As harsh winter segues into early spring, US-backed negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Geneva have ended without a breakthrough, and expectedly so. In three more days, the Russia-Ukraine war will enter its fifth year.
Why does peace remain elusive and what is really happening in the war?
While global attention shifts from Davos to Munich to high-profile technology summits, the wars that require resolution remain stubbornly resistant to closure, whether in Ukraine or in the Middle East. Regarding the former, not only has a decisive outcome been evasive — something I have called successive years of un-victory — even the prospect of a ceasefire appears uncertain. This is unfolding well into, and despite, Donald Trump’s presidency in the US.
Also Read: India’s strategic future tied to easing Russia-Europe standoff
Sobering self-restraints
In the Russia-Ukraine war, the gap between preferred outcomes and battlefield realities has widened.
At a strategic level, the limits of American leverage under Trump have become evident. The US’s shrinking ability to impose a settlement is not mysterious but structural. In the harsh terrain of geopolitics, leverage flows from financial commitment. In 2025, US military aid to Ukraine fell by 99 per cent compared to the previous year. In 2026, direct American assistance, military or humanitarian, has effectively dropped to zilch.
The burden has now shifted entirely to Europe, and it has carried it, no matter how painfully. The question to ask there is—for how long? As of now, it has committed for the foreseeable future.
This marks a radical departure from 2022-24, when Washington, under the Biden years, was Kyiv’s principal financier. Today, Europe finances Ukraine’s war effort, sustains its budgetary needs, and delivers humanitarian relief. Without financial skin in the game, Washington’s ability to shape outcomes has diminished proportionally.
The interesting part is that Trump has himself imposed these self-restraints on having a decisive ‘say’ in the Ukraine war. The US, of course, may facilitate talks in good faith, and Europeans will rally around Trump to keep him engaged, but he can no longer dictate terms unilaterally. There is another reason for Trump’s limits on Ukraine, springing from a domestic factor, to which I will return shortly.
Meanwhile, European solidarity — five years into the conflict and despite cracks in Hungary and Slovakia — remains remarkably intact and functional. For 2026 and 2027, the European Parliament has approved €90 billion in assistance for Ukraine. Military aid from individual European states continues to flow as well. Notably, Europe’s surge in military aid has not come at the expense of humanitarian support. In 2025 alone, European military assistance rose by 67 per cent, while humanitarian aid increased by 59 per cent.
Germany and the UK together now account for roughly two-thirds of Western Europe’s military aid to Ukraine. Northern European states have emerged as the second-largest donors. Beyond the Euro-Atlantic sphere, Japan, under robust leadership and a clear vision of security, has sustained financial assistance touching $20 billion to date. South Korea, a major beneficiary of Europe’s financial instruments for militarisation such as Security Action for Europe (SAFE), is considering joining NATO mechanisms to finance US weapons purchases for Ukraine under the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative.
The bottom line is stark and telling: within a year, Europe has moved from structural reliance on American military assistance to taking the driver’s seat in supporting Ukraine militarily. This is no small feat. The war’s trajectory in 2026 is therefore a function of how inversely proportional US and European leverage has turned out.
The future of the Ukraine war is primarily about how long Europe can stay committed to its cause.
Russia’s pyrrhic un-victory
On the battlefield, tactical developments have also come with their repercussions. Consider the 27 January post on X by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski suggested that Elon Musk should cut off Russia’s access to Starlink after a Russian Geran drone struck a moving train in northern Ukraine, killing five and wounding two.
Hey, big man, @elonmusk, why don't you stop the Russians from using Starlinks to target Ukrainian cities.
Making money on war crimes may damage your brand. https://t.co/dGO6xdFagL
— Radosław Sikorski 🇵🇱🇪🇺 (@sikorskiradek) January 27, 2026
The Geran drones, Russian variants of Iran’s Shahed systems, have been in use since 2022. But continuous upgrades and modifications have now enabled the Gerans to be equipped with Starlink satellite terminals, allowing real-time navigation and rendering them immune to Ukrainian electronic jamming.
