Amid the controversy over the former President’s decision to address an RSS event, here is an excerpt from his book ‘The Dramatic Decade: The Indira Gandhi Years’ on the tumult that followed the Emergency.
Madhu Limaye, a parliamentarian and a socialist, was one of the general secretaries of the Janata Party. He could not stand the RSS and resisted its growing influence in the Janata Party.
The occasion of enrolment for party membership gave him an opportunity. He knew that in the membership drive the organised RSS cadre would outnumber the rest and capture the party as and when organisational elections took place.
Limaye convinced Raj Narain that once the Jana Sangh was isolated, Morarji Desai would be helpless and Charan Singh would emerge as the most powerful entity in the party.
The Jana Sangh faction did not remain idle during this period either. It knew its strengths and weaknesses, and was fully aware of the chances of a split in the party and the collapse of the government.
Given that it was the biggest beneficiary of the power-sharing arrangement at the Centre, it, understandably, tried to bring Charan Singh and Morarji Desai together. It emphasised the need for unity between these two leaders for the smooth running of the party and government. Some other leaders like Biju Patnaik and Chandra Shekhar, too, worked hard to bring Charan Singh back into the government.
The Jana Sangh faction knew its strengths and weaknesses, and was fully aware of the chances of a split in the party and the collapse of the government.
In such a situation, Charan Singh returned to the government as deputy prime minister (and as finance minister). Morarji Desai agreed to the arrangement but remained true to his game by making Jagjivan Ram deputy prime minister (also defence minister) as well.
Desai scored another point over Charan Singh by refusing to accommodate Raj Narain. Wiser in humiliation, Charan Singh accepted the offer and rejoined the government in January 1978. But even this arrangement could not save the government from its inevitable downfall. It was just checked for a short while. Since Raj Narain was left high and dry, he spared no effort in pulling the Desai government down.
Developments in the Congress (I) also influenced the Janata Party. The leaders of the Janata Party had always been obsessed with Indira Gandhi, and during the nearly three years that it was in office, the Janata Party could not come out of her shadow.
With the expulsion of Devaraj Urs they thought she had been cornered and that her chances of returning to power were slender. They were proved wrong.
The first symptoms of the Janata Party’s disintegration started showing at the state level. As has been mentioned before, the BLD (Bharatiya Lok Dal) and Jana Sangh factions had an understanding on sharing chief ministership across a few northern states: BLD nominees in UP, Haryana and Bihar, and Sangh nominees in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh.
The toppling game began shortly after, and Ram Naresh Yadav (UP), Karpoori Thakur (Bihar) and Devi Lal (Haryana) were replaced by Banarsi Das (UP), Ram Sundar Das (Bihar) and Bhajan Lal (Haryana) as chief ministers.
Factionalism became so rampant that, on 13 June, the Janata Party central leadership had to issue a showcause notice to the chief minister and the Janata Party chief of Haryana for sabotaging his own party nominee in a byelection to an assembly seat from Narnaul.
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The ambitions of Charan Singh, who wanted to become the Prime Minister of India, the ever-increasing influence of the RSS and the Jana Sangh in the administration, the increasing dependence of the Prime Minister on that group, and the internal factional quarrel among the socialist groups in the ruling clique had already destroyed the cohesion of the Janata Party.
The year 1979 dawned with new challenges. The ambitions of Charan Singh, who wanted to become the Prime Minister of India, the ever-increasing influence of the RSS and the Jana Sangh in the administration, the increasing dependence of the Prime Minister on that group, and the internal factional quarrel among the socialist groups in the ruling clique had already destroyed the cohesion of the Janata Party.
The only cementing force which kept them formally together was the lurking fear of the emergence of Indira Gandhi.
The attacks on Congress leaders and workers went on unabated. In Punjab, Giani Zail Singh was brutally attacked; and, in West Bengal, Barkat and many other state Congress leaders were beaten up by police. In Bhubaneswar, Indira Gandhi’s convoy was assaulted, as were important Congress leaders like K.C. Lenka and B.M. Mohanty. Even ordinary workers of the party faced such attacks, but no eventuality was enough to daunt them, such was the level of their enthusiasm.
The issue of dual membership — Janata Party and the RSS — was highlighted by leaders like Madhu Limaye, and a section of the Janata Party members demanded that Jana Sangh members snap ties with the RSS. A section of the Janata Party, particularly the socialists, felt that the dominance of RSS elements in both the state and central administrations was costing the party its Muslim vote bank.
In addition, the ineffectiveness of various state governments to tackle communal riots in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and other states had seriously eroded the Janata Party’s base among Muslims.
The Janata Party had already lost the support of the Harijans and other weaker sections, since vested interests and upper castes in the states ruled by the Janata Party deprived them of the gains received during Congress rule.
The virtual dismissal of Charan Singh and Raj Narain from the government, the mutual trading of charges between the Prime Minister and the former home minister, the massive kisan rally in support of Charan Singh to demonstrate his power, all were symptoms of the fissures appearing in the ruling party.
The electoral success and the massive popular support received by the Congress (I) in 1978 worried these warring factions and made them realise that they had to bury their differences in the interest of survival.
The Janata Party tried to deal with their internal contradictions, and hence it started a patch-up bid, along with vindictive action against Indira Gandhi.
Excerpted, with due permission, from The Dramatic Decade: The Indira Gandhi Years by Pranab Mukherjee. Publisher: Rupa Publications