
As most of the transport fleet is catering for army requirements during war as well as peace time (baring logistical move of critical items for air force during war; the bombing role is obsolete). It should detached completely from IAF along with manpower to go under control of army. Making the air force free to concentrate on offensive air power reducing unnecessary inter service demand and allocation.
Given that flexibility is a tenant of airpower, utilizing this tenant effectively will require massive transportation of material is case aircrafts are redeployed inter or intra theater. The AF requires this transportation capability as much as the Army where redeployment encompasses more numbers, but given the vagrances of land warfare are required less frequently.