What is the status of the current war in the Gulf? On one plane, the war persists with unabated brutality; on another, it appears momentarily paused under a fragile ceasefire. At yet another level it is about keeping energy supplies to the world open, anxiously tracking the prices of Brent Crude and Natural Gas amid deteriorating investor confidence.
With some actors talking and others escalating, the conflict defies linear analysis. Is the ceasefire partial or substantive? Will it hold, or fray? And what, if anything, can be expected from the ongoing talks in Islamabad ?
With regards to the military dynamic, two developments must be highlighted. First, the Pakistan-facilitated ceasefire between the United States and Iran has entered its next phase, with direct talks taking place in Islamabad today—a diplomatically significant moment for Pakistan.
What is known is limited yet consequential. Despite agreeing to talk directly, there is no consensus on the ceasefire itself. Washington and Tehran have articulated and pushed divergent interpretations: Iran says it will continue with uranium enrichment, while the United States maintains that no such concessions have been made. The status of Hormuz and Lebanon, too, remains uncertain and divergent.
Second, and perhaps more historic, is the proposal by Israel PM Benjamin Netanyahu for direct talks with Lebanon—the first such overture since Israel’s creation in 1948—following an unprecedented Israeli bombing campaign escalated against Hezbollah in the last 24 hours alone. Hezbollah, Iran’s most formidable proxy against Israel had so far been operating as a state within a state. It now appears to be fighting its last war. Remember that the US too has been launching strikes on Shia militias in Iraq. Taken together, the regional dynamics of Levant might change forever.
And the Strait of Hormuz? It continues to exist in a state of paradox—simultaneously open and closed, depending on the vantage point. Iran has insisted on imposing the selective transit fee, a toll of $2 million per barrel which is rejected by the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and yet some ships belonging to Iran’s friendly nations or bound to friendly nations have continued to pass.
The consequences have been far-reaching. On the 40th day, approximately 187 oil tankers and 15 LNG carriers remained stalled, alongside dozens of cargo ships carrying critical items, including nearly two million tonnes of fertiliser. There is no clear timeline for the resolution of this logistical paralysis.
For the GCC, the implications remain profound. While they rightfully demand a seat at the negotiating table in Pakistan, their concerns extend beyond immediate de-escalation or military ceasefire. The weaponisation of Hormuz and the asymmetric targeting of energy infrastructure have fundamentally altered the region’s security and financial calculus. Any sustainable resolution would require not merely a cessation of hostilities, but constructing a new deterrence architecture—one that integrates diversified energy infrastructure with a range of cost effective military capabilities.
It is increasingly evident that the Middle East today embodies a paradox: Somewhat stable and yet more unstable than ever.
There is no big picture as yet except speculation.
For now, only meaningful analysis lies in analysing the trajectories ahead—what may emerge from these interim negotiations, what are the motivations of those involved and whether they hold the potential for a sustainable equilibrium.
Also read: Pakistanis are bragging about their passports, thanking Shehbaz Sharif after US-Iran ceasefire
Motivations matrix
There is, however, some logic as to why the United States and Iran agreed to talk in the first place—however loosely—to agree to a ceasefire. For both, the incentives were immediate and pragmatic. For DC, the move was shaped as much by markets as by military considerations. Donald Trump’s rhetoric to bomb Iran back to the stone age and growing existential threats to Iranian civilisation had pushed the markets to the brink and had also had other consequences—particularly on oil and gas prices. Perpetual disorder required some restraint and a breather.
Brent Crude, which had consistently traded above $100 per barrel after 28 February, fell sharply to $92 following the ceasefire announcement, before stabilising in the mid-to-high $90 range. Markets, rattled by fears of disrupted supply chains, required rectification.
