China’s state-run media has been eerily quiet about its recent border disengagement deal with India and this silence speaks volumes. It seems Beijing finds it hard to admit when diplomatic pressure makes it blink first. The fear is understandable. For Chinese media, turning the India-China disengagement into a headline could portray Beijing as having compromised its military and diplomatic posture against New Delhi’s policy, which argues that “the state of the border will determine the state of the relationship.” China worries that the policy is beginning to bear fruit.
The Global Times, China’s English-language newspaper, offered a restrained coverage of the events, steering clear of any suggestion that Beijing had conceded ground. In about five articles on the military disengagement at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Global Times claimed that New Delhi’s ties with the United States and its allies are unreliable, which has forced it to ease tensions with China. This narrative perfectly aligns with Beijing’s strategic interests.
“The Modi administration has found that the US and its allies cannot offer India much meaningful support, so now that India has tension with Canada, Washington will not side with New Delhi,” wrote Yang Sheng, chief reporter at the Global Times.
He further argued that the Modi administration might consider acting first to “minimize the risks” following a possible U-turn in US foreign policy after the presidential election in November.
India’s diplomatic success
Contrary to Yang’s account, New Delhi’s diplomatic endeavours and external alliances, primarily with the US and its allies, have been successful in establishing India as a leading power in the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, during the seventh India-Germany Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC) on 25 October in Delhi, co-chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Berlin acknowledged “India’s political weight in the Indo-Pacific and globally.” Interestingly, the IGC took place just two days after Prime Minister Modi met Chinese President Xi.
Moreover, Germany is one of the closest allies of the US and its bilateral trade volume with China stands at €253.1 billion (about $274 billion) in 2023—twice that of India and China. The European nation is seriously looking toward India as it begins to de-risk its economy from China. At the same time, it wants to prioritise New Delhi in the Asia-Pacific region.
On 16 October, Chancellor Scholz’s government, which seeks to deepen an all-front relationship with India, adopted a policy document ‘Fokus auf Indien’ (Focus on India), where it acknowledges India’s core concerns toward China in the Indo-Pacific.
This has strengthened Germany’s focus on the Indo-Pacific. By recognising India as a trusted partner in dealing with the China challenge and agreeing to join New Delhi in promoting a “free, open, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific”, Berlin has laid a futuristic foundation.
Germany has even agreed to “enhance its engagement with the region in line with the Federal Government’s policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”. This is driven by the realisation that diversifying alliances is crucial for counterbalancing China’s growing influence and safeguarding regional stability.
Also read: China can back out of LAC agreement. India shouldn’t be lulled into a false sense of security
US-India partnership
At the same time, US policies toward India have largely been bipartisan despite occasional political hiccups. Not long ago, India and the US charted an ambitious course for the ‘Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology’. Today, the US is the biggest recipient of India’s defence exports, countering China’s argument that “India can’t just snap its fingers and transform into a manufacturing powerhouse overnight.”
China may be right about the process, but if not overnight, India is slowly and steadily moving toward becoming a major manufacturing hub.
If Donald Trump makes a comeback in the US, the India-US partnership is unlikely to change, given that it is futuristic and mutually beneficial, spanning technology, next-generation defence, clean energy, health, trade, and critical and advanced materials.
Moreover, “de-coupling” from the Chinese economy has become a shared strategic priority for both India and the US, reflecting their mutual determination to counter Beijing’s expansionist manoeuvres in the Indo-Pacific. This approach not only aims to reduce economic dependency on China but also serves as a broader geopolitical strategy.
Therefore, even if China wants to disregard India’s rising global status as the key factor forcing its hand toward military disengagement, it cannot ignore India’s engagements with the US and its allies.
There is little doubt that China failingly wants the world to believe that there is no growing pressure on the state from local businesses to normalise ties with India. Chinese businesses have paid a hefty cost since Beijing chose to break the peace at the LAC in April 2020. The decline in Chinese investments in India, hindering China’s geopolitical leverage by limiting its ability to expand into a key market, has added pressure on Beijing to agree to New Delhi’s demand to resolve the border conflict before normalising relations.
Chinese media seems to have suddenly woken up to convey to New Delhi that an overall improvement in bilateral ties would help India realise its development dream, especially its vision of Viksit Bharat. This message, however, may have come too late. The border conflicts over the past five years have created a deep trust deficit; rebuilding that would require China to do much more than talk.
Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. He writes on the Asia-Pacific affairs, strategic Himalayas, and South Asian geopolitics. He tweets @RishiGupta_JNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
wait for the elections to end there to see things clearly