Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently returned from Russia, bringing with him the newly acquired stealth frigate Tushil and presiding over routine defence consultations. The atmosphere in New Delhi is upbeat, buoyed by Singh’s emphatic characterisation of India-Russia relations as “higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas”, a phrase reminiscent of the rhetoric often used by India’s neighbours. This statement drew considerable attention and urges a more careful analysis of what lies beneath.
Reports confirm that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been invited by Prime Minister Narendra Modi for an official visit to India in early 2025.
Since the onset of the Ukraine War, India’s ties with Russia have faced intense geopolitical scrutiny. Despite inherent challenges, the relationship, rooted in historical ties dating back to the Soviet era, continues to evolve by turning obstacles into opportunities. However, Russia’s decades-long dominance in India’s defence sector has not been without issues, including delays, corruption, and conflicting geopolitical alignments. And today more complexities are compounded.
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Mountains and seas
The Ukraine War has introduced a significant disruption, straining Russia’s military-industrial complex and exports, while increasing its reliance on Chinese dual-use technology. This growing dependence on China poses a strategic dilemma for India as Beijing remains India’s foremost geopolitical, economic, and strategic challenge, notwithstanding the recent progress on disengagement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
For India, maintaining constructive engagement with Russia remains vital in the broader Eurasian geopolitical framework, even as New Delhi silently acknowledges the limits of leveraging its ties with Moscow to counterbalance Russia’s growing reliance on China’s wartime economic and technological support.
India’s approach reflects a preference for incremental diplomacy rather than rigid, zero-sum alliances. However, this incremental engagement must be pursued cautiously, avoiding overdoing in a complex and shifting geopolitical landscape.
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Dependencies and challenges
India’s reliance, on not only Russia but also Ukraine, for maintaining and upgrading its Soviet-era military hardware highlights the pressing need for modernisation and indigenisation in a tense geopolitical landscape. Persistent conflicts, from Ukraine to the Middle East, underscore that peace relies on strength, not neoliberal ideals of shared economic interests. This lesson resonates in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s destabilising actions and deepening ties with Russia heighten tensions. Amid unresolved structural rivalries with China, and a China-backed Pakistan, India must contend with unfavourable power dynamics in air and sea domains, requiring a robust response.
India’s current military acquisitions with Russia reflect deals signed before the Ukraine war, such as the Talwar-class stealth frigates. Of the four frigates, two are being built in Russia’s Yantar Shipyard, while the other two are under construction in Goa. However, all rely on Ukrainian gas turbine engines, underscoring a critical vulnerability. Even as Ukraine supplies these engines despite ongoing war, showcasing the resilience of its military-industrial complex, India’s inability to domestically manufacture such components leaves it dependent on external suppliers. This extends to India’s naval fleet, which includes 130 warships powered by Ukrainian engines, and its Soviet-era aircraft, which use Ukrainian-built engines.
To mitigate this dependency, India has taken steps to secure technology. In January 2024, Bharat Forge acquired a 51 per cent stake in Ukraine’s Zorya Mashproekt, a strategic move to ensure access to critical engine technology. Ukrainian firms like Zorya and Motor Sich remain indispensable, not just for India but for Russia as well, given their contributions to Russia’s global defence exports. Russia’s reliance on Ukraine for key engine components, accounting for 32 per cent of its arms trade revenue, has been exposed during the conflict, complicating the standalone capability of its military-industrial base.
India must urgently diversify its procurement sources, while accelerating domestic capabilities in engine production to reduce vulnerabilities and bolster self-reliance. Without such strides, its defence readiness remains at risk.
There are several examples of how India’s dependencies on Soviet-era equipment have slowed our modernisation.
Modernisation efforts extend to phasing out its ageing An-32 transport aircraft, initially designed by Ukraine’s Antonov Design Bureau. While India considered upgrading the fleet for extended longevity, it finally opted for spare replacements to keep the aircraft operational as a stopgap measure to maintain functionality. In parallel, the country has procured C-295 transport aircraft from Spain and is exploring deals with Brazil’s Embraer and Germany’s A400M to modernise its medium transport fleet.
