‘1st mistake was made in Amritsar’ where IC 814 stopped to refuel — Brajesh Mishra in 2003 on Kandahar

In a 2003 interview with Shekhar Gupta, the late Brajesh Mishra, former national security adviser, reflects on how the week of IC 814 hijack & negotiations in December 1999 unfolded.

Brajesh Mishra | Flickr

Netflix’s new web series, ‘IC 814: The Kandahar Hijack’, has stirred controversy ever since its release last month. Based on the 24 December, 1999, hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight, the show has been criticised for allegedly misrepresenting facts, whitewashing terrorism, and using Hindu names like ‘Shankar’ and ‘Bhola’ for the hijackers. In 1999, following the hijacking of the aircraft—enroute from Kathmandu to Delhi, later diverted to Kandahar in Afghanistan—a crisis management team was formed. This included Brajesh Mishra, then national security adviser, India’s first, and also then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s chief security adviser.

In 2003, ThePrint Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta interviewed Mishra on NDTV’s Walk The Talk, discussing the incident, how the decision to exchange terrorists for hostages was taken, and what went wrong. Mishra died in 2012.

Here is a transcript of an excerpt from the interview, edited for clarity.

Shekhar Gupta: Give us your final word on what happened on the Kandahar hijack issue. That is an internal controversy. You can’t say you didn’t know. How was the decision made? What were the considerations in agreeing to an exchange?

Brajesh Mishra: When the hijacking took place on the 24th of December, the first mistake was committed in Amritsar, where we had given instructions from Delhi to deflate the tyres.

Instructions to whom? 

To the airport authorities in Amritsar… Because they had asked for a bowser (fuel tanker), you know, for refueling. And one could have easily put the bowser in front of the aircraft.

Why didn’t they do it? 

I am sorry, it is very difficult for me to say that. There was no inquiry after that or anything like that. So, this is what happened. Once it flew from Amritsar and went to… 

You mean somebody lost their nerve in Amritsar? 

I really don’t know, Shekhar. I wish I could give you a very clear answer. I really don’t know. I only know that we had given instructions, but the hijackers were also very clever. They had kept the engines running. They hadn’t stopped. They hadn’t allowed the pilot to stop the engines.

So, time-wise, there was a very limited opportunity to do something. Which the critics don’t realise.

But once the aircraft left Indian territory, what were the demands? Release 36 terrorists. Give 200 million dollars and let us take the remains of some two or three, what they called, Mujahideens from the graves. These were the demands which were made. The entire Cabinet Committee on Security rejected that. There is no question of that. So, to begin with, everybody was against agreeing to the conditions of the hijackers.

Negotiations went on…and then they came down to three (terrorists). Then there was no demand for 200 million dollars.

You are absolutely sure that no money was given to them?

Absolutely, of course. Not a single paisa. And, of course, the demand for the remains of the bodies was also given. So, we came down to this situation, where release of three (terrorists) versus the release of 160 hostages.

So, this was a considered view? 

This was. And then everybody agreed. Yes, we have to do it. And there was a, I can’t call it an all-party meeting, I don’t know whether it was all-party or not, but the Congress was present. 

They were consulted?

They were consulted. And as far as I remember, the end of it was that everything should be done to get the hostages back. Now, we also know that political parties, and if I may say so, the media, incited the families to demonstrate.

So, there was no question of, in my view, not agreeing to the release of these three terrorists and getting the hostages back.

‘Jaswant Singh was on same flight as terrorists’ 

What brought more bad press to the NDA government is not just the release of hostages, but that Mr Jaswant Singh (then Minister of External Affairs) went on that plane with hostages. Where was the compulsion for him to go? 

Well, I must confess myself that when that decision was made, of course the decision was taken in the Cabinet Committee on Security, he said that he wanted to go and make sure that everything was all right, because he had received a message from the negotiators in Kandahar that it would be good for somebody at a high level to come here, because if there are any last-minute problems… 

And what were the insecurities about using phone lines? 

You know, it always takes time.

Right.

You talk here, then here people will get around and sit. 

And somebody can eavesdrop while you talk. 

But if somebody senior is there to do that, everybody agreed. But, I mean, this is now my… let’s say my thinking, it may not be different. None of us visualised that he was going to be there with three terrorists.

In the same plane? 

Yes.

All it would have taken was a second plane.

At least I didn’t. I didn’t visualise.

And I don’t know whether Pakistanis would have given… Permission for two planes. So, it was a very difficult situation. But the reason for Mr Jaswant Singh going there, as it was given to the Cabinet Committee, was a very sound reason.

That you needed someone to take it. But Mr (L.K.) Advani says he wasn’t aware that he was going. He was aware of the exchange, but he wasn’t aware that Mr Jaswant Singh was going. 

Well, I think it’s Mr George Fernandes (then Defence Minister) who has said that perhaps Mr Advani had forgotten that he was there.

So, I mean, in retrospect, could you have handled this differently? Or, if a situation like this arises again… 

The only place where it could have been handled differently was Amritsar.

Right.

There is no other…

Also, in how Mr Jaswant Singh went to Kandahar, he could have gone by a second plane, if it was possible. 

I mean, that is one thing. But I didn’t visualise it that way. But it became part of politics. It became this and that. But I don’t believe a word of any leader who says that he would have done it differently.

Right. 

He would not have released these three to save the lives of 160. I dare anyone to say that.

And you don’t agree with Mr Advani when he says he didn’t know that Mr Jaswant Singh was going. 

No, I have just quoted Mr George Fernandes.

Of course, you will say that, you know, you could not have visualised it because you are not a political being.

Well, whatever it is, I did not visualise it. But, Shekhar, I think we should be now, it’s what, 10 years? I think we should take a more detached view of this. Yes, it was, it wasn’t good that he was travelling in the same plane, but still, he wanted to get these hostages back. And I think we should concentrate on that, rather than…

But that only came up because of the attacks on this government being weak on terrorists. It was a calamity that the BJP invited upon itself. 

No, I think it also came because of the autobiography.

Yes, but that was the question of why did he go? But, you know, it became a much bigger question because of who is soft and who is hard on terrorism. So, Brajeshji, I know you keep on saying you are not a political person, but as always, your insights, whether they are political or strategic, are wonderful and they are profound. So, be yourself and keep speaking with your trademark candour, for which I would say as a journalist, I am so grateful.

I thank you for your words.