Hamas surprised Jerusalem last Friday by answering US President Donald Trump’s “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” ahead of Sunday’s deadline. It announced to release all Israeli prisoners, “both living and dead”. Trump’s reply was immediate—and pointed: “Israel must immediately stop the bombing of Gaza so that we can get the hostages out safely and quickly.” Israel’s government cautiously said that it was “preparing for the immediate implementation of the first stage” of the plan focused on releasing all hostages.
However, with Trump strongly pushing to conclude the first phase of the plan—involving the release of all the hostages in exchange for a ceasefire and partial withdrawal of IDF—the indirect talks between Israel and Hamas are set to begin today in Sharm el-Sheikh, the Red Sea resort in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.
Winner Qatar
Trump’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, his son-in-law Jared Kushner, and Israel’s strategic Affairs minister Ron Dermer are already in Egypt, along with Khalil al-Hayya, the Hamas leader. Khalil escaped the failed assassination attempt by Israel in Doha on 9 September.
While the hope is that the horrific bloodshed in Gaza will stop soon, if there is a clear early winner, it’s Qatar. Doha has corralled not only Hamas’ political leadership but also its armed cadres on the ground—and parallel factions like Palestinian Islamic Jihad—into a unified position. Qatar has also extracted two rare concessions from Washington and Jerusalem: an executive order treating threats to Qatar’s security as a US peace-and-security concern, and, remarkably, a public apology from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over last month’s breach of Qatari sovereignty.
Hamas’ cooperation
Why did Hamas relent now after ignoring earlier ultimatums? Two reasons: Qatar’s new security umbrella and Turkey’s re-engagement, punctuated by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s first White House visit in six years. Both patrons made plain that continued stonewalling would be costly, while a tactical “yes” could unlock relief, legitimacy, and time.
Hamas’ official text—issued in Doha last Friday— keeps the door open. It claims broad internal and external consultations; appreciates Arab, Islamic, and international efforts (including Trump’s); accepts a comprehensive exchange for all Israeli captives “subject to necessary field conditions”; and signals readiness to negotiate modalities through mediators. It reaffirms a willingness to hand over Gaza’s administration to an independent Palestinian technocratic body formed by national consensus and backed by Arab and Islamic states. “Other issues” tied to Gaza’s future and Palestinian rights should be addressed through a unified Palestinian national framework, grounded in relevant international law and UN resolutions, Hamas has mentioned in its response to Trump’s plan.
While Hamas was able to get a positive reaction from Trump by focusing on his most important goal of releasing all hostages and timing it well before the Nobel Peace Prize committee announces its decision on 10 October, it is important to note that Hamas’ response is largely reiteration of its position for the last many months on this issue: its willingness to release all hostages, provided there is immediate ceasefire and complete withdrawal of IDF from Gaza, as well as not be part of Gaza’s governance in a post-war scenario.
But where the statement speaks loudly, its silences are louder. The US plan’s stipulation that Hamas disarm is nowhere mentioned. That is existential for Hamas. Its identity since 1987, following the first Intifada, rests on armed resistance. Full disarmament would mean organisational extinction. Hamas may be willing to consider making a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons as part of negotiations with the US and Israel, and has stated that it would hand over its weapons “if the occupation ends and Palestinians can govern themselves”.
Another ambiguity is the phrase “subject to field conditions.” That is code for phasing: hostages released in tranches matched to verifiable Israeli withdrawal steps. Netanyahu has repeatedly emphasised a continuing IDF presence in Gaza and rejected a Palestinian state—in the UN General Assembly last month and again after the joint Trump presser. From Hamas’ viewpoint, Israeli backsliding has carried no consequences in Washington.
Hamas rejects international oversight for Gaza. The role of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair is a non-starter across much of the Arab world, given his role in the Iraq War. Hamas prefers a Palestinian technocratic caretaker—an idea the Arab League endorsed in Cairo in March 2025 and which resurfaced in a UK–France joint paper sidelined by Trump’s 29 September plan. As for an International Stabilization Force, Hamas has not commented.
Hamas has thus kicked the ball into Tel Aviv’s court, focusing on immediate and sustainable ceasefire, unrestricted humanitarian assistance, and full withdrawal by Israel—all of which it would want the US to guarantee, and to begin a process for negotiating issues of disarmament, governance, etc.
Also read: Hamas readies for Gaza talks that US hopes will halt war, free hostages
Backed by the Muslim world
Hamas has been able to mobilise the support of the eight Arab and Muslim countries —Qatar, Egypt, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan. These are the countries Trump has been engaging with since he met with them on 23 September, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, to support the indirect talks with Israel in Egypt.
The eight countries issued their second joint statement yesterday, supporting Hamas’ response to the Trump plan.
Interestingly, the joint statement neither mentions the disarmament of Hamas nor international oversight of Gaza governance, thus marking a critical shift from its first statement to actively embracing the path toward a comprehensive agreement fully supporting the positions taken by Hamas.
Since the Madrid Peace Conference 34 years ago, Palestine has been witness to a number of initiatives and proposals to bring peace to the region: the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Camp David Summit in 2000, the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 to Abraham Accords in 2020.
Will the Sharm el-Sheikh talks solve the insurmountable challenges faced by Palestine? It seems unlikely, but it can still reduce the enormous harm inflicted on Gaza.
The hope is it will not be a repeat of “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” – “The more things change, the more they stay the same.”
By R. Swaminathan, Former Ambassador of India to Egypt and former Permanent Representative of India to the Arab League. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)