Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s rise in Syria concerns everyone. It’s the era of indivisible security

Representational image | Syrian rebels push toward Hama after taking Aleppo; pro-Assad forces, Russia mount counterattacks | Photo: Reuters

The Syrian opposition forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, launched a swift and decisive offensive last week, reigniting a civil war that had been largely stagnant since 2020. This renewed conflict almost coincided with a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, temporarily pausing hostilities in the broader Middle East. After the fall of Aleppo, another key stronghold of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Hama has also reportedly fallen with little resistance.

Hama lies on the crucial route to Damascus, with only the city of Homs standing between the rebels and the Syrian capital. The Syrian Army is in disarray, as its traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—are distracted by their own internal and external challenges, a situation US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described as “problems of their own making.” Images of Hama’s takeover by rebels have spread rapidly across the internet, underscoring the gravity of the situation.

What exposed Assad’s vulnerability

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is capitalising on Bashar al-Assad’s weakness. Assad, who inherited Syria’s leadership from his father in 2000, is the only authoritarian leader who managed to survive the pro-democratic Arab Spring uprisings. His government endured largely due to support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Iran began overseeing the reorganisation of Assad’s military in 2012, training thousands of militia fighters. Hezbollah intervened in 2013, deploying forces to defend Assad near the Lebanese border, and Russia entered the conflict in 2015, with airpower and special forces.

On the global stage, Russia and China repeatedly vetoed United Nations Security Council resolutions, which proposed to sanction Assad’s government for atrocities such as the use of chemical weapons. This move, of course, rendered multilateral mechanisms ineffective. Despite holding much of Syria after 2020, thanks to Russian and Iranian assistance, Assad has had only nominal control over a divided country.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically in 2024. Russia is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, diverting resources to annex more territory and reclaim Kursk. Iran, meanwhile, grapples with domestic unrest, economic instability, and setbacks inflicted by Israel on its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas after Hamas’ October 2023 attacks.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has seized this opportunity, emerging from its jihadist roots in the Idlib province as a proto-military force. Over the past five years, it has developed a centralised command structure, specialised combat units, advanced weaponry, and local manufacturing capabilities, including drones and munitions. Its arsenal has grown through both battlefield captures and black-market acquisitions, including Russian tanks, armoured vehicles, and a Pantsir air defence system. It serves as a reminder of 2020 Afghanistan, where US-abandoned equipment was usurped by the Taliban.

The group’s rise threatens Assad’s remaining grip on power. If Homs, the final stronghold before Damascus, falls, Assad’s rule will likely collapse entirely. With his traditional backers overstretched and isolated, the president no longer controls Syria. And his authority remains precarious even within the territories he does hold currently. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s lightning offensive highlights the fragility of his regime and underscores the declining influence of Russia and Iran in sustaining their ally.

Before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Syria served as a key arena for its efforts to challenge the American-led global order. Russia maintained two significant military bases in Syria: an airbase in Khmeimim and a naval base in Tartus. Following the onset of the Ukraine war and the losses suffered by the Russian Black Sea fleet, Moscow activated the Syrian Express, a critical maritime supply route connecting Tartus to the Russian port of Novorossiysk.

The importance of this supply network was first highlighted to me during discussions with naval officials in Eastern Europe. However, the recent evacuation of the Tartus naval base marks a significant strategic setback for Russia. By losing its only naval presence in the Mediterranean, Moscow has also effectively relinquished control of the Syrian Express. This development represents a major defeat, as it severely limits Russia’s ability to reinforce or withdraw assets in Syria without bypassing Europe entirely.

Geo-located footage initially reported by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), confirms that the vessels from Tartus now have only one viable destination: Kaliningrad. The Montreux Convention will prevent Turkey from allowing warships to pass through the Turkish straits, blocking Russia’s access to the Black Sea for these vessels.

Assad’s options

Bashar al-Assad has reportedly announced a 50 per cent salary increase for his fighters in an attempt to shore up morale amid mounting losses. While Russia no longer controls the naval base in Tartus, it retains an airbase in Khmeimim, from which it has been conducting airstrikes to support Assad’s forces. However, these airstrikes have primarily resulted in significant civilian casualties. Moreover, they have done little to help Assad’s army retain control over key cities, which continue to fall one after another. Reports indicate that the rebels are approximately 35 kilometres from the Russian airbase.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is redeploying elements of its African Corps—a unit established by the Russian Ministry of Defense to replace Wagner Group operations in Africa—to bolster its position in Syria. However, this effort to take the shadow-instrument route appears to be yielding minimal results.

Meanwhile, Iran has announced a forthcoming meeting with high-ranking officials from Turkey and Russia in Doha this weekend. It aims to discuss the diplomatic process that previously aimed to stabilise borders in the region. Yet, recent developments reveal that Iran and its allies have largely lost the capacity to sustain or resupply their militias in Syria and Lebanon on a large scale, even under current conditions.

Merging theatres and India

The renewed fighting in northern Syria involving the US, Russia, Iran, and Turkey highlights the complexities of today’s global politics, where competing power plays are deeply interconnected and driven by brute self-interest. We are living in an era marked by overlapping crises. When the war in Ukraine began in 2022, initially, the concept of “indivisible security” from Europe to Asia was met with scepticism, as many neutral countries wanted to avoid becoming entangled in Europe’s problems.

This sentiment was captured by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s well-known statement: Europe has to relinquish the mindset that Europe’s problems are world problems, but world problems aren’t Europe’s problems.

While this perspective remains reasonable, it talks of a one-way impact of how power transitions and conflicts in one region inevitably ripple across others. In reality, it is both ways. The world has three distinct geopolitical theatres—Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific—each with unique characteristics and reasons for ongoing and impending conflicts.

However, these theatres do not function in isolation, as the dynamics of one are closely linked to the others. One could also include regions like Africa and Latin America in this discussion. But a critical factor connecting these three theatres is the emergence of an “axis of destabilisation” formed by certain nations—China, Russia, Iran and North Korea—which is steadily growing.

India has always taken a principled stance in the West Asian conflict and has provided humanitarian help and aid to the war-torn country. It has also been working steadily to increase its footprint in the Mediterranean. As far as the different theatres are concerned, India has maintained neutrality and remained multi-aligned with as many countries as possible.

However, as the ripples reach the Middle East, New Delhi’s response must evolve to address the still-unresolved situation in the Red Sea region, which is directly impacting India. While the apparent weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah has been noted, the same cannot be said for the Houthis, whose assurances have so far primarily benefited maritime trade involving Russia and China. Even after one year, every single Indian ship is still going around the Cape of Good Hope making maritime commerce insanely expensive.

The question is whether India is prepared to take on a more prominent role in the security domain within a global dynamic where geopolitical theatres increasingly overlap and influence one another. There is no escaping this uncomfortable reality today—security has undeniably become indivisible.

The writer is a geopolitics analyst and author. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.

(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)