Ukraine invaded the Russian mainland on 6 August for the first time since World War II, targeting the area of Kursk Oblast. Ironically, this is where the historic Battle of Kursk was fought exactly 81 years ago, from 5 July to 23 August 1943, in which Russia turned the tide against Germany. In terms of objectives and the quantum of troops involved, the operation was tactical, but its impact in political terms is strategic.
Ukraine has changed the status quo of the war—from an impending defeat through a battle of attrition to a moral and tactical victory through a battle of manoeuvre in Russian territory.
After four weeks, Ukraine is in possession of about 1,300 square km and 100 settlements in Kursk Oblast, little more than the 1,175 square km captured by Russia since January. Despite committing 30,000 reserve troops, Russia’s counterattack has made little progress.
Political and military opinions about the implications and outcome of Ukraine’s offensive are sharply divided. Some perceive that the offensive has shattered Russian invincibility, called the bluff of its redlines, boosted Ukraine’s morale, and could even turn the tide of the war if sustained. On the other hand, there are those who believe that Russian superiority in numbers and resources is bound to prevail. They argue that this “monumental blunder” will hasten Ukraine’s inevitable defeat, as it has depleted its limited resources, which can no longer sustain the offensive or adequately defend the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
The hard fact is that there can be no decisive outcome in the Russia-Ukraine war; it is bound to end in a stalemate. Modern military technology has made defensive operations ascendant over the offensive ones, and large-scale manoeuvres have become prohibitively expensive in terms of both personnel and resources. The economic and human costs of the war cannot be sustained by either Ukraine or Russia. Sooner or later, negotiations are bound to begin.
It is in this light that one must see the Kursk offensive. If Ukraine can expand or even hold on to its territorial gains, it would gain bargaining leverage for future peace talks. More so, when seen in the context of dithering and conditional allied military aid, possible shift to a “pro-deal” administration early next year, and the looming spectre of peace on Russian terms.
Ukraine’s offensive was in progress when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Ukraine on 23 August to reinforce India’s neutrality after his visit to Russia six weeks earlier. Anguished remonstrations of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy notwithstanding, India, as the de facto leader of the ‘Global South’, is acceptable as a neutral facilitator of peace by both Russia and Ukraine, including their respective allies.
I examine the lessons the Indian Army can learn from the Kursk offensive and explore the likely contours of the emerging peace process, with India’s role as a facilitator.
Lesson for Indian Army
With modern military technology, defenders can impose prohibitive human and material costs on a superior attacker. However, in a prolonged war, the side with bigger resources will prevail. In World War I, Germany was not decisively defeated but could not sustain the war against the much superior Allies.
This is precisely what was happening to Ukraine. It was steadily losing ground and soldiers in large numbers. The allies were dithering with military aid due to domestic politics and fatigue. It was only a matter of time before Ukraine would have to pursue peace on Russian terms.
Ukraine’s much-trumpeted offensive in 2023 failed because the conditions imposed by Western allies on the use of their weapon systems on Russian mainland forced Kyiv to adopt an attritionist approach. This meant attacking well-prepared and layered defences on a transparent battlefield dominated by precision-guided munitions (PGM).
Manoeuvre warfare is based on the theory of surfaces (enemy defences/strength) and gaps (relatively lightly held areas). The strategy is to avoid surfaces and exploit gaps. Due to the restrictions imposed by its allies, Ukraine could focus only on regaining its lost territory by attacking Russian strengths. As a result, failure was inevitable.
Having learnt its lesson, Ukraine decided to take the battle to the enemy by attacking the relatively lightly held Russian mainland in the Kursk salient. Surprise and deception were of utmost importance. Apart from traditional methods of a cover plan—defence of the Sumi region—strict application of “need to know”, radio/electronic/cyber silence, electronic deception, and drone domination to blind the enemy played a vital role. The surprise achieved was absolute.
In the absence of any airpower, an attacking force of 4-6 combined arms brigades advanced under the cover of a swarm of drones, cocooned by anti-drone measures to keep enemy drones at bay, and a very high density of air defence weapons. The tempo of operations was kept high and most tactical objectives were reached in 3-4 days.
All the above lessons of surprise, electronic warfare, combined arms operations, and innovative use of drones are relevant for the Indian Army, particularly against China where it confronts a superior adversary. More importantly, offensive manoeuvre has to be exploited and the battle taken to the adversary’s territory.
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Contours of the peace process
In 2014, Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. After the failure of its grand design to annex Ukraine in 2022, Russia seems to have settled for a more modest political aim for the war: to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and maximum areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, and prevent Ukraine from joining NATO.
The absolutist position of Ukraine is the restoration of its 1991 boundaries. However, it has, in the past, willy-nilly reconciled to the loss of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, occupied in 2014. In the changed circumstances, it will endeavour to bargain the Kursk territory to rhetorically restore 1991 boundaries, modestly restore 2014 boundaries, and pragmatically restrict Russian gains to the present positions in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
In my view, the most pragmatic and face-saving settlement is for Russia to retain its gains in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts apart from Crimea and withdraw from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts while Ukraine withdraws from Kursk and does not directly join NATO. Long and arduous negotiations will be required to reach anywhere near this solution.
The key to relative bargaining parity in peace negotiations for Ukraine is to consolidate and hold on to its territorial gains in Kursk. Since a peace initiative is not likely before next year, heavy fighting before the winter sets in and even next summer is inevitable, with each side trying to consolidate gains and try to capture more territory.
The moot question then, is, can Ukraine hold on to its gains in Kursk? This will be contingent on how much and how fast Ukraine’s allies give military aid and how much freedom they offer for the use of their weapons on the Russian mainland.
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India’s role
After Modi’s visits to Moscow and Kyiv in succession and his follow-up briefings to US President Biden and Russian President Putin, there was much speculation in the air about India‘s role as a facilitator of peace to end the Ukraine war. On 31 August, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs formally confirmed, “Prime Minister has already indicated India’s willingness to play a constructive role in the interest of peace.”
Both Russia and Ukraine have accepted India’s role as facilitator, albeit with expected rhetorical riders. India’s role is also acceptable to the US and NATO. ‘Global South’, which dominates the UN General Assembly, also backs India.
As highlighted above, given the absolutist positions of both sides and the unprecedented human and material destruction seen since World War II, the peace process is going to be long and arduous. India has about one year to prepare the framework for the process. And this period will likely witness intense fighting on the ground to gain territory for bargaining.
As a first step, India should host a peace conference to be attended by leaders of all countries with stakes in the conflict, including Russia and China. This conference should culminate in the announcement of a ceasefire and broad terms of disengagement. This will pave the way for negotiations of a settlement.
Given the impending US presidential elections, I do not visualise the peace conference to be held before March 2025. It would be prudent to appoint a chief negotiator and assemble a team consisting of India’s past and present diplomats to begin the process.
This role is a diplomatic challenge for India. The success of the peace process can signal that it is recognised as a world power, paving the way for a seat at the global high table and permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (Retd) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post-retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)