Admiral Sudhir Pillai’s article, “Theaterisation reform is stuck on ranks and roles—India’s military needs clarity”, published on 25 September in ThePrint, is a compelling and nuanced exploration of the entrenched institutional challenges that continue to obstruct India’s theaterisation reform. The article elevates the discussion beyond technicalities to the foundational tensions because of misalignment between “statute, symbols, and soldiering.”
Admiral Pillai advocates for a “clear chain of command aligned with rank symbolism and statutory law” and setting up of boundaries between civil and military, where the role of the Parliament and Cabinet would be to articulate “political ends, while operational means would rest squarely with the chain of command” In doing so, the author is echoing Samuel Huntington’s theory of objective control.
Huntington’s theory posits a clear separation of responsibilities between elected civilian leadership and military leadership, theorising that military professionals should have autonomy over purely military matters while civilians set policy objectives. While elegant in theory, this neat separation of operational command from political oversight and the strict hierarchy Huntington envisioned faces profound challenges in modern combat situations. Real-world warfare is complex, fluid, and marked by imperfect information, rapidly shifting context, and overlapping responsibilities, all of which defy the rigid divisions and legal clarity that the article postulates.
In this article, I will explore why Huntington’s model, though favoured by the military, cannot fully account for the messy and often ambiguous modern wars. As a result, wartime policy formulation and conduct of operations cannot be cleanly compartmentalised. This would not only be in the context of the division of the role and responsibilities of civil and military leadership, but also the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the theatre commanders in the proposed and ongoing reforms.
It is not my case to undermine the need for laws, statutes, and hierarchical structures which form the essential backbone of military organisations. However, these formal structures do not operate in isolation nor guarantee success; they must coexist with adaptive leadership, both civil and military, which can cater for personal influences and the fluid realities of modern wars.
Military reforms in many countries are inspired by the US’s Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 (GNA). For some, the Act is a gold standard for military reforms. It would be worthwhile to recall the role of General Colin Powell, the then Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), during Operation Desert Storm and the downsizing of US armed forces after the breakup of the Soviet Union, an extremely important peacetime activity with serious operational consequences.
General Powell has been considered one of the most powerful and influential Chairman of the JCS in the history of that office due to the expanded powers available to him under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and his own personality and experience. The Chairman of the JCS in the US has an advisory and coordinating role, unlike the CDS in the UK, who also has operational responsibilities.
Operation Desert Storm
One of the highlights of Powell’s tenure as the Chairman was Operation Desert Storm, launched in 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. A study of Powell’s actions during the period gives an insight into the functioning of the Chairman during a war-like situation. By his own account, one gets a sense that Powell’s actions were more like a commander-in-charge of an operation rather than an advisor to the Secretary of Defence and the President.
He seemed to have ‘ordered’ and ‘instructed’ more than just ‘coordinated’ during the war. An aspect which ‘forced/assisted’ Powell to perhaps overstep his brief as the Chairman during the war was the poor standing of Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander, Central Command (CENTCOM), in the higher echelons of the then decision-making structure.
The National Command Authority (NCA) largely relied on Powell due to his expertise in military matters and their reservations concerning Schwarzkopf. They counted on Powell to ensure that Schwarzkopf would not make any critical or disastrous mistakes. Schwarzkopf, aware of his relatively lower standing in Washington, depended on Powell’s support and thus refrained from challenging him.
During the war, Schwarzkopf assessed the situation, briefed his plans to both the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council (NSC), and led the operations. However, in several instances, Powell, as the assertive Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, managed to impose his recommendations. Two notable examples are the decisions regarding the day to launch operations and when to terminate them.
Regarding the latter, many within the military hierarchy believed the US forces had not fully achieved their objectives. Does this suggest that the Chairman overstepped his authority and undermined the Combatant Commander? A more pressing concern is that Powell wielded immense authority and influence while bearing very limited operational responsibility.
Also read: India has a solid defence structure on paper. But it lacks a national security vision
Strategic Overview–1994
Colin Powell’s “Strategic Overview–1994” plan was developed in the context of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and rapidly shifting global dynamics by the early 1990s. The plan supported the strategy that would allow the US to continue global engagement without returning to Cold War levels of deployment and expenditure. The plan was resisted by some military leaders who were wary of dramatic force reduction.
Colin Powell writes in his biography, My American Journey, that he initiated the proposal for reduction. He mentions that he did take the service chiefs into confidence and discussed the reduction with them. However, when it came to the final decision from the President, he went ahead and presented his plan. The presentation to the President had specifics of the proposal about which he had not consulted the chiefs.
Powell accepted that he had blindsided the chiefs—a mistake he intended not to repeat in the future. The provision of the GNA puts the Chairman in the position of principal military advisor to the elected representatives. He is not duty-bound by the Act to present the consensus view of the JCS; however, he is required to present a dissenting view, if any. Powell mentions in his book that under the GNA, the Chairman does not have to take a vote among the chiefs before he recommends anything. He does not even have to consult them, though it would be foolish not to do so.
In this case, Powell did not go through the motion of discussing the plan in totality for force restructuring with the chiefs. In doing so, did he in some manner sabotage the intent of the Act and blindsided the chiefs on a peacetime matter of grave national security, one that has long-term consequences?
