The first official ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine—negotiated through two phone calls made by US President Donald Trump—collapsed just four hours after its announcement.
The ceasefire amounted to little more than three key takeaways: a 30-day pause on targeting each other’s energy infrastructure, the exchange of 175 prisoners of war, and (in principle) the resumption of ice hockey between the US and Russia.
Before the two superpowers could settle on a date for the next match, a barrage of missiles and drones struck Ukraine, targeting its civilian and energy infrastructure. Ukraine responded in kind. The ceasefire, in essence, ceased to exist. It now has a place only in strategic discussions as a potential first step toward a sustainable and lasting peace settlement in the Russia-Ukraine war.
A couple of reflections emerge. First, the US was well aware of the fragility of the ceasefire. In anticipation, it reinstated military and intelligence assistance following the Jeddah talks between Ukrainian and American officials. The ceasefire, in fact, came just days after these talks, as a result of an hour-long phone call between Trump and Putin.
Second, if the US and Russia had the real power to end the war, it should have been over by now. Why the delay?
Fragile ceasefires
The Russia-Ukraine war today is fluctuating between the realities on the ground and Trump’s apparent desperation to secure the Nobel Peace Prize. The analytical framework reveals two discrepancies—an agency problem and a solution problem. Both are intertwined.
The agency problem arises from not granting Ukraine and Europe the agency in shaping the broader US strategic calculus. The solution problem stems from insufficient analysis of critical factors such as Europe’s unprecedented military modernisation, the groundwork necessary for executing mineral deals in Ukraine, and the feasibility of peacekeeping versus peace-enforcing strategies for Kyiv. The latter operates with a traditional, outdated mindset focused on conventional warfare, ill-equipped to handle the instability of a grey zone conflict that is likely to erupt if a lasting resolution is not pursued.
For any ceasefire in Ukraine to be effective, it must include a European element. Even if a conventional war ends due to the US’ withdrawal of support, the situation will shift. Ukraine will likely transition from a conventional war to a hybrid conflict. Contrary to popular belief, Russia is vulnerable in this hybrid zone. Ukraine’s ability to strike deep within Russian territory continues to improve, and many of these actions could be executed through unofficial channels as well.
Trump may have been inconsistent and unpredictable, but his desire for a minerals deal with Ukraine has been a constant. However, the question remains: where are these minerals located? If most of them are in territories occupied by Russia, it complicates the US’ potential presence in Ukraine. Would the US invest bilaterally in those regions? Meanwhile, the US is also pushing for a settlement with Russia, which creates a strategic paradox.
When we consider the facts on the ground, however, the situation changes.
Ukraine is home to deposits of 22 out of the 34 critical minerals identified by the European Union as vital for energy security. This places Ukraine among the most resource-rich countries in the world.
The occupied areas are rich in minerals such as coal and iron ore. Moreover, territories under Ukraine’s control, such as Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, contain other important resources like lithium, uranium, and manganese. For instance, Ukraine has three major lithium deposits. These include Shevchenkivske in the Donetsk region as well as Polokhivske and Stankuvatske in the centrally located Kirovograd region—which can rightfully become a rare earth shield for Ukraine.
It’s also important to note that the last comprehensive study of Ukraine’s rare earth minerals dates back to Soviet times. This was discussed during closed-door talks when the Ukrainian foreign minister recently visited Delhi. The assessments made are based on this outdated study. However, my view is that the Americans significantly understand where the minerals are. They’re crafting a strategy to access them at throwaway prices compared to their globally ascertained values.
But will the US be able to operate in such a volatile environment? The Trump administration’s failure to anticipate the collapse of initiatives like the Abraham Accords that led to the IMEC setback—due to Hamas’ attack on Israel—shows the fragility of peace in contested regions. More recently, the Gaza ceasefire, after 15 months of brutal fighting, has already faltered. Despite diplomatic efforts to push IMEC forward, it won’t succeed without a reliable peace that reassures investors in connectivity infrastructure.
