The Muhammad Yunus-led interim government in Dhaka’s call to extradite Sheikh Hasina following the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) death sentence for her and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal poses diplomatic and security challenges for India. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has “noted” the verdict and reaffirmed New Delhi’s commitment to engage constructively with all stakeholders in Bangladesh—a diplomatic way of saying ‘no’.
The ICT, a domestic war crimes tribunal set up by Hasina in 2009 to prosecute those responsible for the 1971 genocide committed by the Pakistan Army and local collaborators—Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams—became a contentious issue, fuelling anti-government protests and calls to scrap it. In December 2012, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami supporters and their student wing, Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir, called a nationwide general strike, which erupted in violence.
But Awami League managed to win the 2014, 2018 and 2024 elections, signalling support for Hasina’s tough stand against Islamic radicalism and Pakistan, much to New Delhi’s relief. But the celebrations did not last long. Extremely violent protests forced Hasina to make a hasty exit and seek asylum in India. The political power went into the hands of furious mobs and trigger-happy army, which installed a pliable Nobel Peace Prize laureate-led government that promises to hold elections in February 2026.
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New Delhi’s options
The argument that the present dispensation in Dhaka is not an elected government but a puppet in the hands of the army, Islamic radicals and anti-India forces is a sound one. But New Delhi has given it credibility and recognition by engaging with officials since August 2024.
Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misry visited Dhaka and held consultations with his Bangladeshi counterpart in December 2024. Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Yunus in Thailand on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC regional summit in April 2025. Riaz Habibullah was accredited in May 2025 as the new High Commissioner of Bangladesh, representing the “unelected interim regime led by Muhammad Yunus”.
In June 2025, Riaz held an official meeting with the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamta Banerjee, in Kolkata. Later, he made an official diplomatic visit to Tripura in August 2025. In February this year, Energy Adviser Muhammad Fauzul Kabir Khan visited India to attend India Energy Week. Bangladesh was officially welcomed in June 2024 as the fifth Member State of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC).
Established in 2020 by India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, joined by Mauritius in 2022—the four countries of the CSC signed the Charter and the MoU for its Secretariat in August 2024. The agreement outlined five pillars: Maritime Safety and Security; Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation; Combating Trafficking and Transnational Organised Crime; Cyber Security and Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Technology; and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.
Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Khalilur Rahman recently visited New Delhi, a couple of days after Bangladesh’s Kangaroo court (ICT) pronounced death sentence against Hasina.
New Delhi has a good opportunity to explore all the options available to tide over the present predicament, mend the relationship, and bide time for the Awami League leader to return to Dhaka. While the extradition of Hasina is not even a remote option, the Indian government needs to list the security threats that could emerge in the coming days. India also has the option to warn Dhaka that any anti-India move by the present dispensation will have serious consequences.
The proposed elections are just about a hundred days away. The Awami League is leaderless but has formidable popular support. Ironically, the party and its apex leadership are in a position similar to that of the BNP and its leaders during Hasina’s regime. With a ban on its activities and its youth wing, the party can form a new political platform and consolidate its position.
Following the 2013 amendments to the Representation of the People Order, anyone convicted under the ICT Act is barred from contesting elections. By this measure, Hasina and Kamal are not only fugitives, but they are also permanently ineligible for public office. For a new leader to emerge, the present leadership will have to vacate its hold over the party, which appears to be difficult. The BNP faces a similar predicament, but could propel Khaleda Zia’s son, Tarique Zia, to the centre stage of politics.
Meanwhile, the once-banned outfit Jamaat-e-Islami, a close ally of BNP, is gaining international recognition. A World Bank delegation led by Jean Pesme, division director for Bangladesh and Bhutan, reportedly held a meeting with party chief Ameer Shafiqur Rahman in his Dhaka office and discussed issues related to infrastructure reforms and development in the country’s financial sector, sustainable economic pathways, taxation, and various aspects of the social sector. Earlier, a meeting also took place between the Jamaat-e-Islami and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Dhaka’s death wish
A BNP-Jamaat-e-Islami coalition government in Dhaka could undo all the anti-radicalisation moves undertaken by the Hasina government.
After the 1971 Bangladesh liberation War, India appears to have taken the bilateral relations with Dhaka for granted, without realising the need to invest in fostering democracy and institution-building. Forces inimical to India’s security and strategic interests, especially China and Pakistan, invested heavily in Bangladesh and worked overtime to undermine Indian interests. Pakistan, on its part, moved into Dhaka stealthily, planting ISI’s sleeper cells and funding radicalism. India’s complete and one-sided dependence on the Awami League and its apex leadership was not a very wise move, to say the least. New Delhi should have built parallel bridges with BNP even while lauding the de-radicalisation efforts of the Awami League.
With a hostile government in Dhaka, India may have to face a three-and-a-half-front conflict in the future. Projects related to BIMSTEC, Look-East-Act-East, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) could suffer a setback, impacting trade with South Asia and the South-South Cooperation agenda. A pro-Pakistan and anti-India government in Dhaka will not only destabilise the region but also harm Bangladesh. Dhaka’s death wish could become an albatross around India’s neck.
Seshadri Chari is the former editor of ‘Organiser’. He tweets @seshadrichari. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)

