For scholars, the first nine months of Donald Trump’s presidency have begun to pose serious questions of interpretation. The relative consensus among scholars of democracy has been that the United States under Trump is undergoing a process of “democratic backsliding” or “democratic erosion.” The American polity, of course, is not alone. In the literature on democracy, India under Modi, Turkey under Erdogan, and Hungary under Orbán are among the widely acknowledged cases of democratic backsliding that predate the current American experience.
But is US democracy under Trump simply backsliding? Or is the phenomenon qualitatively different? Is the United States, by any chance, going through the early phase of a right-wing revolution? How might one distinguish backsliding from the makings of a possible revolution?
Democratic backsliding as a process
Let us first look at how democratic backsliding is understood as a form of politics. In the most widely read text on the subject, How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt write:
“The erosion of democracy takes place piecemeal, often in baby steps. Each individual step seems minor—none appears to truly threaten democracy. Indeed, government moves to subvert democracy frequently enjoy a veneer of legality: They are approved by parliament or ruled constitutional by the supreme court. Many of them are adopted under the guise of pursuing some legitimate—even laudable—public objective, such as combating corruption, ‘cleaning up’ elections, improving the quality of democracy, or enhancing national security.”
In other words, backsliding is a slow but cumulative process — an accumulation of small cuts, each delivering a partial blow to democracy, but collectively resulting in decisive democratic erosion. There comes a point, as it were, at which water becomes steam. Democracy dies.
Moreover, while some democratic cuts take the form of executive decrees, many are approved by the legislature or judiciary, and are therefore wrapped in legality or procedural correctness. Institutions that are supposed to function independently — not in a partisan manner — and are meant to restrain executive excess, such as the judiciary, the intelligence apparatus, the central bank, or the election commission, end up enabling executive power instead of constraining it. The justification for such acts is often framed in terms of removing grave threats to national security or public order, arresting rampant corruption, or correcting supposed electoral irregularities.
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Democratic erosion in India, Hungary, Turkey
Consider India, where the judiciary not only failed to block the legislatively approved abrogation of Article 370 but also did not undo the suspension of Jammu and Kashmir’s status as a state within India’s federation. Or recall how the Election Commission, a constitutionally independent body, announced a quick revision of Bihar’s electoral rolls in a manner that could tilt the scales in favor of the ruling BJP-JDU coalition.
Such moves did not come in one fell swoop. Indeed, the first term of Modi’s government did not begin with such acts; it was only by the second term that the government began introducing major ideological changes. Democratic erosion in Orbán’s Hungary and Erdoğan’s Turkey also took years to consolidate.
Trump’s America: From erosion to upheaval
In Trump’s case, however, a great deal has happened within just nine months. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which for decades functioned independently, have now openly declared themselves partisan arms of the executive, tasked with bringing about a new order consistent with the aims of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) movement. Moreover, the document known as Project 25 outlines the right-wing manifesto for Trump’s second term.
Government offices dealing with development, foreign aid, disaster relief, and welfare have been significantly reduced in size or shut down altogether, while agencies associated with law enforcement have been substantially strengthened. Several immigration issues have been redefined as security threats. To deal with them, the budget of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), whose agents can now be found all across America, has been tripled.
Trump has also ordered the Armed Forces into Democrat-run cities, arguing that their main job is to fight the “enemy from within,” and that their training should henceforth take place on American streets. On his social media site, President Trump has openly asked the DOJ and FBI to prosecute “internal enemies.” Some former law enforcement officers have already been prosecuted, and Democratic politicians may be next.
The astonishing speed with which the role of government, the rule of law, and the functions of the military are being restructured suggests the beginning of a revolutionary rupture. Revolutions are generally understood as sudden and fundamental transformations of the power structure and governmental institutions. The notion of an “enemy from within” is also inherently revolutionary. Democracies deal with opponents as adversaries, not enemies.
But revolutions do not stop at governmental structures alone. They seek hegemony, extending control to every realm of society: culture, education, media, and even the family. This was as true of communist revolutions as it was of religious ones, such as Iran’s in 1979.
Trump has sought to bring America’s universities, television networks, newspapers, law firms, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations under his administration’s control, demanding subservience reinforced by threats. This drive for control is consistent with the idea of a hegemonic project.
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Why the revolutionary efforts may falter
Yet, the attempted revolution faces formidable structural limits, and is likely to falter. Three such limits can be quickly noted.
First, federalism remains a major obstacle. Roughly 36.5 per cent of the US population lives in states where both the executive and the two houses of the legislature are controlled by the Democratic Party. While the federal government is more powerful, state governments continue to wield considerable authority over law enforcement, education, and civil society.
Second, though the US Supreme Court is generally viewed as supportive of Trump’s project, the entire judiciary cannot be expected to succumb. Many judges are determinedly fighting executive overreach.
Finally, America is too diverse and the idea of free speech too deeply rooted to allow revolutionary capture and political uniformity.
In the end, America under Trump represents more than a case of democratic backsliding, but less than a revolution.
Ashutosh Varshney is Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Brown University. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)