New Delhi: On this day in 1971, Pakistani troops surrendered to Indian forces after 13 days of intensive military operations that led to the creation of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Liberation War, as it came to be known, saw the first Indian airborne operation against Pakistan since 1947. The daring offensive, referred to later as the ‘Tangail drop’, was followed by ‘Operation Cactus Lily’ which involved heli-lifting troops across Meghna river.
While Tangail was a standalone operation carried out by the air force on 11 December, Meghna river crossing was part of the helicopter ops held between 3 and 11 December.
ThePrint looks at the two major operations undertaken by Indian Air Force (IAF) during the 1971 War that gave India an edge over Pakistan, which culminated in the fall of Dhaka.
In the years following Partition, there was visible incongruity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Reasons for it included lack of acceptance for Bengali as an official language of East Pakistan, besides Urdu, and stark economic inequality between the two regions, besides the hegemonic influence of ruling elites of West Pakistan on all matters of state.
Tensions peaked in December 1970, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League in East Pakistan performed better than Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-led Pakistan People’s Party in West Pakistan in the general election.
Trigger for a full-scale armed operation, though, was the brutal Operation Searchlight launched by Pakistan Army in East Pakistan in March 1971. It was followed by a mass uprising, in light of which India intervened diplomatically and later militarily.
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Dogfight preceding full-scale war
The first recorded aerial conflict of the war took place on 22 November 1971—at least 12 days before a full-scale war broke out.
Going by IAF’s official version, four Pakistani F-86 Sabres strafed Indian and India-backed Mukti Bahini positions in Chowgacha Mor. On their third strafing run, the Sabres were intercepted by four Gnats from No. 22 Squadron operating from Dum Dum airport.
After a full-scale war broke out on 3 December, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched pre-emptive strikes against IAF bases, railway stations, armour concentrations and other strategic targets. According to IAF, “In response and during the ensuing two weeks, the IAF carried out some 4,000 sorties in the West from major and forward bases in Jammu, Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan, while, in the East, a further 1,978 sorties were flown.”
On the western front, IAF was tasked with disrupting enemy communication, destroying fuel and ammunition reserves and preventing concentration of ground forces; on the eastern front, its primary task was providing direct support to the Army.
As recounted by Lt General Vinod Bhatia (Retd) in MP-IDSA’s Journal of Defence Studies, “Speed and tempo of operations were imperative. Indian Armed Forces exploited the special operations capabilities to ensure an early fall of Dhaka.” Among these operations was the airborne assault at Tangail and the heli-lift of troops across the Meghna river.
‘Tangail drop’
The ‘Tangail drop’, named after a city in central Bangladesh barely three hours from Dhaka, was essentially a paradrop. The objective was to secure Poongli bridge on Jamuna river to ensure the smooth advance of ground forces. The airborne operation involving 46 IAF aircraft was launched from Dum Dum and Kalaikunda airfields on 11 December 1971.
Aircraft used in the assault included C-119, An-12, C-47 Dakota, and Caribou.
The ‘Tangail drop’ is believed to be one of the largest paradrop operations undertaken after World War II. Nearly 1,000 paratroopers were airdropped at Tangail along with a battery of 75mm pack Howitzers, 106mm recoilless guns, jeeps, and other essential combat loads.
The 2 Para (Maratha) were selected for the assault, with support from 17 Parachute Field Artillery Regiment, sappers, signallers, and medical staff of the units of the Parachute Brigade. They were aided by Mukti Bahini.
Capture of Poongli bridge cut off Pakistan’s 93rd Brigade, which was retreating from Mymensingh to defend Dhaka.
The Indian Army had Pakistan believe that the Indian advance into Dhaka would take place through the Comilla border. Lt Gen. Jack Farj Rafael Jacob addressed a press conference in Calcutta on the night of 11 December where he said Indian paratroopers had surrounded Dhaka city—which was far from the truth, since the paradrop was carried out over Tangail.