Similarly, any US business involvement in Ukraine for the minerals deal will require these guarantees of stability.
Also read: US has stepped back from Russia-Ukraine war. India has a small window to export arms to Europe
The Trump pill
For the US, the best strategy is working alongside Europe. If Trump truly is the dealmaker he claims, he should collaborate with the Europeans to establish a stabilising role in the ceasefire and negotiate with Russia. Acknowledging that annexed territories won’t return to Ukraine for now and that NATO membership is not on the table is enough for the time being. But demanding Ukranain capitulation on Russian terms will only prolong the war. If the US had to end it on favourable terms to itself and Moscow, it would have ended by now.
Europe has developed both short-term and long-term plans for Ukraine. In the short term, its primary focus is to support Ukraine as best it can, though there are certain strategic forms of support that only the US can provide. However, Europe can deploy planes to patrol ceasefire areas and the Black Sea.
As for “boots on the ground”, the issue remains contentious. Regardless of their numbers, these troops are unlikely to be stationed at the front lines. They will probably serve in a back-support role. Whether they can enforce peace in the event of a breach is uncertain. This brings us back to the uncomfortable reality of UN peacekeeping missions. The legal distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement can result in significant differences on the ground.
UN peacekeeping forces, even ones from non-NATO countries as Russia insists but without a peace enforcement mandate, will struggle to monitor the situation effectively. The fragile peace could be broken by hybrid warfare, and without clear authority to use force—at most, limited force—these troops would be ineffective in sustaining peace.
Currently, these questions remain intentionally ambiguous. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is now dominated by great-power dynamics vs Ukraine’s survival. While the situation may appear dystopian at first glance, a closer inspection reveals potential opportunities.
Ukraine seems to have learned from the Oval Office debacle that it must thank Trump profusely rather than correct him about the 25 failed ceasefires since 2014. The Zelenskyy administration, for as long as it endures, must remain flexible, self-effacing at times, and develop resilience against the indifference of those who fail to grant it agency.
Europe, too, has realised that enduring the difficult “Trump pill” will ultimately benefit it in the long run, despite the challenges to the Transatlantic alliance. Whether successive US administrations will repair the damage done to America’s status as a security guarantor, and reconfigure ties with traditional allies to reclaim its dominant position globally, remains a question that time will answer.
From Europe’s perspective, time is running out. Key European nations, including the UK, France, Germany, Poland, and the Nordics, have initiated ambitious modernisation programmes, with unprecedented defence spending occurring at the EU level. Despite differing internal views among member states, three factors will drive Europe’s progress in the short term. First, the support of the major economies—the UK, France, Germany, and the Nordics—for this modernisation. Second, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s second term, which is focused on taking action, such as freeing up €650 billion by relaxing constitutional debt brakes for defence spending and an additional €150 billion in loans. Third, Poland, a strong supporter of Ukraine, is currently holding the rotating presidency of the EU Council, enabling it to push EU initiatives more effectively.
It is in Europe’s interest to strengthen its own capabilities, regardless of the war’s outcome. While Ukrainian resilience and military innovations have stunned, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and civilians remains a key factor that could lead Ukraine to capitulate in the absence of air defences and intelligence sharing.
For Trump, a stronger Europe is crucial, not only to confront China in the Indo-Pacific but also to compete in the Arctic, where Russia alone remains the key enabler of China’s access. Therefore, Europe’s re-militarisation, even during tragic times, marks a turning point. Europeans cannot play a direct role in Ukraine without a US backstop, but for American plans to succeed—whether for stabilising Ukraine, pursuing the minerals deal, or preparing for global power shifts—Europe’s role is vital.
That is the essence of the Trump pill in the larger tragedy of great power politics.
Swasti Rao is a consulting editor at ThePrint and a foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Let’s make Swasti Rao the President of USA. She has the solution for this conflict.