In 2015, Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s President at the time, made headlines as the first Taiwanese leader to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore, a move widely interpreted as showcasing his stance on cross-Strait policy and his prioritisation of relations with China. Fast forward to 2024, and Ma was once again in the company of Xi, this time at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Despite characterising his 11-day visit to China as personal, ostensibly leading a student delegation, the nature of Ma’s visit and his meeting with Xi were far from personal or private.
As a member of Taiwan’s major opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), Ma’s objective of prioritising China continues from the time he served as Taiwan’s president from 2008 to 2016. He made overt efforts to influence the Taiwan elections in January this year by orchestrating an arrangement between the KMT and Ko Wen-je’s Taiwan People’s Party, aimed at consolidating power against the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Ma’s actions are motivated by a desire to preserve his legacy and influence in Taiwanese politics and cross-Strait relations. His latest meeting with Xi represents the first and only instance of a Taiwanese leader (either former or incumbent) engaging in discussions with the Chinese leadership on Chinese soil.
Ma’s stance indicates he is entrenched in the past while Taiwan is transforming massively in the present.
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Ma is fulfilling what Xi wants
For many in Taiwan, it is puzzling that a former Taiwanese president would interpret his China visit as ‘a journey of peace and friendship’, especially given Xi’s assertive actions, such as China’s gray zone activities in the Taiwan Strait, and the absence of any signs of reconciliation with the DPP and the current (Tsai Ing-wen) and incoming (Lai Ching-te) presidents.
Upon his return, it seemed that Ma brought Xi’s message back to Taiwan. In a Facebook post, he encouraged the president-elect to consider reinstating the 1992 consensus, endorsing the ‘One China’ framework, and refraining from promoting Taiwan independence.
This sentiment does not resonate with the majority of Taiwanese people, especially given the momentous changes occurring in Taiwan in recent years. More and more Taiwanese now identify themselves solely as Taiwanese (61.7 per cent) and prefer to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait rather than unquestioningly accept the 1992 consensus and the ‘One China’ framework.
During the meeting, both Ma and Xi sought to convey their emotional messages in a bid to sway the people of Taiwan. “Compatriots from both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same Chinese nation. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese. There are no knots that cannot be untied, no issues that cannot be discussed, and no force that can separate us,” Xi remarked.
A Weibo post featuring a photo of Ma at his hotel after the meeting with Xi described him as ‘overly excited’. However, Ma seems to have overlooked the consequences of unchecked alignment with China under the guise of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and the growing dependence that fuelled the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 2014. These factors significantly contributed to the defeat of KMT in the 2016 elections. Currently, perceptions regarding China in Taiwan have shifted, with numerous Taiwanese desiring peaceful cross-Strait relations while safeguarding Taiwan’s autonomy.
Though Ma’s message may not be widely appreciated in Taiwan, he is receiving acclaim in China, emerging perhaps as the most favoured Taiwanese politician there. One notable instance is that of Jin Canrong, Associate Dean of the School of International Studies at Renmin University. He praised Ma for urging Lai Ching-te to uphold the 1992 consensus. Moreover, upon his departure from Taiwan after the meeting with Xi, Ma was seen off at the tarmac by high-ranking officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office.
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Meeting with Ma more beneficial for Xi
The timing of the meeting aligned with the inaugural US-Japan-Philippines trilateral, the 45th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and more importantly, just a month before the inauguration of Taiwan’s next president. This timing implies Xi’s intention to signal to Taiwan and the US his willingness to engage with stakeholders who might be more receptive to his approach, even if they are not necessarily influential in Taiwanese politics or the broader US-China-Taiwan triangle anymore.
In Taiwan, Ma’s meeting did not generate as much buzz as it did in China, where major media outlets like Xinhua and the People’s Daily prominently covered the meeting. Nonetheless, the meeting conferred several advantages to Xi, markedly favouring him over Ma. Firstly, domestically, Xi could portray Taiwan is not entirely lost, underscoring perceived pro-reunification sentiments within the island. Secondly, it provided Xi with a pretext to showcase his purported commitment to pursuing peaceful reunification and his openness to dialogue. Thirdly, Xi seized the opportunity to directly engage with a Taiwanese counterpart (even a former president), showcasing his capacity to adopt a more conciliatory tone towards Taiwan. This contrasted sharply with the usual inflexible stance on Taiwan, especially in his interactions with his US counterpart.
On the surface, Ma’s meeting with Xi appears conducive to restoring peace and stability and creates an illusion that any form of cross-dialogue is important. But its actual impact on resuming cross-Strait dialogue and mitigating China’s coercive policies towards Taiwan remains elusive. While Xi may have momentarily achieved his objectives and conveyed to Ma that his legacy is valued (particularly in China), the meeting did not necessarily benefit Taiwan. Gray zone activities and China’s reluctance to engage with Taiwanese leadership are likely to persist. The stability of cross-Strait relations ultimately hinges on Xi’s willingness and intentions. In this context, Ma meeting with Xi or any other assurances may have limited effectiveness.
Sana Hashmi, PhD, is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and George HW Bush Foundation for US-China Relations. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)