Pakistan’s growing chasm with the Taliban is now widely regarded as a given. While other issues may exist, the primary bone of contention remains the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is linked to various Afghan Taliban groups and has emerged as a significant threat to Pakistan’s security, particularly in Balochistan, the tribal areas, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Tensions in these regions seem to be heating up.
Since the Taliban assumed power in 2021, Islamabad has repeatedly urged Kabul to rein in the TTP and force them to desist from attacking Pakistan or supporting insurgent groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). However, nothing has come of Pakistan’s dialogue with the Afghan government, and the seriousness of the threat has only worsened.
The TTP’s recent abduction of 16 workers from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in Lakki-Marwat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is a major signal—even strategic institutions are not safe from TTP militants in a nuclear-armed state. While eight of the workers have been rescued, serious doubts linger over the TTP’s ability to carry out such an act. Some have argued that Islamabad allowed the abduction of PAEC workers to send a signal to the US, aiming to secure Washington’s active re-engagement in the region.
These claims, however, are factitious and non-serious—although this does not mean the kidnapping is not serious, or that Rawalpindi does not hope for American attention. Pakistan’s nuclear and security establishment may not be too worried because the abducted workers were not senior personnel or engineers but local support staff employed in uranium mining. They were not provided additional security to avoid drawing attention. Transported to the site in a van and possibly kept under watch, they were likely targeted due to their vulnerability.
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Escalation in TTP-Pakistan Army conflict
The kidnapping follows a recent TTP notice warning that its future targets will include military-run enterprises such as the Frontier Works Organization (FWO), National Logistics Cell (NLC), Fauji Fertilizers, Askari Bank, and Defense Housing Authority (DHA) housing schemes. The group also warned retailers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal areas to stop selling military-produced goods within two months. This notice echoes recent calls by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) supporters urging citizens to boycott military products.
While it may be a coincidence that the PTI supporters’ social media campaign aligns with the TTP notice, it supports the Pakistani establishment’s narrative that the two entities are engaged in a coordinated effort to target the military. This narrative kills two birds with one stone: portraying PTI leader Imran Khan, who continues to give sleepless nights to the army chief, as an enemy of the state, and framing the conflict as a struggle between the Afghan Taliban and TTP versus the Pakistan military.
The abduction of the PAEC workers, as mentioned earlier, seems to have put the TTP-Pakistan Army conflict into a higher gear. A linear view of these events frames the development as a heightening of overall tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The buzz around the world is that Islamabad’s pro-Taliban strategy has collapsed and is now starting to bite it. Moreover, the frequency of TTP attacks has increased—from 267 in 2021 to 365 in 2022—and they have systematically gone after hard targets.
There is certainly a visible shift from the confidence exhibited by Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, then-ISI chief, who in 2021 smirked while sipping tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel that “everything will be all right,” to the current scenario, where the situation seems entirely out of control. It is also worth mentioning that since 2013, the ISI has pursued a strategy of resettling and accommodating certain TTP elements in the tribal areas. This policy has now backfired, as the militants are demanding the implementation of their system of Sharia (Islamic law) and control in these regions.
It is no longer a popular notion in Islamabad that Pakistan controls the Afghan Taliban, who seem to be marking their own direction, which was clear from the recent meeting between India’s Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, and Afghan Acting Foreign Minister, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, in the UAE. This meeting has upset Pakistan’s security community, with some arguing that Islamabad should use kinetic means to pressure Kabul. Islamabad did try to send a forceful signal, with Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets pounding Afghan territory in December, claiming it to be a response to a TTP attack on an army outpost that killed 16 soldiers. However, the PAF strikes did not kill TTP fighters but reportedly harmed civilians—women and children—resulting in a swift Afghan response. Therefore, voices like journalist Amir Rana’s are of the view that Pakistan should avoid a purely military approach, instead using military pressure as leverage to negotiate politically.
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Strengthening TTP, weakening Pakistan
These attacks and counterattacks, however, do not form the entire picture of Pakistan’s complex relations with the Afghan Taliban or its inability to formulate a robust strategy to deal with the threat. Many Afghan Taliban leaders have not entirely disinvested from Pakistan—their families either lived in Pakistan, were educated in Pakistani schools, or have personal and financial interests in the country. The Taliban are unable to control the TTP because they probably don’t want to divide their own ranks and drive fighters into joining the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), or perhaps because the TTP itself is not a cohesive group. Some TTP factions aggressively oppose Pakistan, while others maintain varying degrees of engagement with Islamabad.
It is worth noting that the TTP has presence in areas like Lakki-Marwat, and the local police in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa recently protested their inability to counter TTP militancy due to connections between militants and the military establishment. It is also claimed that some TTP elements join hands with other militants to target the Shia population in Parachinar, which is in a terrible state, facing deprivation of daily supplies, including medical facilities. Clearly, a human tragedy is in the offing in Parachinar on which most of Pakistan’s media is silent. Some, therefore, argue that the TTP and the Afghan Taliban are just a means to target the Shias of Kurram, who are suspected to be aligned with Iran.
Of course, such an argument falls in the realm of conspiracy theory and the answer lies in reduced capacity of the state, including its security agencies to deal with tough socio-political tensions in Parachinar or other parts of the country. The more important dimension pertains to lack of capacity that then impacts intent to fight violent non-state militants, especially in an environment where the military may have the equipment but not the political strength to fight.
Pakistan stands at a juncture where suspicion of the state among people, especially in politically less-significant provinces, has eroded its capacity to muster public support for a cohesive political-military action. The ongoing Imran Khan-government tension is just one part of the problem—although it gives wings to rising public anxiety vis-à-vis the state. There is an increasing trust deficit between the people and the state, which would further strengthen groups like the TTP. If unable to rescue the remaining PAEC workers, the state will not push hard enough because it doesn’t have sufficient support among the people to escalate the fight. Unless there is strengthening of the socio-political order, the TTP’s hands will continue to strengthen.
Ayesha Siddiqa is Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)