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The Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan is one of the few international treaties that has survived wars, political upheaval, and decades of hostility. With help from the World Bank, the agreement was signed in 1960. It gave India the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—and Pakistan the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. It also allowed India to use the western rivers in limited ways that didn’t involve drinking.
For decades, India saw the treaty as more than just a legal requirement; it was also a way to build trust. They often played it safe, even when the treaty allowed for much more. As India changes its stance today, making strong claims of rights but within the framework of the treaty, it is important to make it clear that India’s strategy is not revisionist, coercive, or illegal. It’s too late, and it fixes things.
The Myth of “Weaponising Water”
The dominant narrative in regional and international commentary frequently portrays any Indian assertion under the treaty as “weaponising water.” The framing is misleading.
The Indus Waters Treaty does not guarantee Pakistan uninterrupted flows, regardless of upstream development. It assures allocations under particular technological circumstances. India’s current approach—accelerating run-of-the-river hydropower projects, enhancing storage within permissible limitations, and relying on neutral expert systems rather than politicized arbitration—is entirely consistent with the treaty wording.
In fact, Pakistan has frequently sought to expand the treaty’s legal scope, blocking technically compliant Indian projects such as Baglihar and Kishanganga on the basis of strategic distrust rather than treaty infractions. India’s stress on literary purity represents a return to legalism rather than an increase.
Strategic patience has hit its limit.
India’s historical moderation was shaped by a post-independence diplomatic perspective that regarded magnanimity as a form of regional leadership. But the geopolitical landscape has changed in three important ways.
First, cross-border terrorism and ongoing violations of the cease-fire have made the political case for unilateral restraint weaker. Second, climate change has changed how rivers flow, making water management a national security issue instead of a development priority. Third, the stress on domestic water supplies has gotten worse, especially in northern India. This makes it politically and morally wrong to not use the supplies that are available.
If India keeps not using its fair share of water while dealing with its own water shortages, it would be a sign of bad policy. The agreement was never meant to stop progress at 1960 levels.
Climate change has gone faster than what the treaty thought it would.
Before climate change, the Indus Waters Treaty was written. It expected stable glaciers, predictable monsoons, and small infrastructure upstream. None of these ideas are true anymore. The Himalayan glaciers are melting, precipitation patterns are changing, and extreme weather events are happening more often. All of these things have had a big effect on river flows. Pakistan’s water problem is real, but blaming it on Indian projects hides bigger problems with the country’s infrastructure, such as bad irrigation, water-intensive farming, and not enough money being spent on storage and conservation.
India’s approach recognizes that adapting to climate change requires active management of river basins rather than a minimalist approach to treaties. Hydropower projects that use the flow of the river, sediment control, and flow regulation are not dangerous; they are necessary in an area that is vulnerable to climate change.
The law case is definitely on India’s side.
India has not broken the treaty, despite what alarmist claims say. Neutral experts or arbitration bodies have approved every major project, usually after changes were made to the design that helped people downstream.
India is now fighting procedural abuse, which is Pakistan’s habit of bringing conflicts to the world stage too soon instead of using the treaty’s graded settlement system. India is not undermining the treaty’s basic design by pushing for an unbiased expert review instead of full-fledged arbitration.
This is important because treaties don’t just fall apart when one side pulls out; they fall apart when the processes for resolving disputes become tools for political opposition. India’s refusal to accept this distortion makes the agreement stronger, not weaker.
Conclusion: Mature Power Operating Within Legal Parameters.
India’s Indus policy shows that it is a mature state that knows that being restrained without getting anything in return is not a virtue but a weakness. The Indus Waters Treaty is still one of the best ways for people to share water because it is based on rules. India’s current strategy strengthens these principles at a time when climate change, population growth, and geopolitical rivalry make things less clear.
The choice is not between working together and fighting. The choice is between being overly cautious and being responsible and firm. India has chosen the latter, and the treaty makes it clear that it is in favor of that choice.
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About the author:
Anusreeta Dutta is a columnist and climate researcher with experience in political
analysis, ESG research, and energy policy.
These pieces are being published as they have been received – they have not been edited/fact-checked by ThePrint.