Western sanctions prohibit the export of these terminals to Russia. Yet Moscow has reportedly circumvented restrictions through smuggling networks in Central Asia and the Middle East, particularly via the UAE. Shell companies, forged documentation, and activation in regions where Starlink use is legal allowed thousands of terminals to reach Russian operators. Ukrainian intelligence has also reported the registration of terminals using Ukrainian passports from occupied territories in Donbas.
Kyiv has responded decisively. Under the new Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine formalised a rule that only officially registered terminals would function within Ukrainian territory.
Earlier this month, Starlink blocked all terminals geolocated in Ukraine, including those used by Ukrainian forces, until verified. They were then re-included on daily updated “white lists”. Terminals not whitelisted were disabled. Moreover, even approved white-listed terminals would automatically shut down if moving faster than 90 km/hr, limiting their use in drone operations.
By 9 February, Russia’s access to Starlink within Ukrainian territory had been effectively blocked. Musk publicly confirmed steps to prevent unauthorised Russian use. The operational consequences were immediate. Russian forces had built their battlefield communications architecture around Starlink but had not developed viable alternatives for mobile operations. Without reliable, fast and precise satellite connectivity, drone effectiveness dropped, and communication among infiltrating Russian units were significantly disrupted.
Ukraine capitalised on the window quickly. Between 9 and 16 February 2026, Ukrainian forces recaptured 201 square kilometres of territory, primarily in Zaporizhzhia, roughly equivalent to Russia’s total gains in December 2025.
While Moscow remains on an unwavering path of territorial expansion inside Ukraine, the pace is costly and disappointing. As of mid-February 2026, Russia controls 19.5 per cent of Ukrainian territory, less than a 1 per cent increase from the same time in 2025. Approximately 6.8 per cent of that territory, including Crimea and parts of Donbas, had been occupied before February 2022.
These marginal gains magnify the staggering financial and geopolitical price Russia continues to pay in its pursuit of pyrrhic un-victory.
Trump’s domestic constraints
Trump’s tilt toward Moscow has not yielded dividends for the Kremlin because when US military aid ceased, so too did Trump’s leverage. Moreover, divisions within the Republican Party constrain his actions. Significant segments of the GOP remain supportive of Kyiv. Forcing crippling concessions on Ukraine would require party unity — an unlikely prospect ahead.
Trump’s immediate priority is to avert an impending setback in the midterms. A loss would strengthen congressional checks and balances, limiting presidential latitude on foreign policy. The party’s internal fault lines, between MAGA and the rest, compounded by scandals such as the Epstein files, render Ukraine a politically risky arena for dramatic action.
Speculation also persists about potential business deals pushed by Steve Witkoff, US special envoy to the Middle East, and Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund. Yet without Republican backing, such arrangements face structural hurdles. Increasingly, the administration appears more focused on the Middle East’s Board of Peace and Iran than on risking further disruption within the GOP over Ukraine. In fact, one of Trump’s policies to keep his base and the GOP together is to focus on the commercial dividends from selling weapons to Ukraine.
Also Read: From weapon supplier to spectator—India’s foothold in the Caucasus region is shrinking
Reflections in New Delhi
Ukraine’s war consequences are now more systemic than ever.
New Delhi is already paying the price of a faraway war through unjustified sanctions on itself, which forced a radical departure from its erstwhile policy of importing Russian oil.
No comprehensive settlement is on the horizon, and no ceasefire appears imminent. Strategic planning predicated on a soon-to-come peace could make our policies backfire yet again.
Therefore, strategic prudence dictates further de-hyphenating foreign policy calculations vis-à-vis Moscow and the West as long as the war stretches on. India needs to pragmatically adapt to Russia’s entrenchment in the Ukraine war, along with its fallouts that undercut defence and energy ties with India.
As 2026 unfolds, the war continues not because diplomacy has been absent, but because leverage, interests, and battlefield momentum remain misaligned. There is little evidence to suggest they will align any time soon, despite that being the best-case scenario for New Delhi.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)