After years of delays, notable progress has been made with MiG-29 fighter jets, as Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has developed the capability to overhaul RD-33 engines, significantly reducing dependence on Russia. Additionally, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has replaced outdated Russian missile systems with advanced Indian missiles and systems showcasing its capacity for indigenous upgrades. However, challenges persist, such as the unserviceable Mi-35 helicopters, hindered by Russia’s inability to provide the necessary support.
Indian Air Force remains cautious about acquiring advanced Russian fighter jets like the Su-57, citing deficiencies in stealth technology, radar cross-section, and limited technology transfer, making it unsuitable for modernisation efforts.
India is also focused on enhancing its radar systems to strengthen surveillance and early-warning capabilities. Speculations about a $4 billion deal with Russia for Voronezh-class radars appear misplaced, as India has long relied on Israel for dependable radar technology. Furthermore, India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been advancing indigenous radar systems, particularly Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radars.
Existing radar systems in India, sourced from Israel and France, can detect objects at ranges of 500–700 kilometres. However, OTH radars, capable of detecting threats over 2,000 kilometres, while accounting for the Earth’s curvature, remain a critical gap. DRDO’s efforts to develop OTH radar systems aim to enhance India’s maritime and missile defence capabilities. Once operational, these systems would elevate India to a league of advanced nations, including the US, China, and Russia.
The vulnerabilities of Russian radar systems during the Ukraine conflict further underscore the need for self-reliance. Ukrainian drone strikes have damaged nearly 50 per cent of Russia’s OTH radars, exposing their susceptibility to attacks. For India, this highlights the importance of prioritising indigenous radar development to avoid dependence on potentially unreliable external systems.
India continues to face delays in receiving the final two consignments of the S-400 air defence systems from Russia as well.
These issues are further complicated by Russia’s increasing reliance on Chinese technology due to Western sanctions following the Ukraine war. This dependency poses concerns for India, particularly after the Ministry of Defence’s September 2024 directive to remove Chinese components from its defence systems. The evolving Russia-China partnership intensifies India’s strategic dilemma, requiring careful reassessment of its procurement strategies and broader geopolitical positioning to address these intertwined defence and security challenges effectively.
Conflicting geopolitics
India should be deeply concerned about Russia’s extensive arming of China, amplified by Beijing’s reverse-engineering capabilities. The Russia-China defence partnership has shown a sharp rise in the SIPRI-developed Trend Indicator Value (TIV), reflecting the scale and strategic value of their cooperation. Since 2014, these ties have deepened, including the joint development of missile warning systems and the integration of satellite navigation technologies. Worryingly for India, the locations of Russia-China military exercises—eight in the East China Sea, one each in the South China Sea and the Arabian Sea since 2022—threaten key maritime interests. India relies on maintaining the status quo in strategic waterways like the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca, yet its maritime commerce in the Red Sea is strained, lacking guarantees provided to Russian and Chinese ships by regional actors like the Houthis.
The once-dominant India-Russia defence relationship is waning. In its place, crude oil supplies have become the centrepiece of bilateral ties, signalling a fundamental shift in the relationship’s dynamics.
India must adapt to this evolving scenario, seeking a balanced approach to maintain its strategic autonomy while recalibrating ties with Moscow in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting editor, ThePrint and foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)
Very important for India to have a strong relation with Russia. This would protect India from becoming semi client state like EU countries in relation to USA.
40%, not 50%.
Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia was a negligible supplier of oil to India. Principally because of transport costs. An opportunity presented itself in the form of discounted Russian oil, which India has made good use of. Russian imports going as high as 50% of the time in some months. 2. Entering into a 10 year agreement with Rosneft for half a million barrels daily , worth $ 130 billion annually, goes beyond the transient issues created by the Ukraine conflict. It indicates a long term commitment to keeping this time tested relationship as one of the centre pieces of Indian foreign policy. Irreconcilable in a sense with the monochromatic phase of excessive closeness to the United States. 3. Where does China come into this. My sense is Russia has played a role in the recent thaw. That was China’s grouse too. Becoming part of America’s containment strategy. 4. Military hardware is not my area of knowledge. Whether the weapons Russia produces will continue to be a good fit for the Indian armed forces is for the experts to judge.