For Iran, the motivations were more pressing. Despite the performative defiance of the IRGC, exhibited via social media handles, the material costs of the war have been staggering. The decentralised mosaic of the IRGC has inflicted costs on the US and Israel (with their partners), but has not insulated Iran from damage to its own military and energy infrastructure. The most critical trigger, however, may have been Israel’s strikes on the South Pars just one day before the announcement. South Pars gas fields are the backbone of Iran’s vast domestic energy grid and an asset they share with Qatar. That such strikes occurred despite reported US assurances to the contrary may have motivated Tehran to respond favourably to the possibility of a ceasefire, without dropping its uncompromising rhetoric back home.
Therefore, the initial ceasefire, lacking mutually agreed terms and triggering more questions than furnishing answers, functioned less as a resolution and more as a pause—an opportunity for both sides to recalibrate, while claiming victory. Yet, these conditions alone do not explain Pakistan’s emergence as a facilitator.
Global opinion on the matter has erupted along predictable lines, with competing narratives of victory and legitimacy. Within India, reactions on Pakistan’s role have ranged from apathy to anxiety, until official acknowledgment of the facilitated ceasefire from the Ministry of External Affairs instilled a much required objectivity.
This brings me once again to Pakistan—and to analyse whether it turned a facilitator by choice or by compulsion.
Facilitation by choice or compulsion
While skepticism regarding Pakistan’s strategic bandwidth to facilitate is understandable, it doesn’t quite recognise the extent of its ongoing diplomatic engagement. Islamabad has reportedly been involved in backchannel discussions for over 18 months. Its military elite, mainly Field Marshal Asim Munir, maintains favourable ties with US Central Command, while also preserving channels with Tehran.
More importantly, Pakistan’s facilitation is shaped by its own security imperatives. Its relationship with Iran is complex—marked by both cooperation and covert tension. While defence cooperation can be traced back to the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, their intelligence agencies have clashed—particularly over Balochistan and Iran-backed Shia proxies recruiting Pakistani Shia mercenaries. This has happened until very recently when both sides bombed each other’s territories to contain Pakistan’s simmering Baloch separatism.
This invisible Intel war, as described by British Pakistani expert Kamal Alam, had continued despite prima facie strategic cooperation. However, recently the tensions have been diffusing under Asim Munir, whose clear strategic communication has helped create a win-win diplomatic channel between Iran and Pakistan, instead of a lose-lose scenario. This, in turn has strengthened Pakistan’s position as a dependable actor for Iran, while also creating conditions favourable to Pakistan to protect its stakes in Iran’s war.
Also, remember that Shia militias backed by the IRGC have recruited Shia mercenaries from Pakistan in the ongoing war—which does become an added concern for Pakistan to address.
Simultaneously, Pakistan must balance its relations with Saudi Arabia, with which it has recently signed a security pact. Avoiding direct entanglement in a Saudi–Iran military confrontation is a strategic necessity for Pakistan. Its past role in facilitating back channel dialogues between Tehran and Riyadh further and, rightfully so, reinforces its positioning.
In this context, Pakistan’s facilitation is less an act of strategic altruism but one of strategic survival—that to its credit, it has managed deftly. It possesses the requisites strategic and defence ties, intelligence linkages, a relevant geography and incentives to create a platform for dialogue. That it has done so is significant, even if the outcomes remain uncertain.
Also read: How US ‘pushed Pakistan’ for ceasefire with Iran even as Trump escalated threats
Elusive equilibrium
The broader war, however, continues to unfold asymmetrically. The United States remains focused on Iran’s nuclear programme and finding enriched uranium; Israel, in addition to US objectives, remains committed to a prolonged crushing of Iran backed proxies; the GCC seeks a restructured security order; and states such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan navigate the spillover effects of all of this combined. With such divergent priorities, any agreement that does not reconcile these positions is likely to remain fragile.
What is unfolding, therefore, is less a resolution and more a transition. The Gulf and the Levant are undergoing a profound transformation in distribution of power, energy infrastructure, and military strategy. The contours of this new order haven’t become pronounced, but they will differ markedly from the past, incommensurately so.
Though the odds remain slim, the world should welcome the Islamabad talks if they yield even interim progress.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)