Bangladesh’s Interim leader, Muhammad Yunus, is scheduled to land in Beijing on 26 March 2025 for his first State visit. This four-day-long trip will mark Yunus’ first highest-level bilateral engagement with a global power. However, he has had a few engagements with world leaders like former US President Joe Biden, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye and many other leaders of the Islamic world on the sidelines of global summits, including the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), last year.
Yunus is expected to attend the Boao Forum for Asia, founded in 2001, to discuss pressing issues concerning Asia, including trade and multilateralism. China often hosts leaders from Asian countries who either face global isolationism or want to reorient the country from its traditional ally. In this case, Yunus was appointed as the leader of the interim government by the popular demand of the protestors whose violent campaigning forced former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country on 5 August 2024.
Is Yunus’ visit a step toward pragmatic diplomacy, or is Bangladesh shifting into China’s strategic orbit?
Beijing’s strategic quest
The Yunus-led order in Bangladesh also seeks to diversify Dhaka’s bilateral ties, which have traditionally been India-centric. Hasina, currently living in exile in India, was often accused of over-prioritising Delhi in Dhaka’s foreign policy. With ties turning sour with India following the takeover by non-Awami League leadership, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamat-e-Islami, and a possible support of the military, Beijing sees an opportunity in Yunus, who has not shied away from indicating Hasina’s extradition a precondition in normalising ties with India.
The existing void in the Dhaka-Delhi relationship presents an opportunity for Beijing, considering it has been attempting to strengthen ties with Dhaka in trade, defence, investment, and other strategic sectors. Bangladesh’s geostrategic location in the Indo-Pacific makes it a crucial mass in China’s military calculus to counter India and other regional powers. Control over key maritime routes and potential access to naval infrastructure could bolster Beijing’s presence in the Bay of Bengal.
If Chinese President Xi Jinping offers a red-carpet welcome to Yunus, it will be no surprise. While this trip can likely get Yunus recognistion for his leadership and the interim government, Xi would look to press for infusing life into China-led initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Though the Hasina government welcomed the partnership between the BRI and GDI, GSI did not produce the desired outcomes for Beijing. Given its role in the Indo-Pacific, Bangladesh must tread carefully—aligning with China’s security framework, as proposed during Hasina’s Beijing visit in July 2024, could signal a strategic shift.
With Beijing’s current strategic focus on Bangladesh, elevating a “Strategic Partnership of Cooperation” to a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership” may get a final nod during this visit. The Joint Communique may also include new agreements on security cooperation, trade, and BRI investments.
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Focus on people-to-people ties
In the current wave of pro-China voices in the Bangladesh government and civil society, there is also a push for deepening people-to-people ties. China has responded by opening up to more Bangladeshis for advanced medical care, education, and business. In December 2024, just three months after Yunus took office, the newly appointed envoy to China, Nazmul Islam, met with Liu Jinsong, Director-General of the Asian Affairs Department at China’s Foreign Ministry. During the meeting, Islam firmly endorsed celebrating the 50th anniversary of bilateral ties as the “China-Bangladesh Year of People-to-People Exchanges”—an area historically dominated by India.
Beijing recognises India’s socio-cultural and political influence in Bangladesh, which has long been advantageous. Shifting this dynamic in China’s favour would be a significant strategic gain, especially given Dhaka’s current political landscape, which increasingly aligns with Beijing. Therefore, when the Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh, Yao Wen, describes Yunus’ visit as “the most important visit by a Bangladeshi leader in 50 years,” it is more a reflection of strategic reality than a surprise. The political turbulence in Bangladesh has further, no doubt, strengthened China’s bargaining position.
A shift from India
Will the deepening ties between Dhaka and Beijing signal a shift from Bangladesh’s traditional non-alignment and historically friendly relations with India? A notable indicator came at the D-8 Summit in Cairo in December when Yunus exchanged a handshake with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. This gesture stood in contrast to Dhaka’s long-held stance against Islamabad over the brutalities of 1971, hinting at a possible recalibration of Bangladesh’s diplomatic approach.
Now, Yunus would not want to miss the opportunity in Beijing, considering China has a substantial economic footprint in Bangladesh. China remains Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and has also invested heavily in infrastructure projects under the BRI. Additionally, Beijing’s strategic backing, including military cooperation and preferential trade agreements, offers Dhaka economic and geopolitical leverage.
There is little doubt that the current political dispensation in Dhaka seeks to freeze ties with Delhi, a move reinforced by the politically charged anti-India sentiment within the country. With the chances of the Awami League’s comeback looking increasingly slim, the key question is whether Yunus aims to retaliate against Delhi for its longstanding support of Hasina or genuinely seeks to diversify Bangladesh’s strategic partnerships. The latter seems unlikely for now. However, if Beijing indeed trades political backing for a security presence, it could significantly alter regional dynamics. Still, the ultimate question remains—is Bangladesh securing a reliable partner or inviting more profound foreign influence—something that could look beyond its control in the future? This is not for outsiders to decide but for Bangladeshis to ask Yunus.
Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. He writes on the Asia-Pacific affairs, strategic Himalayas, and South Asian geopolitics. He tweets @RishiGupta_JNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)
If the head of government of a neighbouring country waits patiently for several months for an invitation, or even a meeting on the sidelines of an international event, should we really mind if he visits China instead. An economy five times larger, more globally integrated in terms of trade, investment, value chains.