Earlier this month, Pakistan carried out a series of airstrikes on Afghan territory, claiming that they were targeting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan militants allegedly hiding just across the Durand Line. Missiles struck Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and even Kabul, the capital. However, what Islamabad labelled as “counterterrorism precision” quickly spiralled into tragedy.
Independent reports from UNAMA, Reuters, and Al Jazeera confirmed that no TTP fighters were among the casualties. The victims were Afghan civilians, including young cricket players and entire families.
Instead of retaliating, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan chose to respond with restraint, agreeing to a ceasefire facilitated by Qatar and Turkey. This calmness revealed a deeper truth: Pakistan’s airstrikes were less about combating terrorism and more about diverting attention from its own political issues.
At the heart of the airstrikes is Pakistan’s severe domestic crises. The nation is grappling with economic collapse, political turmoil, and a sense of security fatigue.
Pakistan’s security forces are stretched thin. In the past nine months alone, more than 2,400 security personnel have lost their lives — the highest number in a decade, according to the Islamabad-based Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS). In such dire circumstances, external threats can serve as a convenient distraction.
To rationalise its actions, Islamabad has dusted off an old narrative — the idea that India is pulling the strings of the Taliban to destabilise Pakistan. However, regional analyses, including by the Middle East Political and Economic Institute (MEPEI), have found no evidence to back this claim. The Taliban government’s policies are rooted in Afghan nationalism, not Indian influence.
Even Indian officials have dismissed this theory as political theatre. The real issue lies in Pakistan’s tendency to buy into its own myths. By holding onto this propaganda, it distorts both perception and policy. This “India–Taliban” illusion might rally support at home, but it erodes Pakistan’s diplomatic credibility on the global stage.
Difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan
The airstrikes by Pakistan have sparked deep legal and moral dilemmas. In a report, the UNAMA confirmed that civilian casualties occurred in several provinces, with no militants reported dead. Al Jazeera’s coverage depicted scenes of shattered homes, lifeless children, and heartbroken parents.
According to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, any use of force that threatens another state’s territorial integrity is deemed illegal. These strikes also breached the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians. Pakistan’s militarised governance, which thrives on fear, has only served to export its internal instability beyond its borders.
While delegations gathered in Istanbul for discussions, Islamabad’s war-like rhetoric undermined the diplomatic efforts. Peace and threats simply cannot coexist. Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif’s warning of an “open war” with Afghanistan if negotiations fell through perfectly illustrates this contradiction.
Pakistan’s inconsistent signals between dialogue and deterrence reveal a lack of coherent strategy, leaving both domestic and international audiences unsatisfied.
Pakistan aimed to use its strikes to convey messages on various fronts: to reassure the West about its counterterrorism efforts and to signal to China its control over the CPEC routes.
However, both messages fell flat. Washington remains doubtful after years of Pakistan’s double game — publicly opposing extremism while secretly supporting proxies. Beijing, too, now perceives Pakistan’s instability as a strategic risk.
Regionally, Iran, Russia, and Central Asian nations condemned the strikes as reckless.
Pakistan’s push for a border monitoring mechanism, which was marketed as a move toward transparency, has been seen as a way to internationalise the Durand Line issue, almost like a diplomatic Trojan horse. This goes against Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits interference in a country’s internal affairs.
On the other hand, Afghanistan showed remarkable discipline and diplomatic savvy. The IEA concentrated on defence, engaged with Qatar and Turkey, and welcomed the involvement of the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). This level of maturity garnered quiet international respect and solidified domestic support.
The crisis shifted Afghanistan’s image from being isolated to being responsible, while Pakistan seemed impulsive and lacking direction.
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Afghanistan bolstered, Pakistan exposed
Pakistan’s miscalculation for 2025 highlights a significant shift in global politics. In this new multipolar landscape, the old Cold War idea of “frontline states” has become outdated.
The back-and-forth between Washington and Beijing isn’t paying off anymore; both see Pakistan more as a burden than a valuable ally.
Countries that cling to outdated roles risk losing their legitimacy and influence. Pakistan’s view of itself as a ‘geopolitical pivot’ is now just an illusion that masks deeper institutional issues.
The airstrikes shattered Islamabad’s belief that TTP militants were operating safely from Afghan soil. Despite what officials claimed, there was no solid evidence to back this up. This narrative served a political purpose, it was a way to distract from Pakistan’s internal shortcomings.
By highlighting the TTP threat, Islamabad aimed to justify its aggressive actions under the pretence of counterterrorism. Ironically, this led to the opposite outcome: violations of Afghan sovereignty, civilian casualties, and regional backlash. Afghanistan’s diplomatic restraint turned a potential crisis into an opportunity, bolstering its legitimacy while exposing Pakistan’s contradictions.
The hard truth is that the TTP is a byproduct of Pakistan’s own policies, not something that originated in Afghanistan. Pointing fingers at Afghanistan won’t bring back stability or credibility for Pakistan. Unless Pakistan can break this cycle of denial, it risks slipping from a state of strategic uncertainty to a position of lasting irrelevance.
Shukrullah Atif Mashal is an Afghan diplomat and scholar serving as Director General of the Afghanistan Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies (AISRS) in Kabul. He has served as Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan, Chairman of the Afghanistan Cricket Board, and Director of International Relations at the Administrative Office of the President. He tweets @MashalAtif. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)