Six decades ago, crucial negotiations between India and Pakistan were underway from 3 to 10 January 1966 in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, then a part of the Soviet Union. These talks culminated in the Tashkent Declaration, signed by both countries to bring the 1965 war to a formal close.
The high-powered Indian delegation led by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri included Defence Minister YB Chavan, External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh, Secretary to the Prime Minister LK Jha, Home Secretary LP Singh, Foreign Secretary CS Jha, Vice Chief of Army Staff PP Kumaramangalam, India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan Kewal Singh, India’s ambassador to Soviet Union TN Kaul and Joint Secretary in the PMO, CP Srivastava.
The Pakistani delegation was helmed by President Ayub Khan, and included Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Commerce Minister Ghulam Faruque Khan, Information Minister Khwaja Shahabuddin and Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar.
Gauhar was more than an Information Secretary—he was Ayub Khan’s trusted aide and the principal author of Friends, Not Masters. The one difference between the two delegations was that while the Indian team held regular discussions and was united behind Shastri, the Pakistan team was always bickering. Bhutto often threatened to “leave Tashkent, and take the nation into confidence”. The acrimony between Bhutto and Gauhar was intense (the latter was jailed after Bhutto took over the reins of Pakistan).
Why Tashkent?
Tashkent was part of the ancient Silk Road and, though not as well-known as Balkh and Bukhara, was a familiar name in the northern parts of the Indian subcontinent. It was annexed by the Russian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century and became part of the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
Tashkent was chosen as the venue for India-Pakistan negotiations as it was almost equidistant from both New Delhi (1,570 km) and Rawalpindi (1,580 km), then Pakistan’s capital. Also, because the Uzbek President, Madame Yadgar Nasriddinova, was Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin’s acolyte.
The Soviets paid great attention to protocol. Arrangements for the two delegations were exactly the same, and the three villas—for Shastri, Ayub Khan and Kosygin (where the talks were held) were of exactly the same size and dimension. Kosygin extended this insistence on parity even in his inaugural address. He referred to the talks as “India-Pakistan”, and “Pakistan-India” thirteen times each. Kosygin also had the backing of the US President Lyndon B Johnson and Harold Wilson of the UK for the talks.
5 August or 3 September: The Ceasefire Line or the International Border
Both dates are significant because the choice of date determined which country would be seen as the aggressor. For India, the hostilities started on 5 August 1965, when Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar by crossing the Ceasefire Line in the J&K sector. Pakistan sent sixty companies, each comprising around 110 armed personnel (in civilian clothes) with instructions to move to 60 different locations throughout Kashmir, and at each site, carry out arson, murder, and the destruction of bridges, communications, and government property by using Sten guns, hand grenades and other explosives.
Five Gibraltar units—named after legendary Muslim generals Tariq, Qasim, Khalid, Salahuddin and Ghaznavi—infiltrated into J&K under the cover of artillery fire, targeting areas such as Gurez, Kupwara, Uri, Poonch, Mendhar, Naushera and Akhnur. While India was initially taken by surprise, the greater shock was for Pakistani troops themselves. They did not even receive lukewarm support from the local population. On the contrary, their presence was reported to the J&K police, which promptly handed them over to the Punjab Police manning the Ceasefire Line.
Thus, on 8 August 1965—the day chosen for the proposed insurrection because it marked the anniversary of Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest—the operation unravelled. Much to the discomfiture of the Pakistani establishment, the well-laid-out plan of Operation Gibraltar was aired over All India Radio.
The Red Fort speech on 15 August
A week later, speaking from the ramparts of the Red Fort, Prime Minister Shastri declared, “Pakistan must bear full responsibility for the attack. It (Pakistan) had banked upon an internal revolt in the wake of the attack. It intends to step up trouble in Kashmir. Under the circumstances, there is absolutely no scope for talks. We want peace in Kashmir, but if we are attacked, it becomes the responsibility of the government to meet force with force.”
“We have to defend our borders and beat the designs of those who cast an evil eye upon us. The honour of the flag under which we stand today has to be upheld. We may perish, but we will not allow the honour of our flag to be sullied. India will continue to progress and prosper,” he added.
As was his practice, Shashtri concluded by asking everyone present to repeat Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s slogan of the Azad Hind Fauj— ‘Jai Hind’, to which the entire assemblage responded with all their might and vigour.
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From Gibraltar to Grand Slam
After the resounding defeat of Operation Gibraltar, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam, involving a full-scale assault. On 23 August, three companies of the Pakistan army, armed with light machine guns and mortars, attempted to penetrate the Mendhar sector, but were repulsed.
General Robert Harold Nimmo, head of the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), was briefed by Gen JN Chaudhuri on these incursions. This was reported to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant. The US media also got a whiff of this. A report in The Denver Post (reproduced by Hindustan Times on 28 August) read, “the burden of border fighting in Kashmir must fall on the aggressor, which appears to be Pakistan. The report also raised questions against Washington, noting that Pakistan, despite receiving substantial US military and economic aid, was moving to China.
At the time, Pakistan was a member of two US-backed defence treaties: the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization ( SEATO).
By late August, India also decided to flex its muscles. On 28 August, Indian forces drove Pakistani troops out from their bases along the Uri-Poonch loop along the CFL. It was during these operations that India captured the strategic post of Haji Pir Pass, and hoisted the tricolour at 8,600 feet, the return of which became a very contentious issue.
CFL or LAC
Readers may note that this column uses the term Ceasefire Line (CFL), not Line of Actual Control (LAC). For the record, the CFL, with minor modifications, was designated as the LAC after the 1972 Simla Agreement. However, with Pakistan suspending the agreement on 24 April 2025 after India cancelled the Indus Waters Treaty in the light of the Pahalgam attacks, the LAC has again become the CFL.
Sanjeev Chopra is a former IAS officer and Festival Director of Valley of Words. Until recently, he was director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration. He tweets @ChopraSanjeev. Views are personal.
This is the first article in a series about the Tashkent Declaration.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)