For Pakistan, whose domestic politics have looked completely out of control since Imran Khan’s removal as prime minister in 2022, holding the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Islamabad was a big deal. There was no expectation of grand statements or big gestures coming out of the summit, but the fact that such a large meeting of various heads of government could be held without any disruption, with significant representatives from non-Western states—including key states in Eurasia—was huge.
From Pakistan’s perspective, there were three key gains from the SCO meeting. First, Chinese Premier Li Qiang came with a delegation, especially notable given the recent terror attack in Karachi that killed two Chinese nationals.
While Beijing is not entirely happy with Islamabad’s lackluster performance on internal security and safeguarding Chinese interests, the SCO provided a good excuse to invite a Chinese delegation to Pakistan for a bilateral meeting to discuss issues pertaining to the future of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Keeping China and Russia happy
Although it is generally believed that CPEC is more or less dead, Pakistan does not want to give that impression or let the slow pace of the project overshadow the better aspects of bilateral links. Since 2018, Islamabad has been caught in its effort to balance its geopolitics by managing relations with both the US and China, avoiding the impression that it is in either camp.
Despite this hard balancing act, there is an understanding that China is the only country with the resources to invest in infrastructure development in Pakistan. This includes plans for a railway line from Karachi to Peshawar, for which the Shehbaz Sharif government has approved negotiations with Beijing.
One wonders how this project will be worked out, especially in arranging funds to pay off Chinese debt related to it, in addition to what already needs to be paid.
This also means negotiating a security arrangement with China that satisfies both parties without granting it a bigger foothold. Given the series of terror attacks targeting Chinese nationals, particularly if more projects are to be undertaken, some form of Chinese security presence may have to be allowed in Pakistan, closely monitored by Pakistan’s security apparatus. Some sources suggest that, due to Pakistan’s failure to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals, elements in Beijing are ready to engage independently with the Baloch insurgents. It would be surprising if they haven’t already done so. It seems that even the Americans have heard about the Chinese talking to the insurgents.
Beijing has long-term stakes in the port city of Gwadar, which it doesn’t want to abandon at any cost. Meanwhile, the Pakistani military has its own interests in Balochistan that go beyond national concerns; for army personnel, from ordinary soldiers to generals, Balochistan is a lucrative posting. This also means that the military would hate to give up control to the Chinese.
Second, the SCO meeting provided an opportunity for Pakistan to welcome a large Russian delegation. With over a hundred members, the Russians were in town to negotiate trade deals in the agricultural sector. Russian news agency TASS reported a signed deal for Moscow to supply 15,000 tons of chickpeas and 10,000 tons of lentils in a barter deal for 15,000 tons of tangerines and 10,000 tons of potatoes from Pakistan.
In the past, areas of central Punjab benefitted from the smuggling of potatoes from Pakistan to Russia. More importantly, the visit by the Russian delegation signalled to the domestic audience that Islamabad can maintain multiple ties, like India or any other country.
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Hoping for India-Pakistan dialogue
Third, with the confidence of having its Chinese friends at the table, it was good for Pakistan to get India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in the room for a gentle talk, and hope that he also was in no mood to replay the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Goa. Though Jaishankar spoke about India’s terrorism–related concerns, the mood was definitely lighter with more conversation happening informally between the two foreign ministers than at any other international forum. Before the meeting, many expected potential verbal altercation. Possibly due to the various issues on his mind, including the US-Canada assassination allegations, Jaishankar was in no mood or position to adopt a forceful stance. This created the impression that a decent conversation could happen in the future.
The impression in Islamabad following Jaishankar’s visit is that there is a slow buildup of intent on both sides to engage in dialogue. The SCO summit, especially the presence of India’s media team, was used by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to convey his faith in talks, trade, and moving on. Sharif’s track 3 diplomacy through the Indian media was meant to convey a message that may not have been his alone. He certainly took no risks but indicated that the establishment didn’t have an issue with him interacting with Indian journalists, mainly because the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) is not in a position to initiate such discussions on his own. This message was also meant to signal to the world that while Pakistan is ready to move forward, the ball is in New Delhi’s court to take further action.
The key problem remains that both states are stuck in their respective positions. Pakistan would like to have some movement on Article 370, even if it’s not a complete repeal, to satisfy its domestic audience. Terrorism, of course, is another serious matter, with both sides having their own concerns. A total elimination of militancy that would satisfy India would not happen without direct talks, where both sides feel they can extract some benefit from it.
Other than the opportunity for meaningful conversation and the demonstration that a decent direct meeting can happen, nothing more can be expected except for a continuation of a stable instability between the two neighbours.
It goes without saying that for Pakistan’s establishment, the SCO summit was a major achievement to demonstrate domestically that it could host an event without major disruptions from Imran Khan. Even his party seemed divided on the issue of protesting during the summit, which became difficult as the military took charge of securing Islamabad and Rawalpindi, practically shutting down both cities during the SCO summit.
Ayesha Siddiqa is Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.