New Delhi: The Delhi High Court last week opened the door for spouses to sue third parties for interfering in their marital relationship and claim compensation.
Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav was hearing a plea by Shelly Mahajan, who got married in 2012 and had children in 2018. In the subsequent year, one Bhanushree Bahl joined the family business as a lab director and over time her husband and Bahl developed an intimate relationship. Mahajan alleged that despite her protests, her husband refused to end the relationship, humiliated her at public events, and later filed for divorce.
She said that Bahl’s “active and mala fide” conduct deprived her of the love and affection from her husband, a loss for which she is entitled to compensation from Bahl.
The high court has now issued summons based on the largely untested tort of ‘alienation of affection’ [AoA]—allowing spouses to claim compensation from third parties for interfering with their marriage and depriving them of love and companionship from their partner.
A tort is a civil wrong: an act that causes harm or injury to another person and can be the basis for a lawsuit.
Even though the matter will now proceed to trial, the high court’s summons itself signal that such a claim for compensation is possible to be made.
Justice Kaurav said that while such “heart balm” actions have not been expressly recognized in Indian law, they could not be ruled out either.
“Heart balm” actions refer to civil lawsuits commonly used to claim damages for emotional or romantic harm caused by a failed relationship or interference in a marriage.
“Individuals may hold certain expectations from the sanctity of marriage. While the exercise of personal liberty is not criminal and therefore cannot attract penal sanction by the State as a matter of public offence, such conduct may nevertheless give rise to civil consequences,” Justice Kaurav said.
In 2013, the Supreme Court had recognised the possibility of such claims provided there is “clear evidence of active and wrongful interference” with the marriage. However, no Indian court has ever awarded compensation solely on that basis.
“In practice, no reported civil case has been brought to the knowledge of the court by either of the parties, which alludes to the enforcement of damages for the tort of AoA, as the concept remains judicially acknowledged, but not formally adopted. To date, no Indian court appears to have granted relief in a civil suit seeking damages solely on the basis of AoA, nor has any court prescribed a procedure for adjudicating such a claim,” the Delhi High Court observed.
Advocate Malvika Rajkotia, appearing for Mahajan, argued that her client had suffered measurable loss because of Bahl’s deliberate acts leading to the withdrawal of love and affection of her husband.
On the other hand, Advocate K.C. Mahajan, appearing for Bahl argued that his client owed no legal duty to the wife, and that the State could not interfere with the choices of consenting adults. However, the high court rejected Bahl’s arguments and said there was a legally protectable interest in a marriage and third parties have a duty to not interfere with one’s marriage.
“If a spouse is held to possess a protectable interest in marital consortium, intimacy, and companionship, the correlative legal duty would be that any third party must not intentionally and wrongfully interfere with that relationship by acts calculated to alienate the affection of a spouse to the other spouse, which the other spouse is legally entitled to,” the court observed.
It further added that even after the decriminalisation of adultery, there was no open sanction for extramarital relationships. “The decision in Joseph Shine decriminalised adultery; it did not create a license to enter into intimate relationships beyond marriage, free from civil or legal implications,” the high court observed.
Justice Kaurav also rejected Bahl’s contention that the claim for compensation fell exclusively within powers of a family court, which has the power to decide matrimonial cases. The high court said that the wrong alleged here was not an incidental outcome of marriage, which would ordinarily fall under a family court’s powers.
The case was an “actionable civil injury arising from independent tortious conduct”, which could be entertained by a civil court. This means that the claim of compensation was not one which could only be dealt with by a family court, and the high court had the power to look into her claim as it was a civil dispute between the parties. “In the absence of any remedy under matrimonial law, and equally in the absence of any statutory bar, a civil action seeking damages against a third party is not excluded,” the court observed.
Akshat Jain is a final-year student at the National Law University, Delhi and is a contributor with ThePrint.
(Edited by Vidhi Bhutra)
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