Just days before his election, Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba made a provocative proposal: to form an Asian NATO that includes India. He also suggested that either US nuclear weapons be based in the region or that the region develop its own. This suggestion stems from the rising threat from China, particularly over Taiwan, and concerns over the reliability of US extended deterrence. As tensions mount, India will need to balance its strategic autonomy with the security interests of its close friends, without becoming entangled in a formal mutual defence pact.
Japan is increasingly anxious about China’s aggression in the region. Last month, Chinese warships entered Japanese waters for the first time, and its aircraft violated Japanese airspace. Japan responded by sending its own warships into the Taiwan Straits, for the first time. China continues to send large numbers of fighter aircraft and warships around Taiwan and harasses the Philippines Navy in the South China Sea. Ishiba has expressed fears that a war could break out at any moment. Adding to this, Russia’s mutual defence treaty with North Korea, along with supplying it with nuclear and missile know-how, is increasing Japan’s security challenges.
Eroding faith in US deterrence
The Trump administration’s unpredictability shook Japan’s faith in US deterrence. South Korea has similar doubts, and debates over acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent have gained traction there. Although the Biden administration recently reaffirmed its commitment to defending Taiwan, Ishiba’s concerns are valid: Would a future US administration, potentially led by Trump or his ideological successors, risk American cities in a nuclear exchange to protect Taiwan? US public opinion, while supportive of Taiwan’s right to self-defence, has been lukewarm on the idea of sending American troops to the island.
There’s a certain irony here. Japan, which had imposed sanctions on India for its 1998 nuclear tests while enjoying the protection of the US nuclear umbrella, is now contemplating a future where it might need nuclear weapons. Japan has already reinterpreted its pacifist constitution and expanded its defence spending, converting helicopter carriers into aircraft carriers and building up military capabilities.
The case for an Asian NATO
Ishiba’s proposal for an Asian NATO stems from his belief that the absence of a collective defence alliance like NATO in Asia could lead to wars. He points to Ukraine as an example, noting that NATO’s refusal to intervene directly stems from the fact that Ukraine was not part of the alliance. He implies that Taiwan could face the same fate without a similar structure in Asia. In his view, an Asian NATO could deter China.
But this comparison misses a crucial point. Taiwan is unlikely to join such an alliance, as doing so could provoke the very conflict that Japan and its allies are trying to avoid. Ishiba’s vision overlooks the fact that formalising an Asian NATO would likely escalate tensions rather than prevent them. China already views the Quad—an informal group comprising India, Japan, Australia, and the US—as a quasi-NATO. Forming a military alliance would almost certainly heighten regional tensions and could push Beijing into taking more aggressive actions, possibly even sooner than anticipated.
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Where does India figure?
For India, the calculus is different. Unlike Japan or South Korea, India is a nuclear-weapons state with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a growing fleet of ship submersible ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs). India doesn’t rely on the US nuclear umbrella for its security. Its nuclear deterrent and second-strike capabilities safeguard its security interests against China, with whom India has been in a tense border standoff since 2020. India will need intelligence support and military supplies in a conflict—not foreign soldiers or nuclear guarantees.
This is precisely why joining an Asian NATO, particularly one driven by fears over Taiwan, is not in India’s interest. While India has strategic partnerships and reciprocal logistics agreements with the Quad countries and conducts joint military exercises with them, which have increased interoperability, a mutual defence commitment will be a step too far.
India and Japan have been close partners for years, bonded by shared democratic values, a commitment to regional stability, a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and increasing economic and defence ties. While Japan’s growing security concerns are valid, particularly in the face of China’s assertiveness, the proposed solution—an Asian NATO—is a path India must tread carefully.
At the same time, India cannot afford to ignore the security concerns of its strategic partners. With India’s growing economic and military power and rising global profile, there are increasing expectations that it will play a more significant role in ensuring security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Should an Asian NATO actually be formed, India must work closely as a partner but not join it. India’s role in the Indo-Pacific is already significant, and its participation in forums like the Quad provides a platform for coordination on regional security without the rigidity of a formal military alliance.
India can—and should—support Taiwan’s independence and work with partners to counter China’s aggression. This can be done by working with them to develop close military-to-military ties, supplies of weapons and ammunition, intelligence sharing, logistical support, diplomatic backing, and developing punitive economic measures to implement if there is a conflict—not by joining an alliance that could limit its strategic flexibility. This flexible approach, short of mutual defence, will serve the interests of all partner countries.
The author is an adjunct scholar at the Takshashila Institution. He tweets @YusufDFI. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)