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Oli’s upcoming India visit shows the trust gap is narrowing. Nepal’s China card has limits

The ‘China card’ may have proved to be a useful tool for certain political parties in Nepal, but it cannot substitute for engagement with India.

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India has finally extended an invitation to Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli for a state visit, possibly in September this year. From Nepal’s perspective, this was a much-awaited invitation since the Communist Party of Nepal-UML chief formed a coalition government with the Nepali Congress in July 2024.

The invitation was extended by India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, who is on a two-day visit to Nepal from 17 to 18 August, at the invitation of his Nepalese counterpart. During his visit, Misri also met Nepal’s President, Prime Minister, and leaders of various political parties, including the Nepali Congress and Maoist Centre.

While it is traditional for newly elected or appointed leaders in India’s neighbouring countries to visit India to mark goodwill and signal an ‘India first’ approach, Prime Minister Oli had been awaiting an invitation.

The chatter in Delhi’s diplomatic circles is that India has been unhappy with Oli’s stance toward India, especially during the 2019-2020 border row, when he invoked ultra-nationalism premised on anti-India sentiment. It was during Oli’s tenure as PM in 2020 that the country’s parliament passed a controversial amendment to adopt a new political map of Nepal. The revised map unilaterally depicted disputed territories as Nepal’s own, which India strongly objected to. By altering the map in this way, Oli made the dispute intractable. For any government in Nepal—regardless of who leads it—reverting to the status quo ante is now politically untenable. The issue has become a matter of national pride, and any leader attempting a reversal would be courting political hara-kiri.

As External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar once put it, Nepal’s unilateral actions are “not going to change the situation between us or reality on the ground”. However, border issues remain the central bone of contention between the two countries.

Over the past five years, different governments in Nepal have regularly engaged with India, including high-level visits. But the last time Oli visited was in 2018. What makes him troubling to Delhi are his political manoeuvrings, often laced with anti-India sentiment. So what has changed in the last year for India to now welcome Oli?


Also Read: India provides Nepal with military equipment, medical supplies; PM Oli likely to visit next month


 

Diplomatic exchanges & limitations of the ‘China card’

To begin with, the continuation of diplomatic engagements has helped fill the trust deficit. In the past one year, there have been several high-level visits from India, including Misri in August 2024, the Nepal Foreign Minister’s visit to Delhi that same month, and ministerial visits by Shivraj Singh Chouhan and Manohar Lal Khattar in April 2025. These have helped prepare the turf for leadership-level engagement.

In addition, the two Prime Ministers have also met on two separate occasions—in New York on the sidelines of the 79th UNGA in September last year, and again at the BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand this April. Misri’s ongoing visit is expected to finalise the agenda for Oli’s upcoming trip to India.

The second factor would be the proven limits of what Nepal can realistically expect from third countries in terms of assistance and development cooperation, especially from China, its northern neighbour. Notably, after the fiasco at the India-Nepal border in 2015, when Kathmandu accused Delhi of the so-called ‘border blockade’, Nepal began exploring alternate trade and transit routes through China and even signed deals in this regard. However, geography—distance, road infrastructure, and the Himalayan terrain—did not support such plans.

In May 2017, Nepal joined the Belt and Road Initiative (then One Belt One Road), with connectivity as a central pillar. As part of this, the two countries envisaged the Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network (THMCN) in 2018 to connect Tibet and  Kathmandu by rail and road. It was seen as a significant step in Nepal’s attempts to lessen dependence on India for trade routes, and was framed at the time as a ‘diplomatic setback’ for Delhi.

However, BRI initiatives in Nepal have largely failed to materialise despite the highest-level efforts, including Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the country in October 2019. Interestingly, during his previous terms in office, Prime Minister Oli had spearheaded efforts to reorient Nepal’s foreign policy away from India and toward China. But a major question remains: what led to the non-materialisation of this ambitious partnership with China?

One answer could be: who pays for such ambitious projects? While China may be keen to extend more loans for the project to gain leverage and control over the infrastructure, Nepal would prefer it to be completed under grants—something that different leaderships in Nepal have attempted to convey to Beijing.

The fact is, China does not offer freebies. All its investments and activities in India’s neighbourhood, including Nepal, are strategic and dual-purpose, which poses significant limitations for a geographically smaller country like Nepal when dealing with Beijing. The ‘China card’ may have proved to be a useful tool for certain political parties in Nepal, especially the Left, who see China as a natural ideological partner, but it cannot substitute for engagement with India.

Nepal’s partnership with India has flourished on the foundation of mutual trust and better connectivity that facilitates uninterrupted trade and transit, both of which are essential for the well-being of a landlocked nation. Therefore, disregarding the entire gamut of the relationship because of existing issues would be premature. Despite the differences, in the past few years, Nepal’s export basket to India has expanded to include products such as hydropower, which is a major revenue source for Nepal and also expected to grow further.

Issues on the agenda

While the grounds for the visit are being finalised between the two countries, Prime Minister Oli’s key focus will likely be on building trust with Delhi. A possible invitation to Prime Minister Modi to visit Nepal, who has yet to make a state visit there in his third term, could make a difference.

Secondly, this visit might also be politically crucial for Oli, as his coalition with the Nepali Congress remains in a lurch due to deadlocks over constitutional reforms and the introduction of new bills. Considering the Nepali Congress has traditionally been close to India, a result-oriented visit to Delhi might help strengthen the coalition.

Thirdly, Prime Minister Oli may push for enhanced air connectivity with India, particularly between Nepalgunj and Delhi. While land connectivity already exists between Nepal’s western region and India, direct air links could improve public transport and reduce travel time. India, however, may have its own concerns about regional air connectivity with Nepal, including security and route viability, which the two leaders might discuss to resolve. Should Oli succeed in reaching an understanding, it would not only advance bilateral ties but also highlight his diplomatic acumen on the domestic turf.

Additionally, issues concerning trade and security, as well as revising the 1953 Extradition Treaty, could be seen in deliberations.


Also Read: It’s time to move on from Kalapani and Ayodhya. India-Nepal need a real reset


 

Beyond the zero-sum game

The visit provides an opportunity to strengthen trust, but Delhi must also show openness by addressing Nepal’s reasonable concerns, including the feasibility of new air connectivity routes.

Besides this, the Indian and Nepali media need to rethink their approach to reporting on bilateral ties. More often than not, the media in both countries have been at loggerheads and are overly sensitive to developments in the relationship.

For the Indian media, not every engagement between Nepal and China should be seen as a loss for India or as directed against Delhi. As a landlocked country, it is natural for Nepal to interact with its neighbours. Conversely, the Nepali media could rethink before pegging a diplomatic deadlock with India as a ‘high time strategy’ for Nepal to shift gears and move north.

Overall, India and Nepal stand as one of the finest examples in diplomacy that bilateral relations need not be a zero-sum game. When guided by trust and mutual benefit, the partnership can create shared prosperity that uplifts both nations.

Rishi Gupta is a commentator on global affairs. Views are personal.

(Edited by Asavari Singh)

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