India’s maritime vision has matured into a well-defined strategic doctrine, supported by robust policy frameworks executed through a network of bilateral and plurilateral engagements. This evolution is prominently showcased in international mega-conferences—many of which are hosted overseas—attracting a broad spectrum of stakeholders from India’s strategic community, government, and private sector.
These engagements have collectively become vital for positioning India as a key maritime player on the global stage. The mood at the recently concluded 8th Indian Ocean Conference held in Muscat was upbeat, as the event fostered regional synergy and enhanced cooperation through both diplomatic instruments and bilateral engagements.
Although a late bloomer, India has made significant strides in its maritime diplomacy over the last decade. That said, there is an urgent need to accelerate the development of indigenous maritime capabilities. To emerge as a net security provider, India must pursue these objectives simultaneously.
Indian Ocean: India’s primary maritime theatre
India’s primary theatre of maritime engagement is the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which is further divided into the eastern and western sub-theatres. With a coastline spanning 7,500 km, 12 major ports, and over 200 minor ports, New Delhi is positioned at the heart of the Indo-Pacific—a vast geopolitical construct that has gained increasing strategic relevance.
Although India boasts a rich maritime past—with trade and power projections deeply entwined with its cultural and economic evolution—post-independence progress in maritime thought and vision has been a victim of limited resource pool and inadequate funding. When the British left, they bequeathed a fledgling (yet professional) Navy but no overarching maritime strategy or vision. In young India, the primary strategic concern was understandably continental, dominating its strategic imagination and foreign policy.
However, with the maritime domain emerging as the theatre of unfolding great power contestation, the dynamic nature of the oceans once again became intrinsic to India’s economic security, its commitment to free, open, and inclusive seas, and its efforts to balance China’s destabilising rise.
Lately, there is a growing recognition of India’s economic and energy dependence on secure maritime routes. Beijing’s assertive maritime policies in the South China Sea, coupled with the erosion of India–China strategic trust following Galwan, have intensified India’s maritime focus. The Chinese Communist Party’s stated objective of containing India’s regional rise further fuels this strategic shift. Additionally, as noted by Rahul Roy Chowdhary in his book Sea Power, the 2008 Mumbai attacks—carried out via the sea—awakened India to a new dimension of countering terrorism.
Also read: India’s naval advancements will fuel its Indian Ocean ambitions. Focus on 5 key areas
Several nautical miles
Geopolitical events have shaped and honed India’s maritime vision pertaining to the IOR. Although New Delhi began its maritime engagement early on, its initial articulation of naval strategy— ‘Freedom of Use of Seas: Indian Maritime Strategy’ (2004)—was rather simplistic. Despite procedural upgrades in 2007, the strategy maintained a limited view of the IOR and remained confined to coastal waters. By 2009, the approach evolved into a more holistic vision when the Indian Navy replaced the term ‘doctrine’ with ‘strategy’ for the first time.
However, real momentum arrived after 2014. Building on earlier frameworks, the Indian Navy transitioned from ‘using the seas’ to ‘securing the seas’ at a time when global attention started gravitating towards the Indo-Pacific.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s articulation of the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision in 2015 marked a significant milestone—India first used the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in its maritime strategy. That year also marked the first delineation of India’s primary areas of interest (the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and critical choke points) and its secondary areas (the southern IOR, extending from the east of Africa to the shores of Australia). These priorities, along with the aspiration to become a net security provider, were further reinforced by the launch of the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) at the 2019 East Asia Summit.
By identifying the IOR as both its immediate and extended neighbourhood, Modi integrated maritime strategy into India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy.
Geo-economics and geostrategy
Today, India’s maritime strategy reflects a critical overlap between its economic ambitions and strategic imperatives. As India aspires to great power status, a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific remains central to its vision. The western Indian Ocean, in particular, is crucial for India’s energy security and key connectivity initiatives—especially the INSTC and the proposed IMEC—in addition to the traditional Suez Canal route.
As China has aggressively expanded its maritime footprint through its first overseas military base in Djibouti (2016) and strategic investments in key ports around India—including Gwadar and within the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—India has been slowly but steadily responding to this so-called “String of Pearls.” In addition to various instruments that reinforce India’s maritime vision (which will be discussed shortly), key bilateral agreements have also been struck for timely strategic balancing.
