Much of the world’s geopolitics has ended up bruised in 2025, including India’s. Yet, as the year draws to a close, one cannot help but think about the states that have managed to turn chaos into opportunity. They have leveraged global crises to expand their diplomatic, economic, and defence footprint in ways that directly challenge India’s security environment. No, it’s not Pakistan, but it is one of Islamabad’s two main backers: Turkey.
With the second-largest land army in NATO after the US, Turkey has emerged as a disruptive outlier within the Western bloc. The country was sanctioned under the US CAATSA for buying S-400s from Russia and expelled from the F-35 programme. It has transferred NATO-grade warfare to middle powers through subsystem integration, reverse-engineered defence technologies, skillfully compartmentalised its foreign policy whenever circumstances demanded it, and projected itself as a global mediator in bloody conflicts from Ukraine to the Caucasus to Syria. Such is the country profile of Turkey.
The result is an agile, interest-driven foreign policy anchored in an enduring commitment to the Musilm brotherhood ideology. Most strikingly, under its 2019 Asia Anew strategy in the Indian subcontinent, Ankara has deepened engagement with Pakistan and Bangladesh—both Islamic states—while simultaneously cultivating ties with Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Asia Anew extends further into Southeast Asia, powered by the star-performer of Turkey’s resurgence—its bold, experimental, fast-paced defence industry. For the record, Ankara’s defence exports surged from $7.1 billion in 2024 to hit $8.5 billion this year.
For a country that has for years oscillated between ambition and logistical constraints, 2025 brought a series of developments—some carefully drafted and others that flowed from wider turbulence. These have collectively propelled Ankara into a sharper geopolitical profile.
With a nominal GDP of just $1.5 trillion but a high per capita income of about $18,200, Turkey has experienced a phase of stabilisation following years of economic and political volatility. Despite widespread resistance against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reforms aimed at taming inflation and attracting investment and trade have begun showing results. This economic recalibration has coincided with an expanding global trade footprint, particularly in regions where Türkiye had previously been underrepresented—Central Asia, East Africa, and parts of Southeast Asia.
New Delhi should be attentive
Turkey’s indigenous drone programmes, cruise missiles, naval modernisation efforts, electronic warfare capabilities, and aerospace ambitions have all accelerated. The country’s defence exports have climbed, not only in volume but in sophistication. Several middle-tier powers now consider Turkish systems more cost-effective and geopolitically flexible than those offered by traditional defence industry powers such as Russia or the US. American equipment is expensive, Russia’s defence industry grapples with overstretch and sanctions, and China’s export pathways remain entangled in prioritising economic diplomacy over weapons’ supplies.
The cumulative effect is that Turkey has positioned itself as a hybrid actor. Where it cannot sell advanced weapons, it switches to sub-system integration. Where it cannot develop indigenously, it reverse–engineers. And where it cannot give new solutions, it champions recycling.
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Turkey and Pakistan
China’s defence backing to Pakistan and Bangladesh is well–analysed in Indian strategic circles. This is not the case for Turkey, even when Pakistan has emerged as one of the most important markets for Ankara’s defence exports and co-production of defence synergies.
As of February 2025, Turkish company Baykar Defense commanded 65 per cent of the worldwide UAV export market, reaching 34 countries. Turkey has been playing a key role in Pakistan’s drone and aerospace technology. Islamabad has acquired a range of battle–tested equipment, including advanced Turkish drones such as Bayraktar TB2s, Akincis, and Songars, all deployed against India in Operation Sindoor. Pakistan has also engaged with Ankara in integrating advanced weapons systems like Kemankes cruise missiles.
The cooperation doesn’t end there. Turkey is poised to offer Pakistan its fifth-generation Kaan fighter—now under development with joint project teams that include around 150 Pakistani engineers. If the latest Department of State report on Pakistan’s air capabilities getting a fillip from 36 J-10Cs is indeed accurate, a later addition of 5th-generation Kaans on the heels of a likely J-35 procurement from China would be an enhancement to Pakistan’s 5th-generation network-centric capabilities. It’s a matter of grave concern for India.
