When Defence Minister Rajnath Singh landed in Rabat, Morocco, this September, it was more than just another high-level visit. It came alongside Tata Advanced Systems Limited opening its first-ever defence production unit in Africa—a milestone in India’s outreach to the continent. For New Delhi, Morocco is not just a partner but a gateway to Africa and a foothold on the Mediterranean’s southern flank.
However, beneath the headlines lies a more complex story. India’s Morocco venture reveals both growing ambition and persistent blind spots. To make sense of it, we must examine three layers: the initiative itself and its irony; Morocco’s place in a crowded, multialigned defence ecosystem; and its role in India’s Mediterranean calculus. Together, they highlight a larger point: India must recalibrate its strategy. In a world of plurilateral defence chain synergies and subsystem integration, bilateral gestures alone no longer suffice.
Building abroad
The Tata Advanced Systems (TASL) Kestrel facility in Morocco is historic—the first Indian defence manufacturing footprint on African soil. It adds to New Delhi’s export record, from becoming Armenia’s top supplier to delivering BrahMos missiles to the Philippines and providing components to the US and France.
And yet, the irony is striking. The very platform Morocco will induct—the Kestrel Wheeled Armoured Amphibious Platform (WhAP)—remains largely unadopted by the Indian Army.
India’s mechanised infantry still depends on Soviet-era BMPs, upgraded to BMP-2M with modern fire-control and night-fighting systems. These are functional but dated tracked vehicles. By contrast, the Kestrel is a modern wheeled infantry fighting vehicle, co-developed by TASL and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). On paper, it rivals the US Stryker in engine power, mobility, and features.
And yet, India hesitates to use it while selling it to Morocco. The paradox is telling: an indigenous platform that finds markets abroad but not at home. It captures a deeper problem—India’s armed forces’ reluctance to induct homegrown systems at scale, often defaulting to imports or incremental upgrades. The Kestrel thus symbolises both promise and predicament. It’s innovation shackled by domestic indecision.
Minilaterals within multialignment
India’s entry into Morocco should not be seen as a direct counter to Pakistan-Saudi Arabia or any singular rivalry. Geopolitics no longer works through straight-line confrontations. Morocco exemplifies a new reality: the age of universal multialignment, where States gain advantage by forging minilateral defence synergies through effective subsystem integration.
Consider Rabat’s balancing act. When India’s Defence Minister was in town, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita was in Beijing, advancing ties with China. This relationship has deep roots. It began with a 2016 joint declaration, followed in 2017 by China supplying Morocco with air-to-air missiles. Since then, Rabat has purchased the Sky Dragon 50 and HQ-9 (FD-2000B) missile systems, TB-001K combat drones, and multiple rocket launchers. Morocco has also endorsed Chinese premier Xi Jinping’s global initiatives—the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI)—and in 2025 confirmed its membership in the new International Organization for Mediation, a China-led body headquartered in Hong Kong.
The economic numbers are equally telling. China–Morocco trade hit a record in early 2025, with Chinese exports rising 20.4 per cent year-on-year to $52.9 billion. China has been Morocco’s largest supplier since 2021 and its third-largest trading partner overall. After Morocco joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2024, multiple investment agreements followed. Beijing now openly frames Morocco as its “gateway to Africa.”
India, by contrast, lags far behind. Bilateral trade reached only $2.55 billion in 2024–2025, skewed in Morocco’s favour. Diplomatic contacts are steady but lack economic heft.
Turkey adds another layer of competition. Morocco is now a key customer of Ankara’s defence industry. Rabat has inducted Bayraktar TB2 drones in a $70 million deal, with Baykar Defence (a Turkish defence company) announcing a Moroccan facility in 2025. Talks are ongoing for advanced Akinci drones. Meanwhile, Morocco has signed a $50.7 million deal with Aselsan for the Koral electronic warfare system and requested 200 Cobra 2 armoured vehicles worth $136 million, with training and support included. Ankara is also preparing exports of its newer Pars Alpha and ALTUĞ 8×8 armoured vehicles by mid-2025—platforms Morocco is a natural buyer for.
In this crowded landscape, India’s TASL unit is a significant but belated step. Morocco is not a binary partner but a hub where multiple powers plug in their strengths. China brings scale, Turkey agile manufacturing, Pakistan linkages—and together they form cost-effective, interoperable defence ecosystems.
The question for India is not whether it has “countered” anyone, but whether it can compete in this marketplace of plurilateral cooperation. At present, New Delhi’s North African footprint is thin, limited mainly to Morocco and Egypt, with Algeria at a nascent stage. Both Rabat and Cairo practice active multialignment. If India sticks to isolated bilateralism, it risks being overshadowed.
Morocco and the Mediterranean
The third layer situates Morocco within India’s Mediterranean calculus. To date, India has strong partnerships on the northern Mediterranean coast—from Spain and France to Italy, Greece, and Cyprus—though ties halt abruptly at Turkey.
On the southern flank, however, its presence is sparse. Morocco in the west, Egypt in the east, and budding outreach to Algeria form the main nodes. Yet this flank is critical. It links Africa to the Mediterranean, and by extension, to Europe.
Egypt anchors India’s presence in the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb—vital but contested waters. Morocco, meanwhile, anchors the western flank, linking India to Atlantic approaches and complementing outreach to Namibia, Ghana, and other coastal states. If developed in tandem, these nodes could form a dual-axis presence across the Red Sea and Atlantic, giving India a platform to project influence. But for now, the pieces remain disconnected and underdeveloped.
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Toward a competitive strategy
If India is to succeed in Morocco and beyond, two priorities stand out.
First, embrace defence chain plurilaterals. India cannot afford a purely bilateral game when others are creating synergistic ecosystems. In Morocco, it should explore partnerships with Israel or Brazil. In Algeria, it could leverage Russia’s entrenched position to offer joint packages. The key is synergy—adding value in competitive spaces.
Second, focus on subsystem integration. Modern ecosystems thrive on modularity: drones carrying foreign munitions, aircraft with third-party radars, and ships with diverse missile suites. China and Turkey excel at this. India, despite its capacity, has scaled subsystem exports only in a few cases, like BrahMos. By focusing on adaptable subsystems, India can embed itself in supply chains instead of selling one-off platforms.
What is unfolding in Morocco reflects a global trend. As the US retreats as a dominant security provider, the vacuum is not filled by China alone but by a web of middle-power defence chains. This order values flexibility over exclusivity. States prefer hybrid models: a Chinese jet co-produced in Pakistan, equipped with Turkish missiles, serviced locally. Such modular ecosystems democratise defence while multiplying interdependencies.
India’s challenge is not capability but imagination. For decades, it has aspired to be self-reliant. Yet in today’s hybrid order, its share remains negligible. Unless New Delhi adapts—moving from bilateralism to plurilateral defence value ecosystems, from platforms to agile subsystems—it risks watching others shape the very spaces it seeks to enter.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)