One of the most consequential developments in Asia’s strategic landscape is Japan’s quiet but determined transformation into a more assertive security actor—precisely as US President Donald Trump has demanded America’s allies to take on greater responsibility. Against this backdrop, Sanae Takaichi’s rise as Japan’s first woman Prime Minister is more than symbolic. Her ascent in a deeply patriarchal political system indicates a generational shift in leadership and strategic intent.
Japan has endured a revolving door of four prime ministers in five years. Public fatigue with political instability, stagnant economic growth, and eroding trust in institutions opened the door for Takaichi—often called “Japan’s Margaret Thatcher”—to embody both promise and disruption. Her path to power, however, was far from smooth. Shortly after winning leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the coalition collapsed when the Komeito Party withdrew its support. Takaichi then forged an alliance with the Right-leaning, reformist Japan Innovation Party (JIP). That tactical pivot has secured her the premiership—and set the ideological tone of her administration.
Nationalism with strategic restraint
Takaichi is no political novice. Elected to the Diet (Japan’s parliament) in 1993, she has served in key cabinet roles—from Internal Affairs to Communications—earning a reputation for decisiveness in a system governed by consensus and factional bargaining.
Her political ideology sits firmly on the nationalist Right. She is closely linked to Nippon Kaigi, Japan’s largest conservative lobby, which advocates constitutional revision, traditional family structures, and a stronger military. Takaichi supports amending Article 9 of the Constitution to legitimise Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and allow for collective self-defence. This shift would formally end Japan’s post-war pacifist posture.
Yet, upon assuming office, she has shown strategic restraint. In a symbolic gesture to regional diplomacy, she refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine—long a source of tension with China and South Korea. While her ideological roots are clear, her early actions suggest a careful balancing of nationalism and pragmatism.
Abenomics reinvented—or recycled?
At 64, and a protégé of former PM Shinzo Abe, Takaichi is expected to revive the stalled Japanese economy not through austerity but with a stimulus package. She is not a feminist icon—her views on same-sex marriage and gender roles are conservative—but she is viewed as resolute, even hardline, on policy.
Takaichi’s core economic strategy is a renewed commitment to Abenomics, structured around three arrows:
Fiscal stimulus: Expansive public spending to revive growth despite an eye-watering 260 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio, the highest in the developed world.
Monetary easing: Continued ultra-low interest rates under the Bank of Japan to maintain liquidity, even as global pressure mounts over rising bond yields.
Structural reform: Deregulation and innovation-led productivity gains, the least realised component under Abe.
Abenomics, first launched in 2012–2013, succeeded in boosting markets but failed to produce long-term restructuring. Without deep reforms—labour market flexibility, digital innovation, and demographic revival—stimulus only inflated debt. Takaichi insists Japan must “grow out of debt,” not cut spending. Markets responded with optimism: equities jumped 4 per cent after her LDP victory and hit record levels upon her parliamentary confirmation.
Yet the risks remain profound. Inflation has surpassed the Bank of Japan’s target, real wages are declining, and industrial competitiveness is eroding. Political scandals involving slush funds and factional corruption have further damaged public trust. Rating agencies are watching closely: will Takaichi’s economic nationalism lead to renewal, or a fiscal reckoning?
Her first external test will come when she meets Trump in Tokyo this month. Washington wants Tokyo to halt Russian energy imports, increase defence expenditures, and follow through on a proposed $550 billion Japanese investment package in the US—a deal with vague contours. In preparation, she has appointed Toshimitsu Motegi as foreign minister, known for his experienced handling of Trump-era trade negotiations.
Security and defence: redefining pacifism
Japan hosts 54,000 US troops and remains a core member of the Quad alongside India, Australia, and the US. Since the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty, Tokyo has relied on Washington’s nuclear umbrella and forward deployment strategy for its defence.
But two realities have changed: Trump’s transactional approach to alliances and Japan’s deteriorating security environment.
