Sweden has become the latest European country to release its Indo-Pacific strategy. With this, it joins the club of select European countries like France, Germany, Netherlands, the Czech Republic and the European Union to come up with a documented strategy to engage with the Indo-Pacific region, a hotbed for rising tensions between the United States and China. Outside of the EU, the United Kingdom has a strategy that has been duly updated since the Ukraine war started.
The marked difference in the Swedish overture is its unambiguous emphasis on developing defence policy and technological relations with trusted partners in the Indo-Pacific and increasing its military presence.
Although the document doesn’t directly refer to India, it highlights the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region, where New Delhi plays a key role and is an essential partner for the West. India’s relationships with various Western nations have grown rapidly. The Narendra Modi government has actively engaged with Europe across areas such as trade, investment, defence, technology, mobility, maritime cooperation, and joint development projects. These efforts are supported by India’s expanding presence in Europe through new strategic partnerships, reflecting a comprehensive approach to defence diplomacy. Additionally, India is well-positioned to take advantage of the gap left by China’s underperformance in its ‘17+1 plans‘ initiative in Central and Eastern Europe, creating mutually beneficial investment opportunities in connectivity projects.
In its own backyard, India’s bilateral and plurilateral engagement with a range of actors from the West has risen exponentially in all spheres of statecraft.
It’s worth noting that Swedish defence giant Saab made history by securing 100 per cent FDI in a defence project in India. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), led by defence minister Rajnath Singh, approved Saab’s proposal to set up a new facility for manufacturing the Carl-Gustaf M4 systems. This collaboration aligns with the ‘Make in India’ initiative and includes significant technological advancements such as sighting systems and carbon fiber winding. Given that India typically limits FDI in the defence sector to 74 per cent, Saab’s achievement is truly remarkable.
Sweden’s Indo-Pacific strategy is expected to create further opportunities for investment and technological cooperation across Indo-Pacific capitals, including India, which must be strategically leveraged with firm intent and supportive frameworks from both sides.
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Connected theatres
Sweden’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific reflects a recognition of how deeply intertwined Europe’s interests have become with those of the region. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s involvement in the region was largely economic, with 40 per cent of global trade passing through crucial maritime routes. These channels are now increasingly at risk due to rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 not only shattered the post-1991 European security order and violated the UN Charter, but also plunged Europe into a state of ongoing security anxiety. The growing Russia-China alliance has forced Europe to reassess its security and defence strategies.
Meanwhile, in northern Europe, the geopolitical landscape of the Baltics has been transformed with Sweden and Finland abandoning 150 years of neutrality by joining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Defence spending has surged across Europe, along with an increasing focus on security and defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
Sweden in Indo-Pacific
Sweden is not a newcomer to the Indo-Pacific. It has played a pivotal role in shaping European engagement in the region through various initiatives, including the EU-Indo Pacific Ministerial Forum. Originally an EU initiative, Sweden expanded its scope while presiding over the council of the EU in 2023. Building on the Paris Indo-Pacific Forum, the Stockholm Forum gathered EU foreign ministers, their Indo-Pacific counterparts, EU officials, and regional organisations to address three key areas: fostering sustainable and inclusive prosperity, pursuing green opportunities while tackling global challenges, and addressing the evolving security landscape in the Indo-Pacific.
This initiative aligns with the EU Indo-Pacific strategy and supports Brussels’ Global Gateway initiative, which focuses on enhancing connectivity and infrastructure in the region. However, Sweden’s latest strategy has shifted its primary focus toward strengthening the defence dimension of its previous engagements in the region.
Sweden’s strategy, presented by Pal Jonson, the country’s defence minister and a known advocate for “peace through strength”, reflects a shift in the country’s defence posture. Since abandoning its historic neutrality to join NATO, Sweden has significantly increased its defence spending and is now focused on enhancing relations with Indo-Pacific nations. A key element of this strategy is Sweden’s pursuit of access to technology, raw materials, and capital—critical for boosting its defence capabilities.
This strategy aligns with NATO’s broader security discussions. NATO’s Strategic Concept 2022 emphasised an interconnected global security environment, viewing threats across theaters as indivisible. However, NATO itself has not outlined any specific defence pathways or commitments for engaging with the Indo-Pacific. Its involvement, for now, remains focused on countering hybrid threats as they emerge.
In this context, Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba recently proposed the idea of an “Asian NATO”, a concept that received a lukewarm response from other Western partners and failed to gain traction in India. New Delhi, committed to maintaining its strategic autonomy, has shown little interest in joining any military alliances.
Sweden’s Indo-Pacific strategy strikes a careful balance between addressing immediate defence needs at home and enhancing its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. It outlines three clear pathways to achieve this. First, Sweden aims to strengthen defence relations through dialogue and forums, including revamped diplomacy using existing channels. Second, it seeks to increase its military presence through peacekeeping, maritime cooperation, and efforts to counter hybrid threats. For now, this focus is on existing EU maritime initiatives like EUNAVFOR missions, with plans to participate in regional defence ventures, maritime security operations, and relevant military and naval exercises.
The third pillar of Sweden’s strategy emphasises its core strength in technological innovation. The strategy specifically highlights partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Australia—trusted US allies and Sweden’s preferred collaborators for technological innovation. It also mentions strong maritime cooperation with Australia, Japan, and Singapore.
Interestingly, unlike other European Indo-Pacific strategies, which frequently reference India, Sweden’s first policy document does not mention India. However, China is referenced twice—once regarding US-China competition and again in the context of growing alignment between Russia and China, which directly affects the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.
Filling the gaps
From New Delhi’s perspective, Sweden’s Indo-Pacific strategy reveals a limited and somewhat incomplete approach. It appears to rely heavily on established “trusted” partnerships, particularly with US allies, without explicitly creating space for evolving strategies with other relevant players. The Indian Ocean is referenced three times, underscoring its importance without giving India a prominent role in Sweden’s vision.
Another notable gap in the strategy is the absence of concrete defence commitments or timelines. The document offers little insight into how Sweden plans to balance its Indo-Pacific ambitions with its pressing security concerns at home, particularly in supporting Ukraine. NATO’s eastern flank remains vulnerable, and Sweden, like other European nations, is working to overhaul its security capabilities—a process still underway. Sweden has been ramping up its defence spending significantly after joining NATO, proposing a 10 per cent increase in funding for 2024, with spending forecast to reach 2.4 per cent of its GDP in 2025 and 2.8 per cent by 2028.
Looking ahead, Sweden must allocate clear budgetary resources to its Indo-Pacific defence strategy and outline specific short- and long-term strategic objectives. The current document serves as a curtain-raiser, but more detailed plans are needed, including stronger engagement with India, both bilaterally and plurilaterally. Leveraging existing partnerships and aligning them with evolving defence priorities will be crucial for Stockholm’s success in the Indo-Pacific.
The writer is an Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)