Pakistan is getting ready for the Shanghai Cooperation Council meeting in Islamabad, starting from 15 October. As part of the preparations, the government has announced a three-day holiday in the capital city, basically to ensure that no protests take place around that time—especially from the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf, which recently tried to hold a rally and sit-in. Also, the whereabouts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur are reportedly still unknown. Sources claim he is being held at an Inter-Services Intelligence safe house for as long as the foreign dignitaries are in town.
At the core of these efforts is Pakistan’s need to show stability at home while managing its relationships with both India and, even more so, China— especially in light of the Karachi terror attack and what it could mean for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Jaishankar factor
Containing the PTI crowd in the run up to the SCO summit is a priority, especially to demonstrate to guests like India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar that things are not so bad in Pakistan. Islamabad was certainly not excited by his taunts at the recent United National General Assembly session, where he spoke about Pakistan’s poor economic conditions. There is a possibility that things might not be too pleasant on the sidelines of the SCO, with political pressure on both the host and the Indian guest to project strength. Beyond keeping Islamabad peaceful and secure, clamping down on the PTI also sends a signal both to India and Imran Khan that any overtures between the PTI and India will not be welcome, especially after Jaishankar’s unfriendly remarks.
Recently, PTI’s information advisor Barrister Muhammad issued a statement saying that he would like to invite Jaishankar to address a PTI rally. While this was certainly highly provocative, it should not be seen as the party’s greater willingness to talk to India. At best, it may be a move to encourage Delhi and the larger international community to think of Imran Khan as a leader capable of thinking outside the box. While Bollywood filmmakers such as Sudhanshu Saria, director of the recent release Ulajh, may have their fantasies about a new kind of Pakistani leader, one hopes there are saner elements in Delhi who don’t fall into such imaginary traps. Khan is definitely embroiled in a battle with Pakistan army chief General Asim Munir, but whether he can destroy the existing power structure is highly questionable.
Also Read: Chinese influence is growing in Pakistan’s Gwadar. No access for local Baloch people
Chinese security challenge
An even more significant invitee at the SCO summit is China, with whom Pakistan is slowly negotiating the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Agreement. Islamabad has recently dug deep inside its tight pockets to provide some resources for the trainline project that will be built by China. Experts in Islamabad have told me that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been given the assurance that funds provided by it will not be used for the project. The political government needs to build infrastructure that can help boost the economy and improve its image. Having China at the table along with India will provide the diplomatic balance that Pakistan needs.
If people in Islamabad are having sleepless nights leading up to the SCO meeting, it’s not due to Jaishankar but because of the China delegation, which must be extremely unhappy with Pakistan’s lack of ability to protect Chinese workers.
Given that China has made it clear that the biggest hurdle in CPEC cooperation is security threats, one wouldn’t be surprised if Beijing has second thoughts about sending a representative after the 6 October IED blast in Karachi, which killed at least two Chinese workers. Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Muhammad Aurangzeb played up the threat by initially claiming that the two dead workers were involved in negotiations with the Chinese, a statement that was later rejected. Such claims, however, highlight seriousness of the situation.
This terror attack has been claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). Since the mid-2010s, the outfit has upgraded its ability to carry out attacks against hard targets, especially Chinese nationals in Balochistan and Karachi, whom it considers as an enemy that must be pushed out and repulsed from joining hands with the Pakistani state. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas, along with the Baloch separatists with their increased militant capability, are a problem for both Beijing and Islamabad. Both countries have been discussing how to secure Chinese workers for over a decade, with Pakistan making promises after every attack that it will do more.
After the Karachi blast, a resolution to punish the culprits was repeated, but this doesn’t put Beijing’s mind at peace.
In 2016, Pakistan created the CPEC security force of about 15,000 personnel, with many drawn from the army, but that hasn’t improved the situation. The CPEC security force was initially financed by China until they realised that the Pakistani partners were taking them for a ride, after which the Force was financed by Islamabad. Following the attacks in the past one year, and given pressure from the Chinese to either allow it to bring its own security or make better security arrangements, the army, sources claim, dedicated a special unit for protecting the Chinese.
Yet clearly, no lessons have been learned. The attackers in Karachi targeted a vehicle carrying Chinese workers near the airport as it stopped at a traffic light. The risks have been discussed even before, but without any additional serious security precautions being taken.
The routes these vehicles take are not kept super-secret and there are problems with intelligence. What Rawalpindi hates to admit is that it has a serious capacity issue. Some people who have watched such incidents closely over time told me that the problem with both the CPEC security force and the recently deployed special unit is lack of proper training and organisational inertia. Though manned by the army, the force is highly unprofessional—soldiers are not dedicated to the task at hand and are often assigned other duties, such as serving in the houses of senior officers.
Mounting pressure on Pakistan
The upcoming SCO meeting will undoubtedly be a diplomatic show, but the Chinese delegation is likely to bring other messages—including bearing greater pressure on Pakistan to allow Chinese security arrangements, a request that was earlier turned down.
Journalist Adnan Amir, who writes about this issue, told me that before the recent attack, discussions were underway to create a new security structure with dual circles of protection. Islamabad’s suggestion was to allow private Chinese companies to provide an inner ring of security, accompanied by an outer circle to be manned entirely by Pakistan. Beijing may continue to consider this idea, as being involved in the outer circle would involve it even more in Pakistan’s troubled domestic political and security issues. But surely, a solution must be found if CPEC is to move forward
Pakistan has excellent military-security ties with Beijing, which cannot be allowed to weaken due to the strain on CPEC relations. When the CPEC agreement was signed in 2015, it was meant to bolster bilateral ties, not cast a shadow on the countries’ robust security relations. If Pakistan’s capacity issues are not resolved, especially because the army is over-engaged in domestic politics, relations with Beijing may become another serious issue for Islamabad— one that may not be resolved simply by echoing the line about balancing relations between China and the US.
Ayesha Siddiqa is Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)