The India-China border dispute remains a critical flashpoint in bilateral relations, where the nuances of diplomacy are often overshadowed by competing narratives.
A statement last week from the Chinese Defence Ministry asserted that both countries have been able to “reduce differences” and build “some consensus” on disengaging troops in eastern Ladakh, indicating a possible thaw in relations that could facilitate long-awaited normalisation. However, beneath this surface optimism lies a complex web of distrust and grievances.
As winter approaches and troop deployments along the LAC escalate, the stark reality persists: despite the hopeful rhetoric, a profound trust deficit continues to impede meaningful progress in India-China relations.
Also Read: China is playing the victim card—with Quad and US-led global economic system
Chinese hints at India’s conciliatory approach
A review of Chinese media and social platforms reveals a widespread perception that India has adopted a more conciliatory approach towards China.
Commentators suggest that the Indian government recognises that a confrontational stance may jeopardise its own interests, particularly in the manufacturing sector, which has faced significant repercussions due to hardline policies against China.
Amid US pressure to reduce reliance on China, a reporter from Guancha noted that American companies are increasingly viewing India as a potential manufacturing hub to mitigate supply chain risks. However, this strategy is complicated by India’s growing dependence on trade with China. Commentators have highlighted a perceived contradiction: while hopes persist that Chinese investment could strengthen India’s economy, concerns about China are on the rise. This dynamic reflects India’s emphasis on the threat posed by China, even as it actively seeks Chinese investments—which is viewed as a stronger inclination for normalisation from India than from China.
Discussions within Chinese media often exhibit an air of arrogance regarding India’s potential as a manufacturing alternative to China. Analysts remain sceptical about India’s ability to serve as a viable substitute in the economic sphere. Many argue that India will struggle to surpass China or replicate its achievements over the past three decades within a similar timeframe, citing significant challenges in advancing its manufacturing capabilities.
Notably, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s recent statement that India can “chew gum while walking” has been interpreted as an indication of India’s willingness to pursue normalisation with China while maintaining its alignment with the Quad, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). However, some warn that this so-called “fence-sitting diplomacy” could result in greater losses for India.
In a media comment, Qiu Yonghui, a professor at the Centre for South Asian Studies at Sichuan University, cautioned against hasty assertions regarding India’s potential to significantly recalibrate its relations with China. She noted that while some adjustments may be likely, the ongoing stalemate over border issues necessitates improvements in infrastructure and engineering technology—areas where India remains heavily dependent on China. And Long Xingchun, a professor from the School of International Relations at Sichuan International Studies University, characterised India as a regional hegemon grappling with concerns over its declining influence in South Asia.
But overall, there is a growing perception among Chinese commentators that India’s stance has softened in recent years. Enhanced communication with China is seen as an indication of India’s genuine interest in swiftly resolving territorial disputes. Moreover, Chinese analysts observe that Indian media increasingly reflects optimism about Sino-Indian negotiations, likely influenced by India’s current economic situation. The discourse is stuck between the idea that India will never be able to catch up with China and the belief that China should not help its adversary’s rise.
On platforms like Weibo, users frequently disparage India’s infrastructure, with some advocating for China to assist in its development by highlighting its high-efficiency, low-cost construction capabilities as a potential solution. However, one commentator argued against Chinese companies investing in India and aiding its industrial capacity, warning that a stronger India would pose a greater threat to China than the US. Furthermore, a Weibo user pointed out that Chinese state-owned enterprises have helped India build its largest steelmaking blast furnace — which has angered many in China who believe this contributes to India’s industrial advancement and could pose a future threat.
Also Read: China can resolve border dispute with India. It has done so with 12 other countries
China’s deception
China’s attempts to emphasise aspects of bilateral relations beyond border disputes may be misleading. This strategy does not change the realities on the ground or alter China’s actual position. Last Friday, Chinese spokesperson Lin Jian reiterated: “The area of Zangnan is Chinese territory, and it’s illegal, and null and void for India to set up the so-called Arunachal Pradesh in Chinese territory. China’s position on this issue is consistent and clear.”
China’s actions simply do not align with its words regarding India. While Beijing has long urged New Delhi to focus on issues beyond the border dispute, the current narrative suggesting consistent disengagement by China—while portraying India as eager to adjust its stance for commercial interests—appears disingenuous. This effort seems designed to distract from underlying issues and points of contention, while also fostering a false narrative that India is going soft on China.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)