US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy takes a middle ground on China. But it’s not all bad news for India

The document's tempered tone indicates a new reality: China is a power to contend with, and nobody else is likely to take up cudgels against it.

Leaders of the Quad countries (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) in Melbourne, on 11 February 2022 | ANI photo

Ask any seaside enthusiast and they will tell you that some things are more revealing than others. The same can be said about the recent Indo-Pacific Strategy released by the White House. Its tempered tone indicates a new reality; that like it or not, China is a power to contend with, and that neither the United States nor anyone else is likely to take up the cudgels against it. This is a ‘let’s learn to live together’ document, which will annoy China watchers, even as it centres on the need for everyone to work together while elevating India as a leading partner in this thrust. It’s not entirely a good thing. But then, as in life, few things are clear black and white, especially now.

Policy, policy and more policy

If there’s one thing that can be said of the US is that there is a level of seeming transparency, where the White House puts out various policy documents in the public sphere, like the Interim National Security Strategy or a National Defense Strategy, which is mandated by Congress before it loosens the purse strings of budgeting. A new National Security Strategy (NSS) is due soon, as is the defence strategy. But here’s the thing. The Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is not a Congressional requirement but is a pure policy paper flowing almost entirely from the decision of the Joe Biden administration to upgrade the Quad to a summit level and give final shape to its policy in a region that it recognises as vital. To that extent, it is addressed to external audiences, but since it will also flow into the upcoming NSS, it’s also directed to Congress in terms of funding specific programmes like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Don’t go thinking this is all an exercise in transparency. Like all countries, the US has every right to say one thing and do another. That’s what national security policymaking is all about. Besides, this is the unclassified version.

The document follows a dual-track. On the one hand, it conveys US’ determination to strengthen itself in the Indo-Pacific region, and on the other, it tempers this by noting: “Our objective is not to change the PRC [People’s Republic of China] but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favourable to the United States, our allies and partners”. The usual reference to ‘competing’ with China remains — remember, even the belligerent Donald Trump used the same language – with the difference that the document right at the very beginning notes PRC’s coercion of all neighbours including India — a detail that should please Indians annoyed at a seeming indifference of the US to its lone fight in Ladakh.

So what’s the plan? First in priority is obviously the Free and Open Indo Pacific (FoIP) to be implemented together with five Treaty partners, and nine regional partners, all of whom will be encouraged to tie in with each other, and build ‘bridges’ to Europe. This is against a China whose only reliable ‘partner’ is Pakistan, which is more of a handicap than anything else. An ‘economic framework’ for shared prosperity is planned in an obvious counter to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in a region that has some 31 nations onboard the Chinese mega plan.  The regional infrastructure thrust is to be carried through the G-7, a money-spinner, which should please those wealthy economies. Then there is a commitment to work with partners on ‘transnational threats’ like climate change, which was expected. Keep in mind that energy transition is now big money, with as much as $173 trillion expected to drive this, and requiring not just rare earths but also other less famous elements like cobalt, for instance, used in batteries and demand for which is expected to jump by about 70 per cent. To get all of this, you need others, and that applies to the US as much as India. Notably, there is no reference to terrorism — a major transnational threat for India, which occupied a prominent place in the Quad Joint Statement. It only marginally finds a place in the ‘security’ section of this White House document.

Security in the Pacific

Then is the key issue of security, which is to be met by ‘Integrated Deterrence’, that is, cyber, space and emerging technologies, with the core requirement being that all work together. This includes the objective to “steadily advance our Major Defense Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider”. That sounds interesting. And hopefully it will mean more than just buying additional US platforms. There is a ‘Pacific Deterrence Initiative’ to be unveiled soon and a Maritime Security Initiative, which will probably be outlined in separate policy papers (and budget documents).

The main aspect that will make Indian security experts cheer is a complete section on India labelled “Support India’s continued rise and leadership”. It places the country largely in the ‘South Asia’ bracket, but with ‘leadership’ in the Indian Ocean, and to be ‘active and connected’ to South East Asia, and a ‘driving force’ in Quad and other regional fora. All bets are on to say that the text was finalised during the meeting with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in Melbourne, as was the paragraph on Quad, which retains it as a grouping working on health, environment and that kind of thing. It also earmarks a sharing of satellite information for maritime domain ‘awareness’ – which, in simple words, means that a sharp eye will be kept on any movements in the Indian Ocean area, which suits India admirably, and is, in some ways, already up and running with a Maritime Security Coordinator appointed recently. When this ‘awareness’ is detailed and extensive, it moves from ‘information’ to ‘intelligence’. That’s not a given, but it is, however, a give and take.

Overall, the strategy takes a careful middle path on China for several reasons. For one, any major overplay of the ‘threat’ would have made some allies or partners take fright. Take, for instance, the stressing of ASEAN unity – and an upcoming summit with the grouping – which paints over the strong differences within it on how to deal with China. Thailand, for instance, sees China very differently from Vietnam, and the ‘Chinese model’ of strong leadership is not seen as antithetical to value systems in some of these capitals. Then there’s Japan, which, despite moving rapidly towards a more robust defence, does a delicate balancing act with China. Even treaty partners like Germany have no ‘vital’ interests involved in the China fight. Consider also the  European Union ‘strategy’ for the Indo-Pacific — that’s no strategy at all. After all, 18 of them are part of the BRI. Washington is more than aware of the risk-averse state of most countries in the region.

Then there is the reality that Washington is rather risk-averse itself, as is much of the post-Covid world. Economies have been hit, and inflation is hurting the President but not his stance on defence. Biden’s ‘Build Back Better’ Bill is yet to become law, but US growth lies front and centre of even his National Security Guidance. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Indo-Pacific strategy also has a strong underlying thread of what benefits the US economy. True, that includes downsizing of Chinese territorial ambitions too. But again, the reality is that the ‘Chinese threat’ is as much internal as external, which means ensuring a good deal on trade or protection of technology, even while building supply chain resilience. And as the US Trade Representative notes, Biden’s ‘North Star’ is Americans’ interests, and the US cant protect these by itself. This is also why most security experts still fail to see that the Quad cannot, and should not, be about security alone. Its role in the Indo-Pacific should be all of the above and more. So the policy document is all about ‘competition’ for technology and territory that is likely to become fierce and about ‘cooperation’, which is mentioned 20 times.

There’s gold in the plan; it’s also expensive

For India, there is money to be made in cooperation, particularly as a cheap alternative supply base along with possible access to technology, and ensuing employment – keep in mind that unemployment is a huge issue in the ongoing Uttar Pradesh elections, and is likely to take centre stage further down the line. But muscling about in the Indo-Pacific, notwithstanding a rise in the Indian Navy’s budget, is going to be expensive in other ways. Beijing will certainly take fright, despite all the (relatively) peaceable talk, and will choose to prime up Pakistan with more weapons — in addition to frigates and submarines  — to keep India embroiled in the West, even as it keeps up the pressure in the north. China is foolish like that, unable to see that such actions are pushing India more into the US embrace. So yes, black and white choices are not possible unless Beijing decides to bring down its troop buildup and end its belligerence.  Since that’s unlikely, welcome to a grey world.

The author is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views are personal.

(Edited by Srinjoy Dey)