Trump can’t withdraw from allies overnight. US is too enmeshed in global order

American adversaries such as Russia are salivating at the thought of the US withdrawing from its global position. China is eager to claim the mantle of regional and possibly global leadership.

There was a tense showdown between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House Friday.

It is unclear if the ridiculous drama that US Vice President JD Vance instigated during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit presages any fundamental shift in US foreign policy. But it is in keeping with the tone of the last four weeks of the second Trump administration, which seems to indicate they have little understanding of the consequences of what they are doing. The main question is how far Trump wants to go, but also, how far Trump can actually go.

A US global withdrawal could lead to potentially calamitous outcomes. But the worst can possibly be avoided simply because the US is just too enmeshed internationally to accomplish all of Trump’s crazed isolationist fantasies. Irrespective of how far Trump goes, the only power that stands to benefit from all this chaos is China, with dire consequences for India and the Indo-Pacific. There is no reason to expect that Trump would help contain China when he does not understand the strategic rationale of alliances.

It will hurt the US too, of course. Trump is correct about the fact that there are costs to being a leader. Leadership isn’t cheap. But there are also benefits. Oscar Wilde defines a cynic as someone who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. We can see a corollary in leadership in international politics, which is costly but has values that far outstrip that price. Only a strategic simpleton like Trump would be so blind as to not see how the US benefits from American leadership on the global stage.

That’s why American adversaries such as Russia and China are salivating at the thought of the US withdrawing from its global position. China, in particular, is so eager to claim the mantle of regional and possibly even global leadership. Throughout the history of interstate politics, powerful states have fought to claim that leadership precisely because of the benefits it brings.

There are no examples of great powers voluntarily relinquishing the crown—except for the US itself when an earlier generation of America Firsters and isolationists kept the US out of global politics after the First World War. The consequences were dire: economic distress, rise of fascism and another world war. The consequences this time may not be as dire, but it could still be bad. It is the strategic equivalent of cutting your nose to spite your face. The US can stop funding Ukraine, but that also means that the US will have no more say in what happens or how the war is resolved.

It is possible to blame weak states like Ukraine or Taiwan for their predicament. Maybe they should have built their own nuclear arsenals instead of giving up that option in return for US security guarantees. But such choices are never easy for the weak. Moreover, it would have appeared to be a clearer choice, considering that the US was the world’s most powerful state and that it was leading the most successful peacetime alliance in history, one which contained and defeated the Soviet Union. Still, giving up its commitments has consequences for the US too because in the future the US will have much more difficulty in getting such bargains.

Europe’s problems

The focus of the current concerns is Europe because Trump and his administration appear to have particular animus towards them. The response from Europe has been good, at least on paper, with European leaders expressing determination to step up after the Zelenskyy blowup. But history suggests no reason for optimism. Decades of being under US protection have made many countries, especially in Western Europe, more comfortable at working their mouths than opening their wallets.

It is also useful to remember a simple point about the geography of Europe. Many of the most powerful states—Germany, France, the UK—are reasonably distant from Russia, the primary threat that the region faces. Russia would have to conquer Eastern Europe before they can present a credible physical threat to these Western European powers.

This is why these countries and their leaders are still talking about the problem rather than doing anything about it. Their first response was a summit, yet another gabfest.

The second European response was to run to Washington to try to talk sense into Trump. French President Macron already made his visit, and British Prime Minister Kier Starmer was next. This is another equally quixotic response. It is impossible to reason with Trump, who has the arrogant self-confidence that comes only with total ignorance.

Of course, if European powers are serious, they have the capacity to take care of their Russia problem by themselves. Russia has only half the GDP of Germany and it is lower than France, the UK and even Italy.

Even Russia’s neighbours are fairly capable. Russian GDP is just over $2 trillion, while the Central European and the Baltic region together have about $2.2 trillion, though they are divided into almost a dozen countries. The Scandinavian countries add another trillion dollars to the kitty. Wealth is not the sole indicator, obviously, but Russia’s Central European neighbours aren’t necessarily as weak as usually imagined.

Sharing a border with Russia means that they have all endured and remember Russian hegemony and are thus motivated to counter it. It’s no wonder then that it is these countries, especially the strongest of them, Poland, that are so much more assertive about the Russian threat.

Scandinavia, Central Europe and the Baltics’ defence budgets have shown dramatic growth. While Russian defence spending still outstrips them all, much of that goes to sustaining Moscow’s horribly expensive and stalemated invasion of Ukraine.

The problem of course is that creating security partnerships is always difficult. Thus, despite their individual and combined capacity, Western and Eastern European powers will find it difficult to create alliances. This is especially so in peacetime.

It is almost impossible to set up an alliance without a clear leader who is much more powerful than others. NATO was made possible only because the US was so much more powerful, despite Gaullist whining. Security alliances among roughly equal powers in peacetime are almost unheard of. France is trying hard to play the leadership role but it has more desire than capacity. Other potential partners, such as Germany and the UK, also lack the power to play such a role. But unlike France, they do not appear to be hankering after it. Thus, the growing talk of potential nuclear sharing between France and Germany is unlikely to remain anything more than that.

Can allies wait?

The consequences for the Indo-Pacific are even greater because the difficulties of creating a balancing coalition against China in the Indo-Pacific are likely to be even more daunting. The imbalance of power is greater, the historical experience has no parallel to Eastern Europe, and the potential partners are geographically distant from one another. At least Europe has the capability, if not the political will to counter the threat in their region. In the Indo-Pacific, the capability itself is lacking even if there is somewhat greater political will.

European troubles mean that they are at best potentially limited partners for India and Indo-Pacific. Russia, still India’s sentimental favourite, should not even be part of this conversation because sentiment has no place in strategy. The cold facts are that it has an economy that is half of India’s, and technology that is at best Cold War plus, largely unsuited for India’s future needs.

The question for US partners and allies—be it Indo-Pacific or Europe—is whether they can hold out long enough for the next US administration to course correct.

One promising aspect should be remembered too: that the US can’t withdraw overnight from its various commitments. Canada, for example, is an integral part of the US missile defence, hosting a number of radars which feed into the NORAD system. Similarly, the UK and Australia host important signal intelligence facilities. US bases across the world are necessary for its continuing war on terror.

A more likely scenario is one in which US partnerships are not entirely disbanded but are nevertheless somewhat diluted, at least temporarily. Even if it’s only because these are such a tangle that even Trump cannot hack it all down.

Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.

(Edited by Theres Sudeep)