Türkiye is not part of India’s immediate neighbourhood, but it has strategically expanded its influence in South Asia in the past two decades. Since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power, he has pursued a neo-Ottoman foreign policy, making the country’s engagement in South Asia not just linear but a complex combination of strategic, military, economic and ideological engagements.
Türkiye’s recent support to Pakistan became a part of public discourse in India during the four-day India-Pakistan military conflict in May. Pakistan reportedly used 300-400 Turkish-supplied drones to target Indian military and civilian areas. Although the two nations have held joint military and counter-terrorism exercises, such as the “Ataturk/Jinnah” since 2018, Türkiye’s increasing support for Pakistan in various international forums, including the UN General Assembly, has raised concerns for India.
The relationship between Pakistan and Türkiye is not new, but the latter’s influence in India’s neighbourhood has been quietly building up in recent years. Türkiye has also shown a keen interest in Bangladesh, especially after the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August last year. After the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government took over, Türkiye and Bangladesh have accelerated cooperation in the defence industry, adding a new layer to South Asia’s complex security dynamics.
The global shift of power from the West to the East, the “pivot to Asia” trend and Türkiye’s pragmatic foreign policy are shaping Ankara’s turn toward Asia far more quickly than expected.
Türkiye’s strategic recalibration with Bangladesh
In July, Bangladesh announced that it would build two defence industrial complexes in Chittagong and Narayanganj with Türkiye’s support. It has also been expanding its purchase of military equipment from the Middle Eastern country, including Bayraktar drones, howitzers, and armoured vehicles. Türkiye’s strategic expansion and support for Islamist groups in Bangladesh can be interpreted as a move to increase its power projection, threatening regional stability.
In 2016, after Bangladesh executed a Jamaat-e-Islami leader convicted of war crimes, Türkiye temporarily withdrew its ambassador to Dhaka, and Erdoğan strongly condemned the execution. The Türkiye-Bangladesh partnership could be characterised as a strategic alignment against India, given Türkiye’s traditionally pro-Pakistan stance and its overt support for radical groups.
For instance, Türkiye has been a vocal critic of the treatment of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and has consistently called for an end to the violence and atrocities in Rakhine State. As a self-proclaimed champion of Muslim rights globally, Türkiye has used its state-run aid agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), to provide significant assistance to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and, when permitted, in Myanmar.
Through Erdoğan, Türkiye has elevated the Rohingya issue on the international stage, urging other Muslim-majority nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to take action. Senior Turkish officials, including First Lady Emine Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, have also visited the refugee camps in Bangladesh to offer support and publicise the crisis. Türkiye has consistently emphasised its long-term commitment to assisting the Rohingya population.
The Yunus-led interim government is favourable to receiving support from Türkiye and other OIC nations, resulting in a not-so-subtle message to India. The regime change in Bangladesh could be linked to Hasina’s proximity to India, among other more prominent reasons. Therefore, Dhaka’s silence was not a surprise when ‘Saltanat-e-Bangla’ — the Islamist group allegedly backed by the Turkish Youth Federation NGO — circulated a map depicting the so-called “Greater Bangladesh”, which included West Bengal and all of Northeast India.
But the messaging from Bangladesh does not end here. A landmark defence deal with Türkiye is in its final stages. The agreement will see Bangladesh acquire the SIPER long-range air defence system and co-produce Turkish combat drones. Previously, Bangladesh had acquired the Bayraktar TB2 armed UAVs, TRG-300 missile systems, COBRA-II armoured vehicles and BORAN howitzers from Türkiye. For Bangladesh, it is perhaps the most significant strategic recalibration, whereas for Türkiye, the deal projects its role as a global defence exporter that can compete with Russian and Western equivalents.
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Challenge for India in its neighbourhood
In July 2024, Erdoğan said, “We neither turn our backs on the East for the West, nor neglect the West for the East.” This understanding has guided Ankara to expand its sphere of influence and diversify its foreign policy from a West-centred outlook to a more comprehensive approach. To this end, it is establishing and reviving ties with Southeast Asian countries.
Erdoğan’s increased interest in Southeast Asia and South Asia, especially with Muslim-majority nations, is also seen as his attempt to get a bigger seat at the Muslim world table and dethrone the traditional Saudi leadership. Turkiye’s move to seek strategic space in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) aligns with its 2015 Naval Forces Strategy and 2023 National Foreign Policy document, which mentions IOR as an area of strategic importance. The document states that Türkiye aims to improve interoperability by “acquiring logistic bases and local port facilities” and references its own “security of energy and supply chains”.
It is expected that the defence deal will be signed this year, giving Bangladesh its first integrated air defence network. Bangladesh would not only have signalled India but also begun its diversification strategy to balance Beijing’s near monopoly on Dhaka’s defence procurement. Turkiye, through this deal, would definitively seal its influence in South Asia.
The deal would provide a pivot to its roadmap toward becoming one of the top ten global defence exporters by 2030 in the backdrop of its neo-Ottoman ambitions. India, on the other hand, will be left to tackle a new player in its eastern neighbourhood.
India is more adept at handling the complexities that China brings, having done so for decades in its familiar terrain, but Türkiye may be somewhat of a “terra incognita”. However, if India wants regional stability, it must become a regional stakeholder, not just countering inimical forces but ensuring that new ones don’t become too comfortable in its neighbourhood.
Rami Niranjan Desai is an author, anthropologist, and scholar of the Northeast region. She is a distinguished fellow at the India Foundation and has conducted extensive research in conflict areas, recently in Myanmar. She interviewed the victims in Maesot, Thailand. Her X handle is @ramindesai and she is on Instagram @raminiranjandesai. Views are personal.
(Edited by Saptak Datta)