Recently, Justice Deepak Verma, a former Supreme Court Judge gave evidence in the United Kingdom in support of Nirav Modi’s latest attempt to resist extradition. As per reports, he testified that if extradited to India, Modi was likely to be interrogated by the CBI, ED, and other agencies, notwithstanding the Government of India’s sovereign assurance that he would not be questioned by the CBI or ED. Justice Verma reportedly suggested that such an assurance would not bind Indian courts, whereupon counsel for the Indian government questioned his expertise and the court reserved judgment.
The episode is similar to the 2021 Nirav Modi proceedings before the Westminster Magistrates’ Court, where Justice (Retd.) Markandey Katju claimed that Modi was unlikely to receive a fair trial in India, only for the UK court to reject his evidence as lacking objectivity and reliability, remarking that it appeared “tinged with resentment” toward former judicial colleagues and bore “hallmarks of an outspoken critic with his own personal agenda”.
This is no longer about one retired judge, one fugitive, or one embarrassing headline. It is now a recurring institutional problem. Retired Indian judges have appeared in foreign proceedings and offered opinions adverse to India’s case, or to the case of Indian public-sector banks. The pattern is now difficult to ignore.
In the Nirav Modi extradition case, retired Bombay High Court judge Justice Abhay M Thipsay appeared as an expert witness and argued that the charges of cheating and allied offences, as framed in the Indian chargesheet, would not stand under Indian law.
In the Vijay Mallya litigation, this was not a one-off either. In 2019, reporting on Mallya’s UK proceedings noted that retired Rajasthan High Court judge Justice Pana Chand Jain appeared as Mallya’s expert witness, while former Supreme Court judge GS Singhvi appeared for the bank consortium. The dispute concerned whether the Indian Debts and Recovery Tribunal order was enforceable abroad.
Then came State Bank of India & Ors v Mallya [2021], the English bankruptcy proceedings. Justice Deepak Verma appeared for Mallya, while Justice Gowda appeared for the Indian banks. The English court ultimately preferred Justice Gowda’s evidence and held that Justice Verma’s core opinion was unsupported in law, and said parts of his evidence had to be treated with caution.
The same name surfaces again in the Sanjay Bhandari extradition proceedings in 2025. The UK High Court judgment records that Justice Verma gave evidence on prison conditions, violence, extortion, delay, and related issues in India. That judgment also records the lower court’s adverse view of him as “a more combative witness” who, at times, became an advocate for the defendant rather than an objective independent expert witness, and even remarks on the contradictory evidence furnished.
Put plainly, these incidents are neither isolated nor incidental; rather, there is a visible pattern. Retired judges of Indian constitutional courts appearing in foreign proceedings involving fugitives, extradition targets, or high-value debtors, and deploying the prestige of former judicial office against positions taken by India or Indian public institutions.
That should concern everyone who cares about the judiciary.
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Institutional remedy
Let us be clear about what is, and is not, being argued.
This is not to say that retired judges lose their citizenship on retirement. They do not. Nor is it to say that every opinion adverse to the Government of India is somehow illegitimate. It is not. Retired judges may write, teach, arbitrate, speak publicly, and continue contributing to legal life.
But there is a world of difference between participating in public debate and appearing before foreign tribunals as a paid or retained expert, using the moral capital of former constitutional office to weaken India’s position in extradition, insolvency, or other sensitive proceedings.
A judge does not retire like any other professional. The authority of the judicial office is not personal property. It is conferred by the Constitution, sustained by institutional trust, and obeyed because the public believes judges stand above partisan or transactional deployment. Even after retirement, that aura remains. A former Supreme Court or High Court judge does not walk into a foreign courtroom as merely Mr X or Mr Y. He enters carrying the residue of the robe that once took the oath—to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India, and to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India.
And that is precisely why the present vacuum is untenable. If this continues unchecked, three consequences follow. First, judicial stature becomes a litigation asset—something that wealthy fugitives, financial offenders, and foreign legal teams can procure when it suits their strategy. Second, institutional credibility is diluted. Each time a retired judge appears abroad to cast doubt on India’s courts, India’s prisons, India’s prosecutions, or India’s sovereign assurances, the foreign court does not see an ordinary witness. It sees someone who once sat at the apex of the same system now being criticised. Third, the judiciary bears reputational cost without having framed any rules.
The institution is left exposed, yet silent. This silence must end.
The remedy, however, should come from the judiciary. It must regulate itself.
The Supreme Court, perhaps through a Full Court resolution or an in-house code, should frame clear post-retirement norms [just like the Bangalore Principles] for former judges of the Supreme Court and high courts. Those norms should be narrow, principled, and enforceable. They should address at least five matters.
- Former judges should not ordinarily act as expert witnesses or deponents before foreign courts in criminal, extradition, quasi-criminal, or sovereign matters where the likely effect is to undermine India’s legal position or formal assurances.
- There should be mandatory disclosure norms for remunerated expert testimony, consultancy, and advisory roles in matters of public significance.
- There should be guidance on what kinds of arbitral, advisory, witness, and commercial roles are compatible with the dignity of the former constitutional office and what kinds are not.
- There should be conflict principles recognising that the prestige of a former judicial office cannot be treated as a purely private professional asset; and
- There should be institutional consequences for serious violations.
Freedom after retirement cannot mean ethical detachment from the institution one once embodied. The oath may formally expire with tenure; its moral residue does not. Indeed, the strongest argument for judicial self-regulation is judicial independence itself. If the judiciary does not frame its own norms, others eventually will try. That would be worse. Self-regulation preserves both autonomy and honour.
The real question, then, is not whether a retired judge is legally allowed to appear for a fugitive or debtor abroad. The question is whether the higher judiciary is willing to say that some things, though legally possible, are institutionally improper.
A great institution is not measured only by how it resists outside interference. It is also measured by whether it can identify its own weak links and correct them before public confidence erodes.
That moment has arrived. The judiciary should act now—calmly and firmly. The issue is no longer about one retired judge. It is whether the robe can be rented after retirement.
MB Nargund is a Senior Advocate, and Aditya Kashyap is an Advocate. He tweets @adityak.law. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)