I have highlighted two instances of Powell’s injudiciousness—one during a wartime situation and the other an extremely important peacetime decision with implications on national security. We may dismiss Powell’s indiscretions as exceptions at our peril since the lessons from the above have universal application. This brings me to the point that laws, statutes, and hierarchical structures are extremely important to any military organisation as they provide clarity, accountability, and discipline required for the effective functioning of the organisation.
However, these structures and statutes must function in an environment where ‘force of personality’ and ‘proximity to power’ may sabotage the intent of the laws and functioning of the framework. To obviate such a situation, now is the time for the Indian leadership—civil and military—to create organisations, systems and processes that will complement laws and statutes, and make them indiscretion proof.
Powell’s indiscretions also strengthen the case for having four-star theatre commanders so that they can function independently and are not beholden to the CDS and the chiefs located in New Delhi.
Also read: Before Balakot, there was Burki. Lessons from India’s underplayed victory in 1965
Huntington’s Objective Control Theory
Hamas and other non-state actors attacked Israel on 7 October 2023. On 9 October, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a televised address, outlined five strategic goals for Israel to counter the Hamas terrorist group. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) would have planned their initial operations on these objectives.
However, what began as a focused campaign against Hamas has escalated into a multi-front war, with Israel’s political leadership accused of allowing internal factors—domestic politics, Netanyahu’s legal challenges, ideological leaning of certain coalition partners—to steer the ever-expanding political and by extension military objectives well beyond the original five goals laid out in October 2023.
Even in the battlefields of Ukraine, Russian as well as Ukrainian political objectives have evolved in response to battlefield realities, domestic political compulsions and shifting international dynamics. At the outset, Russian goals included “demilitarisation and denazification” of Ukraine, preventing NATO expansion, and installing a pro-Russian regime in Kyiv. After the initial operations got stalled, Russian forces focused on annexing and integrating territories in the East and South of Ukraine as a priority.
Evolving political objectives of the Gaza and Ukraine wars have a direct impact on campaign plans, operational conduct, and international politics of the wars. As political goals evolve, military objectives, conduct of operations, and desired military end states also change. The government may enforce its will through articulating terms of reference, which may border on limiting freedom of operations for the military.
Also read: Ran Samwad put future warfare in focus. We’re barely ready for present
Feedback loop between politics and war
The political objectives are constantly informed and shaped by battlefield outcomes and vice versa. In addition, military coherence and planning are also impacted by domestic political controversies, public opinion regarding war objectives, as well as the conduct of operations and challenges to national leadership, among other issues. International alliances, sanction regimes, and diplomatic pressure may force leadership to recalibrate their political and military objectives.
These are especially true for protracted wars, as are being witnessed in Gaza and Ukraine. If there is a misalignment in constantly evolving political objectives and military capabilities, it may have a major cascading impact on the domestic situation, international relations, and long-term peace.
The challenges posed by evolving political and military situations necessitate countries to develop robust coordination mechanisms, flexible planning, and open communication channels between civil and military leadership, ensuring continuous alignment between political goals and military operations. This is antithetical to the hands-off approach suggested by Huntington, wherein elected leadership, once it articulates political objectives, the military leadership has the freedom to plan and conduct operations.
Modern-day protracted and messy wars have challenged Huntington’s theory by demonstrating increased interdependence and blurred boundaries between the roles of elected and military leadership in firming up the objectives of war-political and military. Elected leadership rely on constant military insights for policy decisions, and military leaders may have to engage in political considerations, creating stress in Huntington’s idealised world.
However, there is a downside to increased politico-military interaction and blurring of roles—the ever-present threat of politicisation of the military. This fear has forced the Indian Armed Forces to ardently define boundaries and isolate the forces, and for good reason. However, that is a topic of deliberation for another day.
Col (Dr) Rajneesh Singh (Retd) is a Research Fellow at MP-IDSA, New Delhi. Views are personal.
(Edited by Saptak Datta)
AFAIK, even in Operation Sindoor, IAF had to face damages to its assets initially, because of artificially imposed restrictions by political executive ( Limited mandate to strike and destroy terrorist infrastructure was found to be limiting as PAF responded by an all out strike). Only when the political mandate unshackled the Indian armed forces that the indian fortune changed. So yes battlefield fluidity demands equal flexibility from political establishment.
What is expected is jointness of force. Airforce is hampered by reduction in force levels from sanctioned levels which itself was designed for 1.5 war fronts, not the 2.5 fronts which we face. Further distributing the IAF assets among theatres will result in diluting Air force till it no longer remains a force.
Same is true for our minimal Sea force levels. In the Andaman and Nicobar Command where the case for theaterization will help the indian navy achieve blue water navy capability of simultaneously defending entire IOR and the trade passing through it.
As a civilian it is clear to me that navy assets deployed over the himalyas was the clearest demonstration of jointness which India needs.
Nato must scale up by investing 4% in defence capabilities and we are a developing country, we make do with 2.6%. This paucity of resource is the gorilla in the room that needs addressing beyond theaterization.
Pak and china are not threats but challenges we must rise to and acquire force levels commensurate with increasing economic stature.
We must be atmanirbhar this vijaydashmi or else the demons of pak china america external hand and color revolutions will keep scaring us.