Pakistan’s media, especially television and social media, appears ebullient and over the moon after the nearly 90-minute interaction between US President Donald Trump and Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, who was accompanied to the White House by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The jubilation is understandable. Islamabad had waited more than four years to get a call from Washington. Many argue that the meeting signifies Pakistan’s return from a period of relative irrelevance to one in which world powers and significant states once again recognise its importance.
The Pakistani lens is certainly glazed by memories of the early Biden years, when the US president never called then–Prime Minister Imran Khan, and when the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), with India at its centre, had displaced Pakistan in Washington’s military-strategic calculus.
Today, not only have those days changed, but many Pakistanis openly admit they feel no remorse that the main player in this Trump-Pakistani leadership meeting was the army chief, not the prime minister. On social media, some voices hailed the meeting as recognition of Pakistan’s resolve and strength in “defeating a country many times bigger than you and that within hours.” A popular perception is that the meeting followed India’s Operation Sindoor, after which Pakistan’s narrative of victory impressed the world, especially Donald Trump, more than Delhi’s.
Of course, this perspective continues to shy away from asking the tough, though relevant, questions: What exactly does Trump want from Pakistan? What does he hope to gain bygranting two meetings to Pakistan’s army chief in less than two months and praising him so profusely?
What Trump wants from Pakistan
A politically conscious friend of mine, critical of Operation Sindoor for different reasons, argued that the recent India-Pakistan conflict turned the tide. In his view, Pakistan’s apparent success in impressing the world left Asim Munir more euphoric, overconfident, and more willing to take risks. He became unstoppable by anyone in the elected government or the military as he took the country to riskier paths and thornier geo-strategic journeys. For this friend, this is not the time for jubilation, but for fear.
Trump’s repeated references to Pakistan’s “air kills” in the conflict indicates he is happy with the military’s performance. He also seems to sense the fire in the bellies of Munir and his generals a readiness to take strategic risks for institutional gain. The White House appears to be recruiting junior partners it can assign tough responsibilities. There are two issues on which he may be eager to engage Pakistan.
First, Trump wants to reshape the Middle East. He would like to revive the Abraham Accords, which he brought during his first term. This means peace and stability for Israel in which all Arab and Muslim countries are also invested. The 7 October 2023 crisis in Gaza made the completion of the accords slip from Trump’s hands. The new cycle of conflict made it politically impossible for countries like Saudi Arabia to negotiate peace with Tel Aviv like the United Arab Emirates. Not that the condition of Palestinians in Gaza is any better today, but Trump now wants to force a solution in which most Middle Eastern and Muslim countries become stakeholders.
The June 2025 American attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, intended to destroy its enrichment and bomb-making capacity, were meant to eliminate an existing threat to Israel. It’s not certain if Washington was able to achieve its objective, but it has certainly succeeded in cowing down Tehran. What remains now is to rebuild a peace structure in which Iran poses a less serious threat. With Arab leaders, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Pakistan’s leadership in Washington, Trump can now claim he is close to brokering a deal. Some analysts I spoke with claimed that Trump envisions building an Arab military force for deployment in the conflict zone. This purpose alone makes Pakistan relevant, with its new defence agreement with Saudi Arabia suggesting that Islamabad has taken responsibility to engage in Riyadh’s military matters.
This meeting at the White House, in fact, could be argued is not about Pakistan but about Saudi Arabia, and how it would like to play its military cards in the region. For American analyst Joshua White, the Pakistan-Saudi defence pact is not a response to the Israeli attack on Doha but the result of a long-drawn discussion between the two countries to assuage Riyadh’s concerns about Israel and Tehran – both covertly nuclear – especially if the US is less eager to play a major role in its protection. The defence agreement ties Pakistan and Saudi Arabia at the hip and gives Islamabad a more significant role at the negotiation table. It also means a more significant role in case a Muslim peace-building force is to be deployed in Gaza.
Second, Trump wants Pakistan’s help in getting back Bagram airbase in Kabul, which he insists should return to American control. While the US president insists that quitting Afghanistan or Bagram was a bad idea, he may not be keen to put American boots on the ground again. He has probably sensed Munir’s unhappiness with the Taliban and eagerness to fight this militant network that one of his predecessors, former DG ISI Lt General Faiz Hameed, was eager to bring to power. Munir, frustrated with the incessant attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), seems to have been searching for help and support from international forces to teach Kabul a lesson. This makes for a common goal between Trump and Munir.
Hurdles in the path of Pakistan’s US embrace
It’s worth appreciating that neither of these common objectives offers an easy or comfortable recipe for Pakistan. Both look highly risky paths and raise more questions. Getting deployed in a conflict-ridden Gaza is an absolutely tall order, especially since Netanyahu refuses to agree to any pushback, leave alone ensuring peace between the equally belligerent Israeli state and Hamas. So, while Dawn columnist Niaz Murtaza is certain that the White House visit is linked to Trump’s plans for Pakistani military involvement in Gaza, there is total silence about possible consequences. Surely, Trump, who is very unhappy with the United Nations, would not use that platform, since he would remain unsure what new structure will govern such deployment and who will ensure order and discipline in a volatile region.
Similarly, retaking Bagram risks escalating the war with Taliban and drawing the conflict deeper into Pakistan. Not to forget that both engagements — Middle East and Afghanistan — are likely to have grave domestic repercussions, such as sectarian flare-ups and worsening ethnic tension, especially the chasm between Pashtuns and Punjabis.
In the backdrop of TTP attacks, there is already a narrative in Punjab and Sindh against the Afghans that inadvertently drags the local Pushtun population as ordinary folk cannot tell the difference between the two.
One must also not forget the other benefits that are already being offered to Trump such as extracting Pakistan’s rare earth minerals. Munir’s choice is Washington, not Beijing. Changing direction from China to the US was a journey started by his predecessor that the current army chief and his team continue to pursue. Sources in Islamabad I spoke with claim that Beijing is told that while they are not being pushed out, Islamabad has the right to explore opportunities with the US. Such an argument is based on a certain naivety that seems not to appreciate that the strategy of balancing between the two powers by Islamabad may not seem like the right approach in relevant capitals. Some sources I spoke with talked about 65 US companies working with Pakistan’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs on Port Qasim and Karachi Port. This must not make Beijing happy.
Surely, Munir can take the risk of partnering with Trump for limited personal and institutional gains. The photo clicks at the White House will ensure that no one questions his extension on November 26 for another two years, if not more. The US-Pakistan partnership will also ensure that voices of criticism, if at all raised, are silenced. History shows how American partnerships empower authoritarianism. Already, Munir’s civilian agents are lobbying Western capitals for military-technological help in suppressing insurgencies in Balochistan and elsewhere.
The happy and excited Pakistanis should now begin to look at another dark era of authoritarian rule worse than what they experienced under Zia.
Ayesha Siddiqa is a senior fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)