Turkey has already been inching closer to making the most of the Pakistan-China bonhomie. For instance, JF-17s, co-produced by China and Pakistan, are getting exported to Azerbaijan with Turkish missiles on them.
Turkey had already undertaken the upgrade of 41 F–16 fighter jets for the Pakistan Air Force, with final deliveries completed as recently as last year. There is more. In air-to-air capabilities, Pakistan and Turkey cooperate in Gokdogan, Gokdogan ER (extended ranges), and Gokhan BVR programmes. The former is capable of being deployed on F–16s and combat versions of Bayraktars, while the latter is comparable to Meteor ranges. These will be adding to Islamabad’s PL-15 BVR capabilities from China, which gained prominence during Operation Sindoor.
Now, let’s consider Turkey’s role in Pakistan’s naval modernisation, which is a prominent example of Turkey’s MILGEM project—an initiative to design and build naval warships using entirely domestic capabilities. In July 2018, the two sides had signed up for four Ada-class corvettes. The naval bonhomie has been growing ever since.
Just last week, Pakistan announced the delivery of its second Babur-class (PN MILGEM) corvette, PNS Khaibar, from Turkey. The first ship in the series, PNS Babur, had been delivered earlier on 24 May 2024. As part of the same programme, two additional vessels being built at Karachi Shipyard—PNS Badr and PNS Tariq—are expected to get commisioned by late 2026 and the first quarter of 2027.
Turkey and Bangladesh
As if former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024 hasn’t led to enough chaos, Dhaka’s new defence synergies are unnervingly similar to Pakistan’s trajectory. China has been Bangladesh’s top-most exporter of military hardware. Lately, however, Dhaka has been forging deeper strategic and defence ties with Turkey for its battle–tested, cheaper equipment.
In 2025, reports mentioned that the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) is planning to establish defence industrial complexes in Chittagong and Narayanganj in partnership with Turkish defence firms. In 2024, Bangladesh purchased 18 MKE Boran 105 mm howitzers, with plans to eventually scale the fleet up to 200 units. Dhaka is also in discussions to acquire TRG-230/300 rocket systems and Otokar Tulpar light tanks from Turkey.
Bangladesh’s Air Chief Marshal Hasan Mahmood Khan made a high-profile visit to Turkey in October. Soon, reports emerged that Ankara was planning to supply Hisar-O+ medium-range and SIPER long-range surface-to-air missile systems to Bangladesh. Recently, the Bangladesh Air Force has also planned on modernising its fighter fleet with 20 J–10 Cs from China in a deal valued at about $2.5 billion.
There are reports of Dhaka now eyeing a squadron of Eurofighter Typhoons. However, it would be far more cost-effective for Bangladesh to instead go for 5th-generation Kaans instead of signing up for an advanced, sophisticated Western jet known for achieving air dominance. In regional military equations, acquiring jets with multi-role capabilities and stealth is a more logical decision any day.
As it does for Pakistan, Turkey also has plans for Bangladesh’s naval modernisation.
Collectively, these developments underline a steadily expanding, multifaceted Turkey-Bangladesh partnership, which is anchored in defence-industrial collaboration, capability building, and growing institutional confidence between the two sides.
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The sum and the whole
Indian strategic discussions have largely under-analysed Turkey’s defence-industry ecosystem in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
As Bangladesh heads toward its 2026 election, talk of a Pakistan-Bangladesh defence pact is circulating. Even if one can’t currently assess the kind of pact it could be, growing Turkey-Pakistan defence synergies are likely to seep into Bangladesh’s military modernisation. It is highly likely that this overlapping integration would be complemented by China. This will collectively be a bigger challenge to India’s security calculus than merely the sum of its parts.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Interesting analysis. Indeed the Turkish axis has not been addressed by India.