The nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific seems set to intensify. The primary reason is the US appears to have decided to ramp up its nuclear profile after failing to make China join some type of arms control efforts, with Beijing now on a path of rapid nuclear growth. Moreover, the US sees extensive collaboration between Russia, China and North Korea, creating a three-front nuclear problem. This has led President Joe Biden to adopt an ‘updated nuclear weapons employment guideline’. It is unclear what this means as yet, but it may eventually lead to upgrading the quality of the US nuclear weapons arsenal, though not the quantity.
An enhanced US commitment to strengthening its nuclear posture, in the Indo-Pacific, has obvious implications for the region, especially for India. It is another marker of the likelihood of intensifying competition and arms race in the region, which now also appears to include a nuclear component. China’s decision to vastly expand its nuclear arsenal also throws into question the current, relatively stable, nuclear order in the region—one which is underpinned by small nuclear forces and autonomous yet prudent nuclear policies.
Instead, we are likely to see greater nuclear tensions add to the existing troubles in the region. Just yesterday, for the first time, a Chinese military surveillance plane breached Japanese territorial airspace after years of probing by non-military aircraft.
Overly cautious US
China’s aggressive behaviour, constant probing and salami-slicing tactics carry within it an inherent danger of escalation. All it takes is one mistake by one soldier, sailor or pilot for an unpredictable outcome. In the summer of 2001, an aggressive Chinese pilot was killed after he crashed into a US surveillance plane. It forced the US plane to land on China’s Hainan Island, which set off mutual recrimination between the two sides. Today, such an incident could easily lead to a potential escalatory spiral with uncertain conclusions. And fear of such actions cannot be limited to one side; both should want to avoid such incidents.
A changed US nuclear posture could also require some changed attitudes about how these capabilities will be used. For example, Biden’s Cold War experience and education has made him constantly emphasise the threat of escalation, whether it is Ukraine or in the Israel-Hamas war. This has led him, for example, to propose strict limitations on military assistance to Ukraine, undermining Ukraine’s military capabilities and actions.
Fear of nuclear escalation is obviously a good thing when dealing with a major nuclear power such as Russia. But overdoing caution can also lead to paralysis, as it’s been very clear in the case of Ukraine. The US and its European partners have often been too cautious in dealing with Russian President Vladimir Putin. They have repeatedly backtracked on military support to Ukraine after inordinate delays in the supply of artillery, or main battle tanks, missiles or combat jets. The truth is that nuclear escalation has not been as serious a threat as the Biden administration has feared.
The question is if that same attitude will be followed in the Indo-Pacific. The US has repeatedly sought to engage China in a dialogue on nuclear issues precisely because of this fear but nothing much has come of this. Changing US policy, which is still constrained by an inordinate fear of escalation, will not help very much in convincing China to tone down its aggression. Though such ‘competition in risk-taking’ could potentially backfire to the detriment of both sides,. China can use the risk of escalation to get its way.
One positive development is that Biden will no longer be president after January 2025. Former President Donald Trump might be more reckless, but Vice President Kamala Harris could strike a balance—likely more cautious than Trump but not as overly careful as Biden. Either way, the coming change in the White House would suggest how difficult Beijing will find it to deal with the next US administration. Additionally, there is growing weariness in Washington DC in constantly being at the receiving end of Chinese and Russian misbehaviour. This could also hopefully lead to more forceful changes in US policy on the Indo-Pacific.
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India’s nuclear arsenal
The intensifying competition in the region does raise the question of whether India has to ramp up its own nuclear capabilities or change its nuclear doctrine. Although it would make more sense in a world in which others are enhancing their capabilities, it is difficult to imagine how this would benefit the country. India’s nuclear force definitely needs improvement but it should focus on the quality of its arsenal rather than just the size.
For example, India needs far greater numbers of long-range missiles that can actually cover all of China. India has only recently deployed the Agni-5 missiles, the country’s only long-range missile that can cover all of China from any part of India. Moreover, India has no submarine-launch missile that can credibly threaten China even from the Bay of Bengal, let alone further south in the Indian Ocean. The country also needs a credible air-based deterrent, and it’s unlikely to acquire one, as no nation is likely to provide such technology, and India can’t build one on its own. Some of these are capabilities that India definitely needs to enhance. The slow, lackadaisical pace of Indian nuclear weapons development needs a bit of a reassessment.
On the other hand, India does not need a huge expansion of its nuclear arsenal to match China or maintain some proportion of China’s force nor change its nuclear doctrine. Beijing’s force growth is being driven not so much by deterrence needs as by political ambition, seeking status and parity with the US. This is not a game in which India needs to participate. But New Delhi must pay closer attention to how the changing nuclear dynamics could impact its interest in the region before an unexpected crisis and escalation break out.
Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)