In ancient times, the beating of war drums and blowing of trumpets was used to psychologically intimidate the enemy and raise the morale of one’s own public and troops before and during a battle. In modern democracies, these have been replaced by political statements of the leadership. They decide the national security strategy and take the decisions to execute it. Keeping in view civilian control and surprise being a principle of war, the military hierarchy generally does not make public statements with respect to national security and remains focussed on executing political directions.
In view of above, it was rather unusual that both the Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, and the Chief of the Army Staff, Upendra Dwivedi, publicly warned Pakistan about changing its “history and geography”, implying a full scale war.
On 2 October, at Bhuj military station, in light of Pakistan’s build up of military infrastructure opposite Sir Creek, Rajnath Singh said, “Any ‘hikamat’ (stupidity) by Pakistan in Sir Creek area would result in a response so strong that both (its) history and geography will change”. He further added, “In 1965 Indian Army displayed the capability to reach Lahore. In 2025, Pakistan must remember that one route to Karachi passes through Sir Creek.”
A day later, while addressing troops in forward areas at Anupgarh, Rajasthan, General Diwevedi warned Pakistan of dire consequences if it does not stop state sponsored terrorism in India. He said, “This time we will not maintain the restraint that we had in Operation Sindoor 1.0. It is possible that we will hit it so hard that Pakistan will be compelled to do a rethink whether it wants a place in history and geography or not”
Hours earlier during the pre Indian Air Force (IAF) Day presser, the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Aman Preet Singh, said that during Operation Sindoor, 12 to 13 front line aircraft of Pakistan had been destroyed. One Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft or a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft, as well as five advanced fighters of the F-16 and JF-17 class, were taken out by long-range strikes by the S 400 air defence system. And Indian strikes at three separate bases inside Pakistan resulted in damage to a C-130 transport aircraft, an AEW&C aircraft and “four to five fighter aircraft, most likely F-16s” parked in hangars. While he presented no evidence to support his claim, he dismissed Pakistan’s claims of shooting five to six fighter aircraft on 7 May as “Manohar Kahaniyan (fanciful tales)”.
True to form, Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations responded on 4 October with an unprecedented all caps statement calling the statements of the defence minister and Army/Air Chiefs as provocative and jingoistic and an attempt to fabricate arbitrary pretexts for aggression. The statement warned that Pakistan had the capability and resolve to take the war to every nook and corner of India. And if there was erasure of Pakistan from the map (brought on by nuclear weapons) it “will be mutual”.
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Reality check
I find the talk of changing the “history and geography” of nuclear weapon armed adversaries incredulous and bizarre. Nuclear weapon states do not, and I dare say cannot, fight full scale decisive wars of annihilation. The moment any conflict tends to reach a critical escalation point to pose an existential threat, nuclear weapons will come into play. This is the very basis of nuclear strategy.
Indeed nuclear bluff as a “trip wire” deterrent can be called but only up to a point. There does exist space for a limited conflict below the nuclear threshold and logically all nuclear weapon states maintain the necessary conventional capability to reimpose deterrent and to prevent loss of face, territory, military potential and economic assets. For the above reasons, all talk of prolonged conventional wars between nuclear weapon states is nothing more than a figment of imagination. The only exceptions could be prolonged quid pro quo deployment or skirmishes for marginal gains along the Line of Control and Line of Actual Control or a state sponsored proxy war/insurgency. Russia-Ukraine (a non nuclear state) war model has no relevance for India.
China, Pakistan and India are nuclear weapon states where each state has attempted to impose its will on the other in the last 27 years, only to reach the same conclusions as above. Hence it would be prudent for the Indian political and military hierarchy to get down to brass tacks to refine its nuclear deterrence and formalise a prudent national security strategy and national defence policy to transform the Armed Forces to fight a limited conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold. Our conventional military capability must enable imposition of an offensive deterrent on Pakistan and dissuasive deterrent on China until the huge military differential with the latter is bridged.
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Measure of victory
Let there be no doubt that the measure of victory in a conflict below the nuclear threshold will rest in the psychological domain. Irrespective of the technological and numerical superiority, the damage inflicted will have to be kept within the bounds of the nuclear threshold. Hence, victory cannot be measured by competitive quantification of damage caused to men and material.
The focus should be on producing psychological paralysis—a situation in which the adversary, despite the availability of resources, cannot or fails to respond. This is achieved by repeatedly and speedily executing the OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) Cycle faster than the enemy. Destruction of men and material has to be kept within bounds of the nuclear threshold.
Imagine an alternate scenario for Operation Sindoor, in which the IAF lured the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into the air through deception and targeted it with long-range air defence systems to send it scurrying to the underground pens while simultaneously targeting the air defence systems en masse with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and ground/air launched missiles. Immediately thereafter, terrorist hubs, airbases, and command/control centres were simultaneously targeted with relative impunity. The operation would have been over in 24 hours with the psychologically paralysed military leadership seeking peace. Due to initial errors of judgement in prioritising terrorist targets over military targets, it took 88 hours to achieve the same results.
India’s victory lay in the symbolic targeting of eight air bases, radar sites and command and control assets across the length and breadth of Pakistan with impunity in the early hours of 10 May. IAF presented tangible proof of its strikes. Keeping in view the nuclear threshold the destruction imposed was limited and symbolic, but the real impact was psychological due to the unchallenged superiority of air power displayed. It is pertinent to mention that unacceptable loss of military potential is one of Pakistan’s specified nuclear thresholds. Hence, all cacophony of pressing home the advantage is hogwash.
Our narrative should have focussed on IAFs freedom of action and control of the sky over Pakistan which resulted in the PAF fighters being in the underground pens with air defence assets neutralised through deception, electronic warfare and destruction. Losses of aircraft over adversary territory from stand off ranges can rarely be proved. In future even the limited “social media evidence” would be blocked by imposition of electronic silence.
Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu famously said: “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” What is the measure of victory? Is it the destruction or loss of one to two per cent of fighter air strength and air defence systems or the symbolic targeting of the heartland with impunity, which led to psychological paralysis? I leave it for the readers to judge.
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Military transgression into political domain
It does not augur well for a democracy if the military transgresses into the political domain. Politicians target the minds of the public and nothing does the job better than rhetoric and bombast with respect to national security and military prowess to annihilate adversaries. But the military hierarchy also doing so is most dangerous. The Generals know the reality and their endorsement of political rhetoric can further raise the expectations of the public which has blind faith in the Armed Forces. This can eventually lead to flawed strategic decision making. The nation paid the price for the armed forces endorsing political rhetoric and grandstanding in 1962.
The military hierarchy has to give professional advice to the government and is expected to have the moral courage to point out the flaws in the strategic directions of the government. In the 15 day run-up to Operation Sindoor, the political statements rhetorically focussed on punishing the terrorists. Surprisingly, the military too got carried away to prioritise terrorist targets over military targets leading to initial setbacks and handing over a fig leaf narrative to Pakistan.
Whether it was due to political terms of reference or due to the military’s own decision making is a matter of speculation.
It would be prudent for the Indian military hierarchy to steer clear from political bombast aimed at the masses and give professional advice to the government with a straight spine. Once the political decision is taken, it should translate it into a pragmatic operational strategy without violating military fundamentals. If political delusions still impinge on operational strategy, have the gumption to ride on the “complete operational freedom to decide on the mode, targets and timing of our response” invariably given by the government.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)