Donald Trump’s re-election to the American presidency with a big bang has sent many countries into a deep rethink about their own posture, with some even reviewing their other vital relationships. This certainly applies to Pakistan, which seems to be in hyperdrive to signal to Washington that Islamabad is ready to play by Trump’s playbook.
For Pakistan, this shift comes at a time when it’s facing increased pressure from China over security for its workers on Pakistani soil. Already, Islamabad has shown signs of pushing back, perhaps to signal openness to re-engaging with Washington.
On Thursday, 14 November, the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson firmly denied media reports that Beijing was pressuring Islamabad to allow Chinese security forces to protect Chinese workers in Pakistan, who have increasingly been targeted by terrorists. According to spokesperson Mumtaz Zahra Baloch, such reports were mere “speculation” and motivated by an “agenda.” The statement was in response to a Reuters story published the same day, which claimed that Beijing was pushing the Pakistan government to allow Chinese security personnel in the country. The story further claimed that Pakistan’s security/intelligence agencies were averse to the idea.
Interestingly, this strong denial from Pakistan comes only now, despite similar claims being made earlier too.
Also Read: Chinese influence is growing in Pakistan’s Gwadar. No access for local Baloch people
Beijing’s security pressure
Back in June, Nikkei Asia reported on the same “pressure from Beijing” over security, but it went undenied by Islamabad.
The author of the Nikkei piece told me during a conversation that the talks were sensitive, with several ideas being discussed—including a proposal for two rings of security, where Chinese personnel would handle the inner ring and Pakistan’s military would control the outer one. This proposal seems rational, as placing Chinese personnel in the outer ring would expose them to greater threat from terrorist groups.
It’s a fact that Beijing is concerned about the increased threats to its personnel stationed in Pakistan. The suicide attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in March, in which five Chinese nationals were killed, and the bomb blast near Karachi airport in October, which claimed two more of the country’s workers, have raised serious doubts in Beijing about Pakistan’s capacity to provide protection.
For the Chinese government, the security of its workers trumps all other discussions with Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Islamabad this October, the Chinese prime minister Li Qiang focused on this very issue. Later, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong, publicly rebutted Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s claim at a seminar that China would continue investing in Pakistan despite security challenges. The ambassador took the floor again and insisted that Beijing’s top priority was the security of its workers.
The persistent lack of security to Chinese workers in Pakistan is a curious matter. Given Islamabad’s attitude and seeming lack of understanding of Chinese sensitivities, it makes one wonder if the issue really lies in Pakistan’s lack of capacity or intent. What is clear from the Reuter’s story and my conversations with various sources in Pakistan is that Beijing has been putting pressure on Pakistan to allow it to make its own arrangements. Reportedly, an agreement was even reached that would allow China to intervene in case of further terrorist attacks. The agreement allowed the signatories, using the SCO framework, to operate in each other’s countries in the event of a terror attack. One would safely assume it wouldn’t be Pakistan going to fight in China, but rather Chinese boots on Pakistan’s soil—it’s the army that seems to oppose the idea firmly.
It’s worth noting that the targeting of Chinese workers dates back to the beginning of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement, which is also when, sources claim, Beijing began talking about providing its own security. Apparently, Nawaz Sharif had agreed to the idea but was snubbed by then army chief General Raheel Sharif. A source knowledgeable about these matters told me that this was also the root of the first altercation between Sharif and his army chief, who insisted on Pakistan creating its own security mechanism.
It was then, in September 2016, that a CPEC security force was established, drawing from both the police and army. Yet, it has failed in providing adequate security. The terror attacks or damage to Chinese workers never stopped, resulting in China stopping its financing of the force. Now, Pakistan itself pays for the CPEC security force North and South.
New pushback from Pakistan
Given the Pakistan Foreign Office’s rebuttal to China twice within a month—first in October in reaction to the Chinese ambassador’s statement, and then denying any security agreement between the two countries—it seems that Islamabad is now more inclined to keep its old ally on an edge.
It’s not just Raheel Sharif who resisted allowing the Chinese to make their own security provisions. Even General Qamar Javed Bajwa and now Asim Munir don’t want to share control of security in Pakistan’s territory. There are several explanations for this.
First, the Pakistan Army does not want to surrender its autonomy over security, which a matter of both organisational control and financial benefits. The military recently got approval for an additional Rs 45 billion for protecting Chinese interests. Allowing the Chinese to create their own security infrastructure in Pakistan would raise doubts about the army’s capabilities and thus its share of the resources under question. It’s also a matter of maintaining power and authority.
Second, from a rational perspective, Chinese security presence in Pakistan would increase the threat of terror attacks and expose workers to even greater danger.
Third and most important, Islamabad and Rawalpindi do not want to create an impression of subservience to Chinese power, especially at a time when the administration in the United States is about to change hands.
Also Read: Pakistan’s Parliament just signed its suicide note. New law gives army chief even more power
Trump factor?
The military leadership in Pakistan seems to hold the illusion that it can reclaim its space in the American strategic calculus if it improves its image or manages to re-engage with Washington. In 2019, former army chief General Bajwa had spoken at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, insisting that Pakistan had “genetic ties with the West”. Audience members present at the event told me that given some help from the West, he seemed willing to abandon China.
Surprisingly, such a statement was made despite Pakistan depending on China for more than 72 per cent of its military equipment. Asim Munir, the present army chief, with his focus on the country’s economic recovery and reliance on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), may be equally tilted toward the West. Sources in Pakistan’s security community that I spoke with also claim that the cooling off with China has been gradual, especially after Munir’s takeover. Now apparently, orders for Ministry of Interior officials are to sit on Chinese visa applications and delay approvals.
Such an approach blows holes in Pakistan’s earlier claims of having designed a national security policy that focuses more on geoeconomics than geo-strategy. Or perhaps the fear of Trump’s reaction, or the prospect of heightened conflict with China in the coming months and years, has forced Rawalpindi into a reversal.
However, this strategy is highly flawed and not likely to bring any dividends, especially from Donald Trump, who is unlikely to be drawn toward Pakistan even with the aforementioned posturing. This plan could also prove a dangerous slippery slope for General Munir. His forces, already divided on domestic political issues, may get even more despondent.
Ayesha Siddiqa is Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)