For instance, key logistics agreements with the US—such as LEMOA (2016) and COMCASA (2018)—strive to deepen US–India defence cooperation in the maritime domain. In the same year, the Indian Navy secured at least three important agreements: one with Singapore to access its Changi base, one with Oman to access its Duqm port, and one with Indonesia to access its Sabang port. Additionally, the Navy has gained similar access to other strategic locations across the IOR through agreements with Seychelles, Mauritius, and Australia.
These strategic maneuvers are complemented by several plurilateral instruments progressing simultaneously. SAGAR itself has been working to enhance maritime domain awareness through initiatives such as the Integrated Coastal Surveillance System (ICSS) with key partners.
The establishment of the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in 2018 has emerged as the most visible of India’s multilateral initiatives to integrate maritime information with trusted partners. This 40-member centre enhances maritime security by integrating maritime domain awareness (MDA) to combat hybrid threats. Another biennial platform, initiated by India in 2008—the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)—has gained strategic traction in recent years, with increasingly enthusiastic participation from littoral countries in the region.
Additionally, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1997 when then-President of South Africa Nelson Mandela visited India, has seen New Delhi play a key role in shaping and expanding its maritime security agenda—particularly during its presidency (2011–2013). India has also deepened its engagement with BIMSTEC, as China’s growing influence in a significantly altered strategic environment in Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries becomes a matter of concern—especially given Beijing’s rapidly expanding defence and strategic footprint.
Trump and the rest
In the era of Donald Trump, India hopes that long-term convergence on the Indo-Pacific will gain ground, despite mixed signals on China and Xi. New Delhi is preparing to receive Donald Trump in September for the Quad leaders’ summit. Although the forum is a centrepiece of the US Indo-Pacific tilt, it has somewhat lost its strategic sharpness. While the members—the US, India, Japan, and Australia—conduct Malabar war exercises, through the Quad they remain conservative on the issue of Beijing’s maritime antics. Come September, the Quad might gain more “teeth” in the security landscape, and developments on the Quad’s Indo-Pacific MDA initiative are expected.
That said, these are days marked by Trump’s perpetual strategic cacophony. India must not only keep its options open but also continuously readjust to the ongoing global realignment, even though its contours remain fuzzy at the moment. PM Modi’s recent visit to the US was aimed at safeguarding India’s interests with a crucial strategic partner.
New Delhi must also capitalise on the strategic confluence with Brussels’ Indo-Pacific vision, whose seven fundamental pillars closely align with India’s. India and the EU (as well as major member states such as France) remain committed to reducing great power contestation. Under an unpredictable Trump with fractured transatlantic ties, Europe is striving to chart an independent course for its security mandate—and India is ideally positioned to be the preferred partner.
The largest ever delegation from Brussels, accompanied by a brand-new Commissioner for Defence, will soon be in New Delhi for strategic talks. Among various strategic verticals, maritime security cooperation is the most developed. India has successfully participated in a range of EU Naval Force missions—such as Atalanta and Aspides—and has aligned with other EU instruments like Enhancing Security in and with Asia (ESIWA) and the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP).
India’s vision for a multipolar Indo-Pacific cannot reconcile with China’s insistence on a unipolar Asia-Pacific led by Beijing. Therefore, a comprehensive and resilient maritime strategy will remain central to New Delhi’s strategic calculus.
Swasti Rao is a consulting editor at ThePrint and a foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)
This article seems all over the place. How is India poised to lead? The India navy is barely able to patrol local seas adequately, forget the Indian ocean. Attending forums and giving speeches on lofty ambitions only serves as an illusion.
China has never called for a unipolar dominance of the Asia pacific. The aggression in the Indian ocean started after India started participating in naval blockade exercises targeting China and trying to muscle it’s way into the SCS dispute.
India should focus on honing it’s green-water naval capabilities first instead of day dreaming of being masters of the “Indo-Pacific”.
This self appointed expert on indian diplomacy and defence, mocked our defence minister sri rajnath singhji, calling him kadi ninda. She was rightfully kicked out of government funded institutions. Now she is trying butter up the govt and get her position back. Rajnath ji , ensure that she is kicked out for good.