Recounting how he carried a message from his commanding officer to Lt Gen. A.A.K. Niazi of the Pakistan Army, Lt Gen. (Retd) Nirbhay Sharma, who was the Adjutant of 2 Para (Maratha), wrote for ThePrint in 2019: “I was a young Captain and Adjutant of the battalion. Colonel K.S. Pannu, my Commanding Officer, asked me to carry a message.
“I, along with ADC [Aide-de-Camp] to the GOC [General Officer Commanding], Captain Hitesh Mehta, carried a handwritten message from General Nagra for General Niazi. It read: ‘My dear Abdullah, I am here. The game is up, I suggest you give yourself up to me and I will take care of you’.”
Meghna river crossing
But, in order to force Pakistan’s surrender, Indian Army and IAF had to make a beeline to Dhaka. For this, they conducted Operation Cactus Lily between 9 and 12 December 1971.
To get to Dhaka, it was essential to first capture Comilla. While the 57 Mountain Division had captured territories up to the Meghna river by 8 December, the Ashuganj bridge on the river hindered further advance. To achieve this, a Special Heliborne Operation (SHBO) was launched under the supervision of Lt Gen. Sagat Singh, GOC (4 Corps), who was accompanied in planning and execution by Group Captain Chandan Singh.
The plan was for infantry units and support arms to establish a series of bridgeheads, one of which was across the Meghna river, which is 4,000 yards wide at its narrowest point.
According to the defence ministry’s official version, the IAF decided to use 12 Mi-4 helicopters—primarily meant for senior commanders and evacuating casualties. “… the pilots were trained for night landings on unprepared grounds.” In addition, several hundred torches were brought in from Calcutta to highlight the improvised helipads at night.
Lt Gen Bhatia writes that the plan was to lift troops in Mi-4 helicopters from Raipura, on the southern side of Ashuganj bridge, and drop them north of Meghna river at Narsingdi, as amphibious PT-76 tanks provide direct fire support to the troops being heli-lifted.
The 4/5 Gorkha Rifles were heli-lifted on the night of 9 December, followed by the 311 Infantry Brigade which was heli-lifted in 110 sorties over 36 hours.
As Lt Gen Bhatia put it, “Against all odds, the largest heli-lift by India thus was put into motion in a bold plan on 9 December, taking the enemy by surprise.”
Squadron Leader Pushp Vaid (Retd), who was awarded Vir Chakra for undertaking as many as 35 missions behind enemy lines while serving with a helicopter unit deployed in the Eastern Sector, told ThePrint, “As a Flight Lieutenant, I was the flight commander, which means the Ops Manager. I was running the show of my helicopters. I had 14 helicopters and 32 pilots and the Army had requested the Air HQ to attach a helicopter unit to IV Corps. We became a part of the Army for the duration of the war.”
“The IAF carried out four SHBOs from 7 December to 15 December. All of us, the pilots and 70-odd flight engineers worked 24/7 and we were delivering arms, ammunition, food, whatever was required and wherever it was required. We wanted to keep moving towards Dhaka,” he added.
Squadron Leader Vaid (Retd) said India had to halt Pakistan’s advance, for which nearly 800 troops were airlifted to Sylhet on 7 and 8 December. “After that we came back to Agartala and did the Meghna crossing.”
Adding, “We delivered a total of 5,000 soldiers and 680 tonnes of equipment non-stop. The only times pilots had toilet, food and sleep, when we went to fuel the helicopters. Whenever we delivered the helicopter to the engineers, we rested. We could catch sleep only for 10-15 minutes and we were on the go once the helicopter was ready. This went on continuously from 3rd to 16th of December.”
But, the job didn’t end with the Pakistan Army’s surrender on 16 December.
“Even after the surrender, Lt Gen Sagat Singh and his Army were in Bangladesh for three months keeping law and order. Our helicopters were attached to him and we helped Indian Army and Bangladesh government in keeping law and order. Between 3 and 16 December, we had so many bullets coming towards us but we managed to survive. Had it not been for the helicopters, the war would have lasted for two weeks or longer.”
(Edited by Amrtansh Arora)
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