As India and China mark the 75th anniversary of their bilateral ties this year, the border dispute in eastern Ladakh continues to define present-day relations between the two countries. It’s the biggest issue for New Delhi. But in Beijing, they’re concerned about the growing anti-China sentiments in India.
Since the military standoff in June 2020, relations have been tense, and in the past four years, there has been no political dialogue. It is the military and diplomats on the two sides who have engaged in discussions on the border.
India’s cautious optimism
The recent high-level meetings—including separate talks between Indian foreign minister S Jaishankar, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, and China’s top diplomats—have sparked cautious optimism about a possible resolution. But does it mark a positive shift, moving beyond the usual ‘who blinks first’ stalemate? An easy answer would be a clear no.
It is primarily because, for India, the cardinal issue remains the comprehensive resolution of the border conflict—not just the 75 per cent disengagement, but also the de-escalation issue and joint patrolling in the bordering areas along the Line of Actual Control. This is in line with Jaishankar’s 2022 statement at the Asia Society Policy Institute in Delhi that “the state of the border will determine the state of the relationship.”
The Indian Army Chief, on 1 October, added that the situation at the border today is “stable, but not normal and it’s sensitive.” Earlier, on 24 September, at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York, Jaishankar said that “once we deal with the disengagement, there is a larger issue…(that) how do we deal with the rest of the relationship? Because right now, the relationship is very significantly disturbed.”
However, China has a different approach to the bilateral ties.
Also read: Normalising India-China relations is an economic need. Modi is right to seek peace
Dispatches from China
During my recent visit to China as part of an Indian delegation, Chinese officials and scholars emphasised a desire to rejuvenate bilateral ties. Their advice? Do not make the border dispute the focal point for an overall engagement; pursue economic relations with an open mindset.
The popular on-ground view in China is that the growing bilateral trade between the two countries should be a marker of furthering ties in the economic domain. In FY 2023-24, the bilateral trade between India and China accounted for $118.4 billion. Such numbers in the face of a high-scale conflict exhibit the importance of bilateral trade inputs in their respective economies.
But these numbers have a problem—‘trade deficit’. The staggering $100 billion trade deficit with China exacerbates India’s economic vulnerabilities. While the overall trade volume underscores significant economic interdependence, this imbalance reflects a structural asymmetry that will influence the future trajectory of their political and economic relations.
However, as soon as India begins to see the bilateral ties more objectively, questions on issues like trade deficit are often ducked in Beijing.
Cost of the conflict
Beijing’s acknowledgement of the costs of its conflict with India stood out this time from the interactions in China. As a result of the tensions, Chinese businesses—especially investors—have lost access to one of the world’s fastest-growing markets, which is on track to becoming the third-largest global economy.
There is a noticeable push in the official statement and otherwise urging India to welcome more Chinese investment. There is an intense frustration among local businesses eager to invest in India, who see the diplomatic chill becoming a roadblock, making it harder for them to seize the opportunities.
Also read: China can resolve border dispute with India. It has done so with 12 other countries
Why is India aligning
India shedding its non-alignment posture strikingly worries Beijing, particularly the young researchers whose understanding of India has long been shaped by the idea of a neutral, non-confrontational stance, which disregards the China factor in regional tensions. There is a view that India’s deepening ties with the United States across the domains—defence, technology, and trade— are seen as unreliable, and suggests that India must tread carefully to avoid over-dependence.
Also, a common perception of India’s role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is that it runs contradictory to Delhi’s pursuit of ‘strategic autonomy’. However, this view is often limited by looking at India-Quad relations solely through the lens of India-US ties. In reality, India remains in the Quad to serve its own national interests, while also maintaining strong ties with Russia—even as the West, particularly the US, has been critical of Russia over the Ukraine war.
Amid the global power struggle, India is charting a course based on what best serves its strategic needs. If India’s interests with the US and the other two members of the Quad align on key issues like regional security, freedom of navigation, and securing sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, it should be seen as a pragmatic choice. Therefore, while Beijing criticises the Quad for fostering a ‘bloc mentality,’ it cannot overlook the alliance’s increasing influence and strategic significance in the region.
Curtail anti-China sentiments
Growing anti-China sentiment in India’s public sphere, especially after the Galwan conflict in June 2020, was highlighted by Chinese policymakers and Indian experts during our discussions in Beijing and Yunnan. However, this shift in public opinion should not surprise China—it is how democracies react to national security concerns, reflecting the collective sentiment of their people.
When security is at stake, public opinion is not easily swayed. The only way public opinion in India toward China may improve is through Beijing’s consistent action-oriented efforts, including tangible actions in resolving the border dispute. But this does not give a clean chit to the Chinese state media as it continues to make targeted attacks on India and its leaders, including Jaishankar.
Direct flights and visa
Beyond public opinion, the continued suspension of direct flights between the two countries since Covid-19, and later due to border tensions, was also a key issue raised by the Chinese side during my discussions. Additionally, India’s slow visa processing for Chinese business persons, tourists, and academics is a mega concern, with some suggesting that India is using visa delays as a bargaining tool in the broader geopolitical context.
India is solely blamed for not resuming the flights or not normalising the number of visas issued, but this one-sided narrative overlooks the broader geopolitical complexities at play. The underlying trust issues require steps that must align with long-term strategic interests.
While the progress toward resolving the border conflict is ongoing and generating high hopes, all these engagements must be seen as groundwork activities ahead of a potential breakthrough to be unveiled by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping during their meeting on the sidelines of the forthcoming BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 22-24. The Chinese side looks assured that a major diplomatic breakthrough could be on the horizon.
Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. He writes on the Asia-Pacific affairs, strategic Himalayas, and South Asian geopolitics. He tweets @RishiGupta_JNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)