During their infamous White House meeting on 28 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made an interesting offer to his US counterpart, Donald Trump. He said that Ukraine, which produces some of the world’s best military drones, and the US, with its top-tier air defence systems, should exchange licences for the production of these weapon systems.
What he did not mention was that Ukraine produces drones for as low as $400-500 which can destroy combined arms weapon systems like tanks that cost $2-10 million. Until 2022, Ukraine relied on imported drones like Turkish Bayraktar TB2 costing $5 million each. But since 2023, it has been mass producing indigenous drones, with the goal of making four million units annually—twice the number of artillery shells it fires in a year.
There is no doubt that cheap and expendable drones produced on a mass scale have dominated the battlefield in the Russia-Ukraine war, particularly with the advent of first-person view (FPV) drones, which can be operated by frontline soldiers. As a result, a decisive victory to Russia was denied, with the country losing over 2,900 tanks so far. The Russian naval fleet has been forced to vacate western Black Sea while even Moscow has been targeted by Ukrainian drones. However, the drones have not prevented the qualitatively and quantitatively superior Russian military from steadily capturing 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory, albeit at a phenomenal cost.
While drones are still dominating the tactical battlefield, their effectiveness has become relative due to an array of passive and active countermeasures and adaptive combined arms tactics. Drones still require manually controlled guidance and cannot match the volume and potency of artillery fire. Fully autonomous swarm drones capable of en mass engagement of multiple targets are nowhere on the horizon.
At this juncture, drones are certainly the cheapest and most effective precision-guided munition (PGM). However, their impact on the tactical battlefield is evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Drones on tactical battlefield
Since the first tanks clinkety-clanked over the trenches in the Battle of the Somme 109 years ago, these war machines have ruled the battlefield. An evolutionary process led to the creation of the mobile combined arms units and formations that are still dominated by tanks. In mountains, the infantry acts as the lead arm. Despite technological advancements, armour- or infantry-led combined arms are still required to defend or capture ground or at the macro level territory, which is the sine qua non of a nation. It is, invariably, one of the aims in a war and is likely to remain so until a fantasy army of robotic soldiers can be created.
Advances in military technology and countermeasures to neutralise combined arms have been relative and competitive, with any exponential advantage proving temporary. The experience with drones has been no different. The real challenge lies in making this technology affordable, whether to exploit or neutralise it. In my view, drones have become another component of combined arms — both to be exploited and defended against. Organisations and tactics for fully exploiting this arm are still evolving.
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Protection against drones
Tank is the most protected weapon system on the battlefield. However, it was designed for protection against flat trajectory weapons from the front. The appearance of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) with tandem warheads and top-attack capability led to introduction of strap-on explosive reactive armour (ERA) and ‘cope cages’.
FPV drones have the capability to hit other weak spots of a tank like turret-hull mounting, engine, exhaust, barrel, and tracks. Frantic efforts have been made to ensure protection through additional ERA panels, intricate cope cages, metallic sheet layers, and other improvisations.
Passive physical protection of supporting weapon systems like infantry carrier vehicles, artillery, and air defence guns as well as headquarters and logistic installations is not practical beyond a point. Age-old passive measures like dispersion, camouflage/concealment and small team operations still remain relevant. Infantry operating outside the defences has to rely upon passive measures more skilfully.
In view of the above limitations of passive protection, the best way to neutralise the drone threat is through active countermeasures, which include jamming and kinetic/laser destruction, and ‘fighter drones’. These countermeasures can be deployed on expensive weapon systems like tanks subject to design constraints and cost. Terminal active protection systems like Trophy and Arena, which destroy incoming ATGM/drone at standoff range, cost as much as 15-20 per cent of the cost of a tank. All these measures will have to be controlled by the same crew already handling an array of weapons.
In my view, the most effective way to protect against drones is to create an anti-drone bubble or grid around subunits, units, and even entire formations. Ukraine’s Kursk offensive is an excellent example of manoeuvre under the protection of an electronic and drone bubble.
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Tactical employment of drones
Drones tactics are still in an evolutionary stage. Their current domination of the battlefield is due to their precision, versatility, relatively low cost, and inadequacy of countermeasures. By all yardsticks, it is the most effective force multiplier ever seen on the battlefield. Drones can be employed for reconnaissance, surveillance, hard kill, active/passive counter-drone operations, target support for other weapon systems, and for deception to mislead/deplete enemy air/missile defence. They can also be used to overload enemy surveillance, lay mines, and as a carrier for communications, electronic warfare, and logistics.
Employment of drones and counter-drone planning must be dovetailed into all-operational activity—surveillance/reconnaissance, tactical movement, combined arms fire planning, and combat.
The concept that emerges is that the fighting arms—armour and infantry—must have integral cheap and expendable integral drones and counter-drone capability in addition to the drone support and counter-drone bubble created by higher headquarters. Combat support arms like artillery and air defence will require their own dedicated need-based drones. All combat support/logistics units and headquarters will have to be covered with integral anti-drone protection apart from the anti-drone bubble.
At the Integrated Battle Group (IBG) and corps level, more sophisticated drones with longer range will be required to cater for their areas of interest. Same would be the case for an anti-drone system to create an area protective bubble. The drone and anti-drone systems must be integrated into the Battlefield Management Systems. There should be a clear-cut demarcation of the area of responsibility of close combat, tactical, and operational/strategic level drones. The Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system has to be standardised between drones, helicopters, and aircraft to avoid fratricide. Air space management is likely to become more complex.
It is pertinent to mention that the abundance of low-cost drones makes their threat omnipresent in the entire battle zone. The same was never achieved by aircraft and attack helicopters due to their much smaller numbers and very high cost. In the Ukraine war, drones have made close air support and attack helicopter operations redundant.
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Organisations
Contrary to the impression given by videos of the Ukraine war and commercial drones seen in everyday life, the handling of military drones requires specialist training. Ukraine has created a new armed forces branch—Unmanned Systems Forces. Its commander, Vadym Sukharevsky, compared it to the creation of an air force. All drone units on land, air, and sea come under this branch. However, for large militaries each service would require its own component.
There is no other option for the Indian Army, but to create a similar combat support arm at the tactical and operational level as part of Integrated Battle Groups and Corps. This would require a subunit at IBG and a unit at corps level. These subunits/units will be responsible for coordination and control of all drone and anti-drone operations. Hence, anti-drone electronic warfare subunits should also come under their command.
In addition, the fighting arms—arms and infantry—and combat support arms will require their own subunits for drone and anti-drone operations. Close combat drones will have to be handled by frontline soldiers as add-on weapons. Composite counter-drone systems will have to be authorised to all logistics units and headquarters for point protection. Area protection will be ensured by IBG and corps subunits/units.
The Russia-Ukraine war has given the world a ringside view of the evolution of drone warfare. The Indian Army was quick off the blocks to rapidly induct drones. What needs to be done now is to formalise the integration of the drones as an integral arm of the Army’s combined arms.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)