Japan’s security threats are multi-directional and intensifying. First is China: territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands—central to any Taiwan contingency—along with Beijing’s assertive naval posture and “wolf-warrior” diplomacy. Second, Russia: the unresolved Kuril Islands/Northern Territories dispute, compounded by growing Russia-China military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific post-Ukraine war. Third, South Korea: the Takeshima/Dokdo territorial dispute and lingering resentment over Japan’s wartime history. Fourth, North Korea: advancements in missile technology, including the Hwasong-20 ICBM, heighten existential concerns that have led to a disruption in the balance of power in the Korean peninsula. Finally, historical burdens: neighbours frequently invoke Japan’s imperial past, complicating reconciliatory diplomacy.
Japan’s strategic posture is further constrained by Article 9, which prohibits maintaining “warring capabilities.” Only after 1992 were the Self-Defense Forces allowed to be deployed abroad under UN peacekeeping missions. Defence remained structured around reliance on US forces, especially in Okinawa. But that has changed.
Shinzo Abe was the architect of Japan’s security reorientation—reinterpreting Article 9, expanding SDF roles, and institutionalising the Quad. Takaichi inherits not only his vision but a global order more militarised, uncertain, and less dependent on American leadership.
In 2022, Japan unveiled a new National Security Strategy, followed in 2023 by a Defence Buildup Plan that enables the acquisition of long-range counterstrike capabilities—a dramatic shift from defensive-only doctrine. Japan, known as an economic giant wielding its soft power through Official Development Assistance (ODA), has now embarked upon the Official Security Assistance, aimed at developing security capabilities in countries such as the Philippines.
The new LDP–JIP coalition agreement promises four important developments in the above context: Accelerated deployment of long-range missiles and nuclear-powered submarines with vertical launch systems; streamlining SDF command structures and enhancing joint operational capability; and removal of export restrictions on Defence Equipment Transfer and Expansion of Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) defence facilities.
But it is the fifth development that is going to get the most attention, which marks the most ambitious restructuring of Japan’s intelligence architecture since World War II.
One of the most striking innovations is the plan to overhaul Japan’s historically weak intelligence system. The coalition proposes establishing a National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Director of National Intelligence equivalent to the US model; creating a National Intelligence Council by 2026; launching a Foreign Intelligence Service by FY2027; and setting up a cross-ministerial Intelligence Officer Training Institute and drafting a legal framework covering a basic intelligence law, Foreign Agents Registration Act, and Lobbying Disclosure Act by 2025.
Also read: India must move Japan from ‘old friend’ trap to real partners
Implications for India
India–Japan relations have gained momentum amid uncertainty about the US commitment to Asia. For New Delhi, a more proactive Japan under Takaichi presents both opportunities and strategic tests.
Japan’s willingness to expand defence and technology partnerships—signalled through projects like the “Unicorn” mast technology transfer—will likely deepen under Takaichi’s leadership. A more hawkish Japanese posture means India must recalibrate its role within the Quad, especially regarding burden-sharing in maritime surveillance, logistics, and military interoperability.
Intelligence cooperation may become a new frontier. For years, analysts debated whether Japan could ever join frameworks like Five Eyes and whether India could align with such intelligence-sharing ecosystems. With Article 9 constraints being circumvented and reforms in intelligence underway, Tokyo could inch closer to these clubs. This raises critical questions for India—particularly around the Quad’s Maritime Domain Awareness initiative, which increasingly requires sharing not just commercial shipping data but military intelligence.
Strategically, India stands to gain from a more engaged and empowered Japan in the Indo-Pacific and beyond—forming new trilaterals with Europe, the UK, and African partners. Yet it will require India to move beyond symbolic alignment to substantive strategic coordination.
But before any of this unfolds, Takaichi faces her first major test on 28 October—her meeting with Trump. Negotiating a recalibrated, less lopsided trade deal and defending Japan’s core interest in an era of transactional geopolitics will reveal whether she truly embodies Japan’s future: confident, resilient, and indispensable in the Indo-Pacific.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)