Mixed signals are coming in from Jammu and Kashmir. On 2 January, Home Minister Amit Shah said that the Modi government has “completely dismantled the ecosystem of terror in Kashmir, thereby strengthening peace and stability in the region”. An elected government in harmony with the central government is in power, and the restoration of statehood is on the cards. The degree of terrorist violence is, by far, lower than the violent crimes in metropolitan cities. Tourism is thriving and infrastructure development is progressing rapidly.
However, rather than a decrease in military deployment, 15,000 additional troops were inducted into the Jammu region in 2024, and emergency procurement of counter-insurgency equipment was sanctioned. The troop-to-terrorist kill ratio in 2023 and 2024 was 1:2.6—the lowest level in a decade. But in the Jammu region, from 2021 to 2024, the ratio was an alarming 1:1. Both Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and the Chief of the Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi, have stated on record that Pakistan continues to wage a proxy war in J&K. The COAS has said that 80 per cent of the terrorists present in J&K and 60 per cent of those killed in counter-terrorism operations came from Pakistan.
So, what is the reality? By all yardsticks, violence has plateaued to the lowest levels ever. For once, politics is at centre stage to win the hearts and minds of the people. Per my assessment, the sporadic surge in violence is due to the changed tactics of the terrorists, necessitated by their small numbers, and the Army’s failure to adapt. This is imposing disproportionate caution, both politically and militarily. Thus, political and military strategy remains unchanged and continues to focus on long-term conflict management. A review of this is in order.
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An opportunity for India
Currently, Pakistan’s capacity for a proxy war in J&K is at its lowest ever due to its poor economy, confrontation with Afghanistan and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan along the Durand Line and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the insurgency in Balochistan, and the deteriorating security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
That said, Pakistan’s long-term strategy of attempting to usurp J&K—or at least its Muslim-majority areas—through a proxy war remains unchanged. Thus, it will endeavour to keep the pot of terrorism simmering by maintaining 100-150 terrorists.
At the tactical level, terrorists are likely to be based in forested areas and difficult terrain, direct confrontation with security forces will be avoided, and there will be a reliance on ambushes and surprise attacks.
This strategic and tactical environment offers a unique opportunity for India to transition from ‘conflict management’ to ‘conflict termination’ in J&K. For this, a de novo political and military approach is required.
The present political environment in J&K is ideal for a bold initiative by the central government. The people have reconciled to the revocation of Article 370, and the National Conference government has gone out of its way to cooperate with the Centre.
The restoration of statehood to J&K must be announced at the earliest, along with an economic package focused on development. This would set the stage for a military push to wipe out the terrorists.
Changed tactical environment
According to an India Today report based on “intelligence sources”, there are 119 active terrorists in J&K: 79 (18 local and 61 Pakistani) operate north of the Pir Panjal range and 40 (6 local and 34 Pakistani) south of it. Since the operational lifespan of a terrorist is approximately one year, at least 100 terrorists with arms and ammunition must infiltrate every year to sustain current numbers. In addition, weapons, ammunition, and equipment required for local recruits have to be smuggled across the Line of Control. To reinvigorate the insurgency, the number of terrorists would need to go up by three to four times, which can only happen with increased infiltration.
Given their small numbers, the terrorists are not directly engaging the troops. They are also refraining from operating in villages and urban areas, where troop density is high. Instead, they are predominantly operating in forested and mountainous areas, relying on ambushing security forces by baiting them with planted information. Selective targeting of civilians and policemen is sometimes undertaken to make their presence felt.
Apart from the formations deployed along the LoC to physically safeguard it and for counter infiltration, the counter-terrorist grid of Company Operating Bases, manned by the Rashtriya Rifles, primarily covers developed areas near villages and towns that were once used as terrorist bases.
Currently, only a limited endeavour is made to dominate forests and mountainous areas through patrols or need-based operations by security forces. And this is exactly what the terrorists want. They have freedom of action in these areas and bait the security forces who operate in unfamiliar terrain and suffer disproportionate losses. While relative peace prevails in developed areas, tactical reverses in forests and mountainous regions perpetuate the cautionary persistence with conflict management.
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Review the operational strategy
For long, the Army has believed that the infiltration of terrorists, arms, and equipment can be controlled and reduced, but not completely stopped without committing disproportionate resources. However, if we want to eradicate terrorism, additional resources must be committed.
With limited local recruitment, insurgency is being sustained by infiltration from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. By my assessment, at least 60 additional infantry companies are required to achieve zero infiltration. These additional resources can be obtained by redeploying 10 Rashtriya Rifles battalions. For detailed analysis, read my article on strengthening the counter-infiltration grid.
The second aspect of the revised operational strategy is modifying the counter-insurgency grid. This grid, manned by 62 Rashtriya Rifles battalions, has been the mainstay of counter-terrorist operations in the hinterland. Since terrorists previously operated from villages and towns, the grid was—and still is—focused on developed areas. But over the last two to three years, terrorist activities have shifted to forests and mountainous areas. Some Rashtriya Rifles battalions have not had any contact with terrorists for years. However, maintaining the grid is required as terrorists always gravitate toward voids.
Current terrorist tactics demand the extension of the grid to forests and mountainous areas. This should be done using 50 per cent of the Rashtriya Rifles battalions. The voids in the grid in developed areas must be filled by redeploying Central Armed Police Force battalions and State Armed Police battalions. If required, the Uniform Counter Insurgency Force headquarters and one Rashtriya Rifles sector with two battalions deployed in Eastern Ladakh must be brought back.
In addition to the redeployed grid, additional Special Forces battalions must be inducted to clean up the forests and mountainous areas. Per my assessment, the revised operational strategy can be implemented through bold reorganisation and redeployment of existing resources in J&K.
To reiterate, our current political and military approach in J&K is focused on conflict management. Conflict termination requires a bolder political and military strategy, and this is the opportune time to execute it.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)