Ever since US President Donald Trump returned to power, observers have speculated whether his foreign policies are based on instinct or if there is an elaborate strategy in place. We now have a document, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, which came out on 4 December. The document’s 29 pages contain the strategic worldview of the Trump administration.
The key elements of this view focus on Western Europe, China, Latin America, and the Middle East, along with, of course, what changes must be introduced internally. India does not get a significant placement, only a fleeting reference. I lay out below the salient features of Trump’s worldview—before coming to India. Believing that exposition must precede critique, I do not yet engage in a critical overview. We must understand before we critique.
The document begins with a two-fold criticism of the pre-existing government strategy. First, previous administrations wrongly thought that America had the resources to fund a welfare and regulatory state internally and a massive defence, intelligence and foreign policy complex for external purposes. They “overestimated America’s ability to fund” such an ambitious state; it ought to be downsized.
Second, their hugely mistaken drive toward globalisation and “the so-called free trade hollowed out the very middle class and industrial base,” which forms the basis of economic and military power. America’s allies should pay more for their defence, not “offload the cost of their defense” on the US. Moreover, the power of international institutions, “some of which are driven by outright anti-Americanism”, must come down. One should assume that this means a reduction in America’s support for the UN and its affiliate organisations, perhaps including the World Bank.
Does diversity weaken national security?
From a security perspective, what is absolutely new in the Trump doctrine is the emphasis on issues of culture and ethnic diversity, both within and without.
Internally, Trump wants “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health, without which long-term security is impossible”. The emphasis here is on severely controlling immigration from non-Western countries, as well as an abandonment of the so-called DEI (Diversity, Equity and Inclusion) policies, both in the government and non-governmental institutions such as the universities. “The era of mass migration is over,” for it, says the document, has increased crime, undermined social cohesion, warped labor markets and, by representing foreign interests in American polity, weakened national security.
Externally, the argument is two-fold. First, in its foreign policy, the US will not especially cultivate democracies, nor would it emphasize democracy-building, stating that local cultures determine whether democracy is an appropriate governmental form. It will deal with foreign countries purely based on interests.
Second, Trump also believes that America’s biggest ally, Western Europe, faces “civilizational erasure”. The full argument is worthy of citation:
“The larger issues facing Europe include … migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence. .. Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. .. We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence.”
Trump says that the Right-wing parties of Europe, not the parties currently in power, can revive “civilizational self-confidence”. In the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, Vice President JD Vance had raised this point. The reference here is to Nigel Farage’s Reform Party in the UK, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Europe should also drastically cut immigration from non-European countries and embrace right-wing populism, says the document.
On Latin America (or the “Western Hemisphere”), the document speaks of a “Trump Corollary” to the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, identifying this region as an incontestable sphere of American influence. Non-American powers like China must reduce their special relationships and influence there. In addition, the power of drug cartels and crime syndicates, which negatively affect the US, should be crushed, and the Hispanic immigration from the region systematically discouraged. At 18 per cent of the US population, one should note, the Hispanics are the biggest minority in the US now, one and a half times larger than the African Americans.
On the Middle East, which American foreign policy “has prioritized .. above all other regions .. for half a century at least”, Trump’s basic argument is that the region’s customary oil significance has declined because America has hugely increased its energy production. But “conflict remains the Middle East’s most troublesome dynamic”.
America under Trump would follow a two-fold strategy. It would not let the region be dominated by an “outright enemy”, meaning Iran and its affiliates in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Second, it would like to turn the region into “a place of partnership, friendship and investment”, an idea that the Abraham Accords embodied. Business can dampen conflict.
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Dealing with China
China is given more space than any other country in the document. Trump, says the document, “singlehandedly reversed more than three decades of mistaken assumptions about China: namely, that by opening our markets to China, encouraging American business to invest in China and outsourcing our manufacturing to China”, the US would make China a responsible member of a “rules-based international order”. That did not happen, and America’s economic elites, supported by both Democratic and Republican administration, were “willing enablers”. China’s rise has hurt the US, especially economically, but also strategically.
So, how should America deal with China?
Economically, Chinese trade surpluses should end. Also, must end state subsidies for private entrepreneurs in China, intellectual property theft, and threat to “our supply chains.. including rare earth elements”.
As for national security per se, “deterring a conflict over Taiwan.. is a priority”. Taiwan’s importance is emphasized. It dominates semiconductor production and provides “direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters”. Also critical is the security of the South China Sea, through which “one-third of global shipping passes annually”. A “competitor nation” like China cannot be allowed to militarily dominate it.
How would these goals be achieved? While the US will strengthen itself militarily against China, allies also have to chip in. Japan and South Korea must increase defence spending. And America “must continue to improve commercial and other relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States (‘the Quad’).”
This is among the two fleeting mentions of India in the document. In the opening pages, a reference is also made to Trump’s success in bringing a ceasefire to the India-Pakistan conflict in May.
Let me end with two conclusions. First, Trump’s security doctrine speaks of something that scholars used to discuss, but defence policy documents rarely did. Can ethnic or racial diversity undermine national security? Trump has no doubt it can, and it does. Scholars have always said: It depends on history and institutions. Second, his approach to India is instrumental, not intrinsic. For all US administrations since Bill Clinton, both Republican and Democratic, the US-India relationship, as Barack Obama put it, was the “defining relationship of the 21st century”. For Trump, India matters only for Indo-Pacific security.
Ashutosh Varshney is Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Brown University. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)